Studying the epistemological status of memory from the viewpoint of Matthew Frise and Allameh Mohammad Hossein Tabatabai

Sensational perception, reason, testimony and introspection are the fundamental sources of knowledge. It has been much debated that memory is one of the basic sources of knowledge. This article aims to apply the perspective of Frise and Allameh Tabatabai about the epistemological status of memory with an analytical approach. In this essay, we try to answer the questions raised such as, is the memory one of the sources of belief production? Do memory beliefs justify other beliefs? Are memory beliefs self-justified or do they need justification? This article shows that by relying on the epistemological function of memory, Frise considered it as a source of belief production, by which those beliefs can be used in the structure of reasoning. While unifying memory and imagination, relying on the reductionist approach of powers, Allameh Tabatabi has considered imagination as the source of partial beliefs, so that it performs this action with the cooperation of common sense and communication with the outside world. Both philosophers believe that memory is just like a repository whose epistemological status is meaningful in preserving the justified beliefs. Also, from the view point of Frise and Allameh Tabatabai, memory beliefs are among self-justified and basic beliefs that are used to justify non-memory beliefs. Therefore, the view point of these two thinkers can be closed to the reformed foundationalism approach.