A Critical Analysis of Kant's Idea about the Nature of Truth

Kant’s theory of truth is of great import because of his influence on the developments in the field of theory of knowledge in the last three centuries. He wrote his Critique of Pure Reason to answer the question of the relation between the object and the subject of knowledge. The correspondence theory was the single official theory about the nature of truth before Kant. That is why both rationalists and empiricists –despite their main differences— shared the idea of subject-object dualism. Barkley was an exception who walked over the boundaries of realism into the realm of idealism. Kant has no firm position in this regard. In his Prolegomena, he accepts noumena-phenomena dualism, while in his Critique of Pure Reason, he does not acknowledge an independent status for phenomena in the mind. However, he insists on the lack of knowledge of noumena and on epistemic priority of subject over object. In this way, Kant does not believe in the correspondence theory of truth, and is considered the founder of the coherence theory of truth. The author in this article tries to shed light of different aspects of Kant’s theory of truth and to criticize its claim as well as Kant’s arguments for it.