A Typology of Moral Goodness in the Theory of Existential Proportionality

So far, there have been various explanations for moral goodness. In some of these explanations, moral goodness is not something independent of other goodnesses and can be reduced to immoral goodness. In contrast, some other explanations give an independent place to moral goodness. Each of these independence and dependence perspectives is divided into different branches. Now the question is, how is moral goodness explained in the theory of existential proportionality? The basic claim in that theory is that all moral values arise from existential proportionality and harmony. The author has explained this theory in his other works. In this article, the semantics of goodness in a broad sense is investigated step by step with the analytical method and finally, the meaning of moral goodness has been determined in its narrow sense. The result shows that goodness is a philosophical concept that is obtained from the comparison of different affairs. This philosophical concept includes some common and specific semantic elements. The two common semantic elements in all forms of goodness are affirmation and proportionality. What separates the types of goodness from each other is the specific semantic element that plays a key role in the meaning of each type of goodness. The specific semantic elements in moral goodness are admirablity and value, which cause moral goodness to be independent from other types. Also, the proportionality that leads to moral goodness or moral value is a specific one and is different from the proportionality that we deal with in other types of goodness.