Scientifc Discontniuty; Semantic Incommensurability or Causal Theory of Reference?

Shifting from one scientific paradigm to another one, the sense of common term between two paradigms changes. It means that the role of the concept to which the common term designates is different within the conceptual networks of the different paradigms. Kuhn infers that since the conceptual networks of the two paradigms are distinct, two paradigms are semantically incommensurable. This type of incommensurability, like its other types – methodological and perceptual/observational – has been severely challenged and criticized by philosophers. One of the competing theses for semantic incommensurability is the causal theory of reference which is advanced by Kripke and Putnam. In this paper, I consider the consequences of these two theses in the case of scientific dis/continuity. I introduce two criteria for scientific discontinuity according to each of these theses and study the behaviors of the introduced criteria in two case studies of scientific concepts of planet and phlogiston. After that, I suggest alternative imaginary situations for the mentioned cases and again observe the behaviors of the criteria. According to these case studies, I will conclude that though semantic incommensurability advances a chauvinistic criterion regarding comparison of scientific paradigms and explanation of scientific changes, the causal theory of reference – as its competitor – can not offer a remarkable explanation for changes in the meaning of scientific terms and describe the birth, life and elimination of these terms as random events which are dependent to the personal decisions of members of scientific community.