The Development of “absolute” in German Idealism and its Relationship to the Problem of Freedom in Hegel’s Absolute Idealism

Freedom in Hegel is defined in terms of the determining power of subjectivity, i.e. by the rule “to be with oneself in the other”. Free is the one who moves in his thoughts and actions completely in accordance with the absolute thinking that has been freed from its finitude, meaning that it has become identical with being. Freedom presupposes the elevation to the “absolute” standpoint and conforming to it. Thus, it is tied to the concept of identity. Free is someone who lives (thinks and acts) in accordance with the “absolute” subjectivity. Therefore, the individual is not free as far as he/she is an individual, but only to the extent that he/she is a universal individual (absolute subjectivity). Schelling calls this position on the “absolute” simply “negative”, for it defines the “absolute” as identity-in-difference of thinking and being in accordance with absolute subjectivity or thinking. Being, what Schelling calls the positive, is supposed to be explained away according to thinking, the negative, which means that contingency should be included under necessity.Schelling, on the other hand, emphasizes that contingency takes precedence over necessity, just as Kant’s freedom takes precedence over cognitive thinking. Therefore, in Schelling, thinking sould be based on freedom. Furthermore, heunderstands freedom in relation to the divine. In this article, we will first explain the development of the Hegelian “absolute” in connection with its history in German idealism; Then we will unpack its implications for freedom. After that, we will point out Schelling’s criticism of the Hegelian “absolute”, and finally give a perspective of a non-Hegelian model for freedom.