نشریه متافیزیک
سال ششم شماره 2 (پیاپی 18، پاییز و زمستان 1393)

Intuition has a central role in philosophy، the role to arbitrating between different opinions. When a philosopher shows that «intuition» supports his view، he thinks this is a good reason for him. In contrast، if we show some contraries between intuition and a theory or some implications of it، we think a replacement or at least some revisions would be needed. There are some well-known examples of this role for intuition in many fields of philosophy; the transplant case in ethics، the chinese nation case in philosophy of mind and the Gettier examples in epistemology. But there is an assumption here; we suppose all people think in same manner، i. e. we think intuition (s) is universal. Experimental philosophy tries to study this assumption experimentally. This project continues Quine's movement to «pursuit of truth» from a naturalistic point of view and making epistemology «as a branch of natural science.» The work of experimental philosophy shows that in many cases people with different cultural backgrounds reflect to some specific moral or epistemological cases –like Gettier examples- differently and thus intuition is not universal. So، many problems that are based on this assumption maybe dissolved، have plural forms for plural cultures or bounded to some specific cultures –western culture in many cases.

Aristotle's understanding of Presocratic philosophers and his interpretation of their theses based on his own framework has always been a matter of dispute among scholars. His role of representing them as one of the main sources of Presocratic philosophy makes this is more. Here in this paper we try to investigate, analyzing Metaphysics, Physics and Generation and Destruction, how Aristotle interprets all the Presocratics in the same way and based on his own framework. He understands their arche as a simple element came out of nothing and constructing all other things and even considers it as substance while every other thing as accident which is obviously on the basis of his own distinction. He also interprets their change on the basis of his own distinction between change on the one hand and generation and destruction on the other that is itself based on the substance-accident distinction. All these show that he interprets them Aristotelian and this is what we should be aware of while we look at Presocratic philosophers through Aristotle.

Persian miniature was showing itself as dynamic during dialogue with “other” visual traditions (Specially Eastern ones). But it seems that meet renaissance painting was a kind of “encounter” to a strange matter for it. The most substantial part of this encounter is incompatibility of whose perception of space. Since that the conception of space is related to basic principle of representation. What this paper has focused on, is “the reason” of this encounter. With the help of philosophical approach this paper is trying to answer the question. So is to shed light on metaphysics foundation that make possible rise of conception of space in both side. By using the conception of “the mathematical” in Heidegger philosophy, it is shown that how ascend of modern metaphysic was lead to quantitative perception of space in renaissance painting, and at the other hand how using a qualitative perception of space in Persian miniature opposing to modern perspective of space.

This paper aims to illustrate the mutual inter-relation of physics and metaphysics in the context of the philosophy of space and time. We especially emphasize, in this paper, that scientific development could impact on our position regarding the reality of space and time. To illustrate this point, we investigate the mutual inter-relation of physics and metaphysics in the modern developments of physics, i.e. neo-Newtonian structure, special and general relativity (GR). This paper ends up anticipating that it is likely, by considering modern physics, especially GR, that substantivalism to be a more defensible position.

In de Interpretatione Aristotle says about antiphasis (pair of sentences that are contradictory) that necessarily one of them is true and the other is false but later in chapter ix tells this thesis doesn’t hold about future contingent singulars because otherwise we shall commit to determinism but determinism is not acceptable then the rule under discussion, doesn’t hold about future contingent singulars. There are several interpretations of this passage. Traditional interpreters say that here Aristotle denies the principle of excluded middle and/or bivalence. Another common interpretation is that Aristotle wants to note that necessity of the disjunction (that represent excluded middle) doesn’t entail that one of the disjunct is necessary. The first interpretation is more successful in dealing with determinism but not consistent with other ideas of Aristotle. The second interpretation, however, does not succeed alone against determinism, but is consistent with other views of Aristotle. I think that Aristotle's main goal in this passage is not an argument against determinism but he tries to block the way of concluding determinism from his ideas about antiphasis. Non-traditional interpretation is more successful in representing this concern.