نشریه جاویدان خرد
سال یازدهم شماره 2 (پیاپی 26، پاییز و زمستان 1393)

The theory of religious pluralism is a new approach in religious studies and wasn’t prevalent in the period of ibnʿArabī and Mawlana Rumī. It is, nevertheless, possible to understand their views on the truth of religions by focusing on their works.In this paper, by appeal to the works of ibnʿArabī and Mawlana Rumī in a descriptive-analytical way, we attempt to evaluate their views on the truth of religions and compare them with the theory of religious pluralism.It appears that their views have some pluralistic contents, although they have significant difference with it. Despite their belief that some truth can be found in all religions and can’t be treated as wholly false, but on the other hand they maintain that Islam includes the most complete truth. In fact according to pantheism, they consider truth as comprising various degrees which the highest degree of it can be found in Islam.

Intermediary in ibnʿArabī’s view, is the most basic ontological attribute for imagination in a way that other ontological attributes of imagination can be reduced to this principle. Since in this view, imagination is domain and the present of existential presents of god, it might be asked from ontological point of view how intermediary has manifested in the reality of imagination and where is its origin? In this paper, by appeal to two components, i.e. eternal essences and manifestation as two basic principles of ibnʿArabī’s metaphysics, the manifestation of intermediary will be reduced to the existential status of eternal essences and the metaphysical structure of them in a manner that since the existential status of eternal essences has an intermediary-like status, the same status will be appeared in other degrees of manifestation.

The name of Abulqāsim Mīr Findiriskī, the Safavid philosopher, is more reminiscent of his famous ode known as Qaṣīda-ye Yā'īyya. Some authors have written commentaries on this work and again some poets have quinted it. Due to Mīr Findiriskīs's fame, some poems are attributed to him at times, but clearly we know that such attributions are incorrect. Mīr Findiriskī has written some other poems on the margin of his treatises and this has led some scholars to assume that these poems belong to him, an assumption that we shall refute. A group of these poems belong to poets whose lives and works are known to us while there are others that are composed by unknown poets. Thus, the attribution of these poems to Mīr Findiriskī requires further investigation. In this paper, we compile both the complete corpus of his poetry as well as those poems attributed to him. We attempt to introduce his scattered poems by appealing to his life and thoughts and thoroughly studying manuscripts. These poems, which are edited and introduced for the first time, can shed light on Mīr Findiriskī's life in Iran and India, inform us about his spiritual state at the time the composition of these poems and broaden our knowledge of the Safavid period.

Aristotle's project in Metaphysics is to investigate being, qua being. He searches the principles and the causes of beings as such. He intends to explain why the beings exist, and what does existence for each being. Both essence and substratum can provide a basis for explaining the existence in different way. The problem Aristotle has faced here is that on the one hand the combination of essence and substratum is real at least in material substances, on the other hand substance which is basis for existence is supposed to be unitary and prior. In analyzing and answering to this problem Aristotle uses potentiality. The thing which exists, i.e. substratum and the thing that a being comes into existence by it, i.e. essence are not disparate, rather they are two modes of one thing: mode of being potential and actual. Thus, although the combination (of matter and form) is real, it does not contradict with the unity of substance, since one is the actuality of the other. What provides us with the response to explain the existence of the material substances is "potentiality".

"the Goals of Metaphysics" is a philosophical treatise of Fārābī which is short like the other works of his. Although it is a short one, it consists of prominent matters and can be deemed to be a turning point in the analysis of the definition and the subject matter of metaphysics. Since this treatise had a great influence on representing the definition and the subject matter of metaphysics in metaphysical system of Avicenna and he himself acknowledges in his autobiography his debt to it in understanding the goal of Aristotle's metaphysics, it became strikingly well-known. Perhaps this treatise can be deemed as a principle of Avicenna's metaphysics and Islamic philosophy.This critical edition has been done on the basis of 5 manuscripts. 4 of them preserved in Iranian libraries and 1 preserved in "Raghib Pasha" library in Turkey.

My aim in this paper is to show an inconsistency in Umberto Eco's semantic of fictional names as presented in his latest book: Confessions of a Young Novelist. To prepare the ground for my intervention, I first of all give a summary of Kripke's view on proper and fictional names, then I retrieve and record Ibn-Sina's view on proper names as purely denotative and his version of so-called causal theory of proper names. At the end I show, hopefully, a way out of Eco's seemingly conflicting views.

The application of imagination in ontological and epistemological debates of mysticism is always the center of researchers’ attention in philosophical and intuitive knowledge. Among them, imagination has a great role in realization and explanation of many unveilings of mystic. In explaining this issue, Suhrawardī and Mulla Ṣadrā have divided the imagination into conjoined and separated. Conjoined imagination is one of the human’s intrinsic force and the sustainer of imaginative forms and separated imagination is an independent world which is between the world of intellect and the world of sense. In Mulla Ṣadrā’s view, the mystic’s soul by an inner conduct can be united with the separated imagination through conjoined imagination and unveil the ideal forms which have been descended to the conjoined imagination. The outcome of this unveiling is the unity of the soul with its object of witnessing and having an immediate knowledge of it. Suhrawardī considers imagination as a material force and doesn’t embrace the cognation of this with the Idea. But since he believes soul is the main perceiver of Ideal forms, therefore his explanation of the realization of formal unveiling is logical.