Rationality in Pragmatism of Richard Rorty

The common interpretation of natural sciences is that such sciences are, in terms of their particular methodology or particular relation to reality, other than other fields; and they are regarded as the pattern of rationality. According to Rorty who rejects in principle distinction between natural sciences and other sciences, difference between rational and irrational has nothing to do with difference between methodologies of sciences; and in his rationality, humanities are not excepted. Instead of traditional quest for an absolute criterion for rationality, he advances the issue of attempt to make network of beliefs consistent and transparent in the course of dialogue. The present article presupposes that Rorty's approach may be in principle understood within an anti-Platonic framework. At the same time, Rorty's pragmatist view will be, with some sympathy, explained; and his positions concerning weak and strong versions of scientific rationality will be introduced. It will be shown that Rorty's rationality is nearer to the weak version of scientific rationality.