فصلنامه تاریخ فلسفه
سال ششم شماره 4 (پیاپی 24، بهار 1395)

Kant, the modern philosopher, believes that the development of Man’s moral life depends on designing a moral system the principles of which are based on reason and objectivity. In this way, it would be free from any kind of subjectivity and personal bias, which damaged the moral system of his period. The only proposition which enjoys these features is the categorical imperative. Now, the problem is how Kant justifies the objectivity and truth of this imperative. Another question is how this problem is answered in Mulla Sadra’s Islamic philosophy. In his Critique of Practical Reason, Kant maintains that practical matters are rooted in the moral law and tries to justify them by resorting to practical reason and the notion of freedom. Although Kant’s discussions in the field of philosophy of ethics proceed in a way to demonstrate nomena and, particularly, freedom, he considers them to be among axioms. This means that the reality of practical reason and freedom only justify the practical possibility of moral experience and other practical fields. In other words, admitting the reality of the intellect and freedom is merely based on belief and faith, consequently, moral propositions are rational rather than cognitional. In Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent Philosophy, practical propositions in individual and social fields are developed based on practical reason while attending to its relationship with theoretical reason. Moreover, the realms of both theory and practice stem from the innermost of the soul and are known through presential knowledge. As a result, all mental and rational perceptions are related to the truth of the good and its grades as an ontological affair. In this way, the objectivity and truth of these propositions are justified not based on certain axioms but by resorting to the possibility of the presential knowledge of the world of fact-itself. In this paper, the writer has tried to discuss the truth and objectivity of propositions in practical philosophy through employing a comparative method and the analysis of the philosophical principles of Kant and Mulla Sadra in order to highlight the importance of the principles of the Transcendent Philosophy.

Mas‘ud Motaharinasab; PhD candidate of Political Sciences, University of Isfahan
A review of scientific and methodological dialogs dominating Islamic civilization during the last periods, particularly in the third and fourth centuries (AH), and their explanation and analysis could play a significant role in creating a modern Islamic civilization. The purpose of this paper is to clarify and analyze the scientific methodology of Ibn Sina and Aburayhan Biruni in order to expose the nature of the scientific and methodological dialogs of that period of civilization. A comparative study of the methodology of these two thinkers demonstrates that, following the Aristotelian logic, Ibn Sina attached more importance to deduction than to induction. However, Aburayhan was mainly interested in empirical and inductive methods and performed more professional and field studies. He even criticized Ibn Sina for his extreme emphasis on his rational method. Another difference between these two philosophers stems from the fact that Biruni did not confine himself to a pre-determined philosophical structure, whereas Ibn Sina initially defended the structure of Aristotelian philosophy to some extent. However, He finally distanced himself from Aristotle in his al-Isharat wa’l-tanbihat and Oriental Wisdom. Still another difference between the two is said to be that Ibn Sina believed that whatever we hear might be possible, but Biruni maintained that whatever we hear must be denied first unless its opposite is proved through reasoning and argumentation (this judgment has been criticized by many thinkers).

Ibn Arabi is one of the prominent figures in the field of theoretical gnosis in the world of Islam. He enjoys a unique status among Muslim gnostic-writers thanks to his benefitting from the legacy of distinguished Muslim and, particularly, Iranian gnostics, on the one hand, and the philosophical legacy of Muslim thinkers of the West, especially, of Seville, on the other hand. The cultural center of Andalusia, which was the philosophical meeting point of Islamic gnosis with Christian gnosis and, especially, Jewish gnosis for centuries, clearly reflects Ibn Arabi’s influence over these gnostic schools and indicates the necessity of making a continuous effort at gaining a thorough knowledge of the different aspects of his thoughts and works. From among all his works, Fusus al-hikam seems to be the best criterion for learning about Ibn Arabi because this great book provides a trustworthy account of the history of Islamic gnosis and Andalusia. Several commentators have commented on Fusus al-hikam, but not all of them have praised the writer, and some of them have even criticized his ideas in their commentaries. Nevertheless, all of them have praised the magnificence of his thoughts in this work. The present paper casts an analytic glance at Ibn Arabi’s character and examines this book based on the ideas of its writer and commentators in terms of form and content. It is hoped that the findings of this study can pave the way for more comparative research in the interreligious atmosphere of Andalusia and contribute to a better understanding of this distinguished figure of the Andalusia school as the crossroad of cultures.

The truth and its meaning have always been discussed by gnostics and philosophers in the course of history. Philosophers have mainly dealt with truth in its logical sense; however, some philosophers, such as Mulla Sadra in Islamic philosophy and Heidegger in Western philosophy, have paid attention to truth in its ontological sense, which is very close to Islamic gnostics’ particular impression of this word. The meaning of truth in gnostics’ view is greatly influenced by its meaning in the Qur’anic and traditional culture. One of the divine names mentioned in the Holy Qur’an is the “Truth”, and Almighty God has called Himself by this name. Some philosophers such as Ibn Arabi used to refer to Qur’anic verses and traditions in order to consolidate their religion. Muslim gnostics concede that there is only one truth in the world, and it is the Necessary Being. They believe that any existent other than Him is mentally-posited and is among the manifestations of that simple Truth. That is why gnostics, themselves, consider the religion of the philosophers who believe in the graded unity of existence to be atheistic and believe in the individual and true unity of existence. Hence, they view closeness to the truth as the only way to attain it and have always been after some ways in order to gain proximity to that original Truth. On the other hand, gnostics consider the human soul to be the most complete locus of the manifestation of God; therefore, the first step in Islamic gnosis in order to attain the knowledge of God is to attain the knowledge of the soul. Ibn Arabi also believes that wayfaring towards God is of vital importance for learning about that single Truth.

The main question advanced in this paper is as follows: Which specific criterion is used to distinguish the problems of prime philosophy from each other. Another related question here is whether Islamic philosophers really employ this criterion or not. A review of the works of Greek philosophers, particularly Aristotle, indicates that Aristotle’s words regarding the subject of prime philosophy are diverse and divided. It also reveals that the problems of prime philosophy have not been inferred and formulated with reference to a specific subject in an organized manner. In spite of the entrance of Greek philosophy and all its concomitants into the world of Islam, Islamic philosophers, especially Ibn Sina, tried to explain the subject of prime philosophy and its problems, dissect the relationship between them, and provide a criterion for distinguishing philosophical problems from the problems of other sciences. They often considered the subject of prime philosophy to be existent qua existent and assumed that its problems include predicates which are deemed to be among the essential accidents of pure existents. Therefore, the main criterion for identifying the problems of prime philosophy and distinguishing them from each other was introduced as follows: the predicates of those problems had to be essential accidents for absolute existents. Nevertheless, in reality, these philosophers discussed some problems the predicates of which did not follow this rule. A study of the works of Aristotle and Islamic philosophers reveals that the secret of this ambiguity is hidden in an approach according to which they firstly divided theoretical sciences into three categories: natural sciences, mathematics, and prime philosophy. Then, in reality, they transferred the problems that could not be discussed in the other two sciences to the domain of prime philosophy while the equivalence of their predicates with essential accidents for existent qua existent were questionable. The present paper aims to analyze and explain the above claims in detail based on reliable documents and arguments and disclose the main reason behind the lack of conformity between the problems and the subject of prime philosophy in the history of Islamic philosophy.

In this paper, the writer has explored the philosophy of language in Suhrawardi in the mould of the “gradation of word” with reference to his books, treatises, and allegorical stories. In so doing, he has initially conducted a meticulous study of Suhrawardi’s books, treatises, and stories, as first-hand sources, as well as some second-hand sources which have commented on Ishraqi or Illuminationist philosophy or in which some words have been written on language and its nature. After collecting and classifying the required data, he has analyzed them thoroughly. The content analysis of the collected points has led to the discovery of a fact called “gradation of language” or, to put it more clearly, “gradation of words”. The results of this study also reveal that, following a reductionist approach, Suhrawardi bases his philosophy of language on “word”, considers three general, ontological, and luminous levels for it, and calls them “major words”, “middle words”, and “minor words”. Major words are at the top of this ontological hierarchy; middle words are in the middle, and minor words are at its lowest level. These words are issued from Almighty Truth through the “supreme word” and are the origins of creation in the world of being or the world of possibility. In the process of creation, the Truth, the Necessary Being, or the Light of Lights initially created the “supreme word”. This word, similar to the Light of Lights, the Necessary Being, or God, is one and immaterial; however, it is lower than God in terms of level and luminosity. This is because there is no light or word beyond God. The supreme word is an equivalent to the “most approximate light” in Suhrawardi’s Illuminationist philosophy and “the first intellect” in the Peripatetic philosophy of Farabi and Ibn Sina. It is noted that from the lights of this word are created some other major words. Based on the written texts on Illuminationist philosophy, the “last major word” is Gabriel, the Active Intellect, or the Tenth Intellect. The word Gabriel or the Holy Spirit has resulted in the making of some lower level words called middle and minor words. In Illuminationist wisdom, middle words are equivalent to the nine-fold heavenly souls and are at a level lower than major words. Minor words, which come into being from the illumination of the word Gabriel or the Active Intellect are equivalent to human rational souls. This paper is intended to examine each of these words in detail.

The present paper investigates the functions of reason in the realm of religion in the kalami thoughts of Qadi Abd al-Jabbar Mu‘tazili and Qadi Abubakr Baqillani following a descriptive-analytic method. In doing so, it compares and examines the rational approaches of both thinkers to the interpretation of the Qur’an and applications of reason in inferring religious principles. The results of this study indicate that what distinguishes these two great figures from each other more than anything else is their approach to reason and the quality of its relationship with revelation. Qadi Abd al-Jabbar believes in the priority of reason and rational arguments and always resorts to reason as a tool for gaining knowledge in his kalami perception of religion. Sometimes, in cases where rational judgment is in contrast to the exoteric meaning of Qur’anic verses and traditions, he even gives the priority to reason with no reservation and firmly interprets or negates the validity of propositions which stand against reason. However, preferring tradition to the intellect and granting priority to the descended texts, including the Qur’an, traditions, and those on the acts of the Prophet’s companions are the most important epistemological principles of Baqillani. However, his philosophical system, in fact, marked the beginning of Ash‘arite kalam’s treatment of rational premises. The Ash‘arite considered rational principles to depend on beliefs and, thus, believed that it was first necessary to have faith in their content.