Monism or Dualism about the Human Personal Identity from Viewpoint of Allamah Tabatabaei
Allamah Tabatabaei is one of the theorist philosophers in Transcendent Philosophy, whose viewpoint of the soul, including the human personal identity, has not been discussed. This article deals with Allamah Tabatabaei’s viewpoint of monism or dualism about the human personal identity. In this case, we should discuss on the relationship between the soul and body, and their mutual influence on each other, and the personal identity resulting from that. It seems that those who believe in the causal relationship between soul and body, including Allamah Tabatabaei, should believe in dualism about the soul and the body. But, according to the ontological foundations of Allamah Tabatabaei and his acceptance of substantial movement, it is concluded that the soul and the body are two levels of one gradual and fluid reality. Allamah’s ontological view of the human personal identity is the main characteristic of the structure of debate and differentiates it from other views of the way of the relationship between soul and body in the philosophy of mind. In this article, it will be clarified that Allamah’s viewpoint, in spite of its fundamental difference from other viewpoints, is nearer to substantial monism and quality-dualism.
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