Higher-Order Theories concerning Consciousness

It is not an easy task to provide an explanation for “phenomenal consciousness”; and that is why the problem of consciousness is called “the hard problem of consciousness”. Since explanation of representational (intentional) mental states is free from conceptual challenges, many philosophers seek to reduce the problem of consciousness to representation in order to solve the problem. Representational theories concerning mind may be divided into two general groups: “first order representation” and “higher-order theories”. In the present article, the author speaks of higher-order theories. In these theories, consciousness is identified with the higher order states representing first order ones. This higher order state may be “thought” or “perception”; the former is called the theory of “higher order thought” and the latter is called the theory of “higher order perception”. The theory of higher order thought comes, in turn, in three versions: theory of actual and relative higher order thought; theory of dispositional higher order thought; and the theory of essential higher order thought (extensive essentiality). Recently, a new higher order view has been introduced which is known as “theory of higher order radial states”, and is somehow similar to “extensive essentiality”. In the present article the author discusses general arguments for higher order theories (against first order representationalism”, arguments posed by each higher order version against other rival versions, and objections to each of them. In conclusion, the author will describe general objections to all higher order theories.