Good will and moral realism in Kant's moral philosophy

Constructivist interpreters of Kant's moral philosophy claim that all moral values and norms depend on agents and the good will create moral values. The realist interpreters of Kant's moral philosophy claim that the will and its autonomy are not incompatible with moral realism, because at least some values exist independently of agents. In this view, a detailed analysis of the good will is usually not given or it finds an unimportant role. Contrary to these two interpretations, in this paper, with an interpretive method, by explaining the fundamental meaning of good will, we discuss the compatibility of Kant's good will with moral realism, in such a way that the key role of good will is maintained. The basis of the good will is autonomy. On the one hand, autonomy is the formal condition of moral facts, and on the other hand, the end in itself is the material ground for the good will. Therefore, the good will can be considered compatible with non-natural realism, because the good will has a formal function and its material ground is an intrinsic and real value.