The Temporal Shape of Perceptual Experiences

This paper delves into the ontological nature of perceptual experiences, seeking to categorize them within a metaphysical framework. Contrary to the orthodox debates about the content and phenomenal character of experiences this discussion examines their underlying nature as belonging to ontological categories. The common perspective considers perceptual experiences as mental events whose content represents the world. Despite this, the question remains whether these experiences can be ontologically classified as events. At first, this paper accounts for Alex Byrne's view, which disputes reasons based on ordinary language and introspection for classifying perceptual experiences as events. Byrne then compares perceptual experiences to propositional attitudes and beliefs, suggesting an alternative view. Thus, experiences are not events at all but rather states that, like beliefs, relate the subject to content. It appears that Byrne, by proposing this, firstly acknowledges the ontological distinction between states and events and secondly, gives precedence to the notion of perceptual experiences as states. By examining the temporal structures of phenomena (temporal shape), I address whether the distinction between different categories, including events and states, is ontological or merely different ways of expressing our descriptions of phenomena in language. Through discussions on the issue of the persistence of physical objects, I ultimately conclude that determination at the moment can serve as a good criterion for distinguishing the two categories of state/event. Finally, I will argue that experiential properties are dynamic, and their instantiation by the subject places perceptual experiences in the category of occurrents, specifically events.