Study of Kripke's skeptical argument and reply and some reactions to it

Through his own reading of Wittgenstein's teachings in Philosophical Investigations, Kripke develops a skeptical argument on the basis of the concept of "rule-following". Then, he refers again to the later Wittgenstein's teachings, and provides a skeptical reply. It seems that the argument is aimed to challenge the realistic approach to "meaning" and, generally speaking, to provide an alternative picture of the way that "meaning" is attributed and statements are acknowledged. Skeptical argument is based on the thesis of normativity of meaning. Assuming such a thesis, Kripke's skeptic concludes that "if I believe in semantic realism, I will not be able to find a fact showing that, using various words, I have intended (and intend) to communicate some meaning; for, there is no such a fact at all, thus there is no meaning". According to the realistic approach to meaning, only if we can find the truth-condition of the said sentence, we will be able to speak of its truth, falsity, and meaning. In the present writing, skeptical argument, its consequences, and presumptions will be posed; and then Kripke's skeptical reply will be introduced. In this regard, the author has tried to, at first, provide a proper formulation of his argument, and then he introduces, on the basis of this formulation, possible solutions for such a skepticism. Then, he will discuss the conflict between this skepticism and semantic realism. In what follows, he will try to discuss some of the most important characteristics, consequences, and threats of this argument in some fields; in doing so, he will show some possible defects in Kripke's non-realism.