Evaluation of Haecceitism from the Viewpoint of the Contemporary Analytical Philosophers’ Arguments in Defense of Haecceity

Contemporary analytical philosophers have provided arguments to prove haecceity in beings. These arguments can be divided into two general categories. The first category is called conceivability arguments and the second category is the arguments known as the Chisholm’s paradox. All these arguments seek to prove a non-qualitative feature in objects or any of the possible worlds, which can exclusively distinguish that object or possible world from other objects or possible worlds. This special non-qualitative feature is specific to haecceity. This article while touching upon both categories of arguments that have been presented so far for haecceitism, has examined the critiques offered on these arguments and came to the conclusion that none of these arguments are inviolable from the perspective of opposition to haecceitism. On the other hand, by stating the consequences and challenges encountered by the opponents of haecceitism, it has generally assessed that haecceitism is an acceptable idea despite the fact that all its arguments are unacceptable or at least debatable; because, even irrespective of the challenges faced by the opponents of haecceitism, it seems to be a more acceptable explanation for understanding the distinctions of beings from one another.