مجله فلسفه و کلام اسلامی
سال چهل و هشتم شماره 2 (پاییز و زمستان 1394)

The attribute of Divine Wisdom is applied in Shi‘ite Theology to prove some religious beliefs. Shi‘ite theologians believe that providing the tools needed to achieve the Divine Purpose of the human beings’ creation and removing the obstacles to it is necessary to God. Using logical analyses, this research investigates the sufficiency of the arguments based on Divine Wisdom in relation to the problems of the principle of Divine Grace, Divine Justice, the necessity of prophecy, the Imamate, and the resurrection. It seems that these arguments, because of having their roots in Divine Purpose, are not sufficient to prove the results.

The contemporary philosopher of religion, William Leonard Rowe (1931-), with emphasis on gratuitous evil, has tried to show a new version of an evidential argument from evil against God. In this article we, first, try to show a detailed description and documentation of Rowe’s views and, then, have some critical remarks on it. In describing his views, we try to reveal properly the evolution of Rowe’s ideas, according to his critics’ views and his thought reformations. We have shown that the Rowe’s efforts to conclude the existence of actual gratuitous evils from the existence of the some seemingly gratuitous ones is not correct, and that not to find the justification for some evils does not imply that they do not have any plausible justification at all.

The theories concerning the issue of the soul are so various in the history of philosophy. The nature of the soul, its originatedness or eternity and quality of its relationship with the body are the most controversial issues in philosophical and theological discussions. Ibn Sina, as a Peripatetic philosopher, in most of his writings, has accepted the Aristotle's views on the originatedness of the soul, but in some mystical treatises and also in his work Qasidat al-Ayniyah, there are phrases which do imply his tendency to the Platonic view of the eternity of the soul. This raises a problematic for commentators of Ibn Sina, namely, how these two apparently contradictory views can be justified. The present paper examines the issue with descriptive-analytic approach. It seems that there had been no change in Ibn Sina’s views in his oriental philosophy, and that he remains faithful to his previous thesis on the originatedness of the soul. Therefore, there is no difference between the Peripatetic and illuminationist p[hilosophical approaches of Ibn Sina on the issue of the soul.

For the first time in the history of logic, Abd al Razzaq Al-Jili (d. 570/1174), in the treatise Al-Lame fi al-Shakl al-Rabe, dealt with the modal syllogisms of the fourth figure. Previous to him, Dinha, the priest, and Ibn Salah Al-hamadani had discussed the non-modal moods of the fourth figure. Jili’s treatise deals only with simple modalities and ignores the complex ones. His pupil, Fakhr al-Din Al-Razi, like his master, neglected the complex moods of the figure, but denied Al-Jili’s modalities for three moods. Al-Razi’s pupil, Zayn al-Din Al-Kashshi, developed the complex moods of the fourth figure. After Afzal al-Din Al-Khunaji realized that negative particulars have conversions in some complex modalities, Athir al-Din Al-Abhari discovered three new valid moods in the modal fourth figure.

Ibn Sina speaks repeatedly of the distinction between the specific (khas) being and the positive (ijabi) being; a distinction on the basis of which is his distinction of being and essence. Thence, the famous problem of the distinction of being and essence is applicable to this distinction too. The difficulty is this: if the specific being is 'being'? This is indeed a problem about essence: is there any sense of being present in Ibn Sina’s understanding of essence? Based on the relation of the specific being to positive being, possible being, thingness, and essence, this paper is trying to explain that the distinction between specific and positive being in Ibn Sina is, indeed, a distinction between two aspects of being in its Greek sense; a distinction on the basis of which is the famous distinction of being and essence and has not been focused on in Greek philosophy.

As one of the most unfathomable mysteries human beings encounter with, death has always been one of the main concerns of great scholars and one of the major teachings of monotheistic religions. Augustine is one of the great scholars who reflect upon and talk about death. Interestingly, we do not face with a particular definition of death in Augustine’s works. As a Platonic philosopher, he considers death as the separation of spirit from the body; As a Christian theologian, however, he opines that death is the consequence of sin and distance from God. In his works, one can find both some specific characteristics of natural death as well as characteristics of intentional death, which has an obvious manifestation in Augustine’s own life. Even though he endeavors to know and introduce the nature and varieties of death, his sayings signify his inability to the knowledge of this great existential enigma. It is why that he wishes Adam and Eve had not captivated us with this predicament.

If we discover an adequate naturalistic explanation for religious experience, will it diminish its evidentiary value? In response to this question, many thinkers such as C.D. Broad, Richard Swinburne and William Wainwright argue that an adequate naturalistic explanation cannot diminish religious experience evidentiary value unless it can be demonstrated that there is no God. In contrary to this, some such as Jeff Jordan insisted that the discovery of such explanation results in diminishing of its evidentiary value even though it cannot be demonstrated that there is no God. In this article, having examined the two views, I suggest a third one, according to which, there are two kinds of religious experiences, according to one, the religious experience has evidentiary value even though it can be explained naturalistically too.