The Evolutionary Tripartite Game of the Government, Mine Management, and Miners in Ensuring the Safety of Mines

In order to investigate the relationship between the management and executive components of the mine and to improve the safety level of the system, this paper introduces a new method for evaluating and managing the safety of the mining system. For this purpose, game theory has been used to solve mining safety issues. Game theory is a structured tool that can examine interactions between two or more players to understand their actions in certain situations. In this  paper, evolutionary game is used because of expressing the dynamics of relationships between players. The introduced model simulates the interactions between the government, managers, and miners under different conditions; also,the influence of regulatory factors on them in the system is evaluated. The results show that the effect of each factor on system safety is different and players affect the system safety according to each regulatory factor. Among these factors, the influence of punishments applied by game supervisors on the behavior of the mine management and mine workers was the greatest. So that with the increase of fines, the players adopted strategies aligned with safe production in a short time. Subsequently, the impact of government incentives was also investigated and it was determined that in exchange for increasing the reward factor to the management and mine workers, a change in strategy and safe production will be established in the mine.