A Fundamental Assessment of the Role of the Primacy of Existence and the Primacy of Quiddity in Explanation of Necessary Being's Not Having Quiddity Focusing on Viewpoints of Mulla Sadra and Allameh Tabatabaei

The current essay seeks to explain the role of the doctrines of “the primacy of existence” and “the primacy of quiddity” in the determination of whether or not the Necessary Being is capable of having quiddity. The main question is which doctrine, whether the primacy of existence or the primacy of quiddity, can aid us to provide a more dependable and rationally grounded interpretation of the identity of the existence and quiddity in Necessary Being and the impossibility of its having quiddity in addition to existence. Using a descriptive-analytic method, after an exploration of the distinction or indistinction between the potentiality and causality in the nature of the Necessary Being and also referring to the notions of the conditional or causal dimensions, we will show which doctrine is more efficient in proving the divine purity of the Lord in having quiddity. However, some scholars have superficially suggested that there is a fundamental difference between the viewpoints of Mulla Sadra and Allameh Tabatabaei regarding the absence of quiddity in God. This essay has sought to show that Allameh Tabatabaei's criticism addresses the structure of one of Mulla Sadra's arguments regarding the impossibility of having quiddity on the part of the Lord and, given Allameh's belief in the doctrine of "the primacy of reality", the content of Allameh's view can be seen as in line with Mulla Sadra's view.