Refutation of Epiphenomenalism in the theory of the property dualism

The dualistic theory of the characteristic in the philosophy of mind considers human beings to be entirely physical from the point of view of substance, however, it assigns two types of characteristics to the said physical substance; Physical property and non-physical (mental) property. In the meantime, the most serious problem facing the dualists of the characteristic is the danger of them being pushed towards epiphenomenalism. epiphenomenalism does not accept the causality and effect on the physical body without rejecting the principle of realization of non-physical (mental) characteristics. As a result, in addition to making it difficult for someone who wants to bridge poperty dualism to substance dualism, the poperty dualism itself leads to monotheism. In this article, in addition to the original problems, we have presented several structural and structural problems in refuting epiphenomenalism, and at the end, we have criticized the theories that led to epiphenomenalism. Method of Study: We use analytical-rational method in this article.

It should be said about the origin of epiphenomenalism; As mentioned, the basis of epiphenomenalism is the dualism of characteristics; But it is questionable how a mental philosopher like Jackson, who designed the "cognition" argument to prove the distinction between mental and physical characteristics, has given epiphenomenalism to mental qualities and like Davidson for Mental characteristics do not have a causal role? (For further study on the change of Jackson's point of view, refer to: Martin Nida-Remilin, it can be said; The same explanatory gap that led to Cartesian essence dualism despite its admirable advantages, the same crisis occurred for attribute dualism; To say that after Descartes proposed the pineal gland in response to Elizabeth's question about the interaction between soul and body, philosophers were disappointed with the way Descartes went and instead of repairing Descartes' arguments (which was possible because Descartes' problem The failure to find a correct explanation of the causality between the mind and the brain was not the absence of any correct explanation - in this context, refer to: basically, he moved from essential dualism to homogenous, reductionist and physicalist theories such as behaviorism and functionalism.

For someone who accepts the poperty dualism, it is necessary to remove the factor called epiphenomenalism, which introduces the mental attributes as secondary matters and considers them to be ineffective especially in relation to mental matters. In the present article, in order to remove the obstacle called epiphenomenalism, we stated in the first step, despite the fact that the origin of epiphenomenalism, i.e. "physical causal layer" has been proven to be distorted, this origin cannot be the causality of mental affairs in relation to In the second step, we proved that the promise of epiphenomenalism practically destroys the dualistic structure of the attribute and once again leads it to monotheism. In the third step, we introduced five forms based on epiphenomenalism; First, the manat that neutralizes the effect of mental things on physical things, the same manat can negate the effect of physical things on the mind, which is accepted by epiphenomenalism. Secondly, believing in the doctrine of epiphenomenalism is a self-contradictory event; Because the mentioned belief is effective in epiphenomenalism behaviors. Thirdly, acceptance of epiphenomenalism makes there is practically no difference between a zombie and a real person. Fourthly, we can make a proof with present and experimental premises and prove the effect of mental things on physical things in a present-acquired (experimental) way. Fifthly, the promise of epiphenomenalism actually denies what is confirmed by empirical science, because from an empirical point of view, mental matters (regardless of whether they are physical or non-physical) affect physical matters.