نشریه پژوهش های فلسفی
پیاپی 18 (بهار و تابستان 1395)

Every culture has its own conception of poetry and approaches it differently. This paper draws on phenomenological approach, in specific that of Mikel Dufrenne, to compare it with Structuralism’s approach. Dufrenne makes use of two Husserlian concepts, noema and noesis, to show the difference between these two approaches to poetry. He contends that Structuralist commentaries does not provide much in terms of enjoying and understanding poetry because it says almost nothing to get us in close touch with the lived experience of poet and the world of his work. Phenomenological approach, on the contrary, moves from noema toward noesis and as such gives a way to the world of the work and yields an aesthetic understanding of it. Dufrenne sees the world of the work not as represented but instead as a world that can be traced back to poet’s lived experience to which Structuralist rules grant no access. Based on a comparative-analysis method, this paper would compare these two approaches.

In this essay through a brief sketch of Husserl’s thesis about time-consciousness, especially concentrating on its third level, it has been argued that a turn has been taken during his last reflections on time published in the C-Manuskripte in his phenomenology in general and his phenomenology of time in particular. That is to say, by holding the view that the absolute consciousness is temporal character and denying his earlier conception of a non-temporal point for consciousness as keystone of philosophy as a rigorous science, has abandoned three decades of seeking to founding transcendental philosophy; and indeed his dream of philosophy as a rigorous science is over. Therefore, the philosophical tradition that had begun with Descartes and aimed to base the edifice of knowledge on the rigorous, undoubtable and unchangeable ground, comes to end in Husserl’s phenomenology, its last heir, and thus clears the way for the appearance of a new version of phenomenology in the works of the frequent thinkers of this movement.

The purpose of this article is to representthe obvious understanding of the challenging concept of a science of the life-world in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology and meaning of this project by Husserl. Hereof, first is very important to perpend distinction and yet relationship between the objective science and the life-world then it seems inevitable to reflect on steps to this transcendental science including epochs of the objective science, epochs ofa science of the life-world and transcendental reduction. Here, the main focus lays onthe possibility of a science of the life-world project with tow attitude a reflective and a non-reflective. In the first attitude be accomplished the universal structures of the life-world in format of anontologyofthelife-world and in the second attitude be discovered on Husserl's transcendental turn on the life-world and its manner-of-givenness the transcendental solidarity between the world and the world consciousness.

This paper presents dialectical relation between conditions of objectivity and its foundational components in philosophy of Husserl. Above distinction results from grounds and locations of objectivity in Husserl. This dialectical relation that leads to reduction of conditions and components together, and without considering them the verification of objectivity of knowledge and its objects is impossible, required the flexible essence of transcendental consciousness. For displaying the dialectical relation the review of transcendental consciousness is necessary. The essence of consciousness is the intentionality of it. The other properties of consciousness results from the intentionality. Conditions of objectivity are related to the noetic pole of consciousness and components of objectivity to the noematic pole of it.

Mikel Dufrenne, French phenomenologist philosopher, has elaborated a systematic description of the aesthetic experience in some of his works, especially his most important book, The Phenomenology ofAesthetic Experience. This article addresses an orientation that outlines his phenomenology of art: giving priority to the original sense of the word "aesthetics", i.e. perception (aisthesis) as the integral and irreplaceable element of the aesthetic experience. Dufrenne does this mainly by distinguishing aesthetic object from work of art. In this article, it is shown how this distinction leads to the originality of the sensuous (le sensible) in the aesthetic experience. At the same time, it is explained that Dufrenne's emphasis on sensibility and the sensuous in aesthetic experience is not meant to deny or underestimate the cognitive elements in the experience. However, according to Dufrenne, these elemens are immanent in the sensuous and could not be found and grasped without it. In other words, what can be said "in" work of art, can be said only "by" work of art.

By reducing the history and actuality of things, phenomenology attains to pure phenomena, and so it makes its special realm itself. But we would lose the world by phenomenological reduction, and we must acquire the world by phenomenological constitution, beginning from eidoses. As we would demonstrate, consequences of eidetic reduction are beyond remedy. Parallel to reduction of the world, the transcendental ego would reduce to absolute ego (eidos ego) too, and so we lose the clue of the constitution of the world. Heidegger noticed the problem so soon, and by taking worldliness primitive, attained to a different understanding of the world and subject (Dasein). In this article, alongside analyzing the causality and its relation to the world and transcendental ego, we would consider this problem and the way of departure from it to existentialist philosophy of Heidegger. In fact their separation from each other was begun at very first, at eidetic reduction.