China’s New Role in the Persian Gulf Region and Its Impact on the Islamic Republic of Iran

In the post-Cold War era, the international system continues to undergo a state of transition. In the emerging geopolitical landscape, the West Asia, and specifically the Persian Gulf region, occupies a unique role in the policy of major powers (e.g., the USA and China), thanks to its special geopolitical, geostrategic, and geo-economic significance, alongside its stable oil and gas reserves. China, as a growing East Asian country, has increasingly directed its focus towards strategic regions, such as the Persian Gulf, in recent decades. This shift is driven by China’s growing need to maximize its increasing power. China’s critical need for fossil resources has been a primary driver compelling the Chinese political elite to consider the Persian Gulf as a pivotal region in their foreign policy. To be more specific, since the late 1980s, China has been reliant on oil imports to sustain its economic growth and move up the global power hierarchy. This fundamental issue has, in turn, prompted Beijing to adopt a pragmatic and non-ideological perspective to consider closer collaboration with major energy actors such as the Islamic Republic of Iran (in opposition to Washington) and Saudi Arabia (in alignment with Washington). Relying on a descriptive–analytical approach, the present study endeavored to address the questions of what role China assumes in the economic and political future of the Persian Gulf region, and how it can impact Iran’s national interests.

Literature Review:

 In “China–Iran Relations Through the Prism of Sanctions,” Scita (2022) explains how China has dealt with the sanctions imposed on Iran. Scita not only delves into Beijing’s response and approach to the imposed sanctions, but also assesses the extent to which China complies with the these sanctions. The author notably argues that China–Iran relations are influenced by their relations with the US as well as their status in the international arena. In their article titled “Iran, China and the Persian Gulf: An Unfolding Engagement,” Shariatinia and Kermani (2022) address the question of how Iran views China’s growing involvement in the Persian Gulf region, particularly in light of China’s strong ties with Iran’s primary regional competitors.

Neoclassical realists posit that a country’s ambitions are primarily shaped by the capabilities of its government in the realm of foreign policy, as well as by its position in the international system. They contend that a government’s relative capability in mobilizing domestic resources forms the basis for formulating a balanced strategy in the international scene. In this light, it can be observed that conditions are indeed conducive to China’s economic growth and realization of its potential, owing to the recent significant changes in China’s foreign and domestic policies and the ensuing normalization of relations between this growing Asian country and the capitalist West. China’s vast geographic expanse, a population numbering in billions, the young and large workforce, and efficient management, have enabled China to achieve rapid and substantial economic growth. For over four decades, China has consistently maintained remarkable economic growth, averaging around 8%. However, to sustain the economic growth, China needs access to foreign markets, cheap and abundant raw materials, and notably, energy resources. Focusing on a country’s domestic capacitates and the structure of the international system (i.e., possibilities and limitations), the theory of neoclassical realism can explain the overt and covert competition between Washington and Beijing in the Persian Gulf.

The analysis revealed two scenarios about China’s presence in the Persian Gulf and its impact on Iran. The first scenario pertains to the maintenance of the status quo. In this case, the USA would continue its presence in the Persian Gulf region. If the Arab nations in the Persian Gulf trust the American presence and the alliance commitments, and the US exerts more pressure on its regional partners, it is conceivable that strategic industrial cooperation with China may be halted somehow without further progress. The second scenario revolves around the decline of the US presence in West Asia, including the Persian Gulf region. This essentially signifies the dominance of the Great Power Competition doctrine and the strategic prioritization of the Indo–Pacific region, specifically China, in American foreign policy.

What is particularly noteworthy here is the fact that the nature of the strategic relations between China and the countries in the Persian Gulf has not only placed the US in a strategic quandary in the region but has also significantly influenced Tehran–Beijing relations. Not solely relying on Iran to achieve all its regional objectives, China has tried to diversify and deepen its relations with the Arab countries in the region in order to diversify its energy supply sources. However, this approach does not imply ignoring Iran. China, given its strategic stance, has consistently aimed to maintain the most positive relations possible with Tehran, albeit at a more limited level. The findings point to the conclusion that China’s approach to the Persian Gulf region should not be viewed solely in terms of the energy economy and cooperation in the energy sector. It is also essential to analyze its implications within the context of regional security and solidarity. In fact, the Persian Gulf is recognized both as a focal point for global energy production and distribution, and one of the most unstable parts of the world.