نشریه خردنامه صدرا
پیاپی 85 (پاییز 1395)

The faculty of imagination is considered to be among the inner faculties of the soul by Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra. Ibn Sina considered it material in nature, while Mulla Sadra maintained that it was immaterial, and both adduced some arguments to support their views in this regard. In considering imagination as material, Ibn Sina had to deal with some serious philosophical problems such as corporeal resurrection and preservation of certain souls. While responding to his arguments, Mulla Sadra provided several arguments in order to demonstrate his own stand on this issue. On evaluating the arguments of these two philosophers, the author finds Mulla Sadra’s position to be more acceptable than that of Ibn Sina. Moreover, by confirming the immateriality of the faculty of imagination, Mulla Sadra had several achievements such as justifying the preservation of memory during old ages and some other meta-psychological problems and demonstrating ascension, corporeal resurrection, and subsistence of simple human souls, which Ibn Sina also sought to resolve. Therefore, it can be concluded that Mulla Sadra’s theory regarding the immateriality of imagination is more functional and can facilitate the process of adducing rational justifications and arguments for some religious beliefs.

The concept of spirituality as opposed to materiality and the material world constitutes the main principle of all revealed and non-revealed religions. True existence is spiritual in all religions. Spirituality means having great faith in the existence of transcendent and supernatural truths, which, in Mulla Sadra’s view, have their origin in the unique existence of Almighty Truth. Such a belief grants a specific color and direction to human behaviors and various angles of life, so that individuals will never consider their own being or that of others and the world to be in vain. Rather, it fills them with a pleasant feeling of satisfaction. This concept is not limited to the holy doctrines of a specific religion in psychology, and it is not opposed in this field, either. Based on the principles of his Transcendent Philosophy regarding psychology and the mutual body-soul relation, Mulla Sadra believes that behaviors, physical acts, sciences, and human awareness exercise a profound influence over the human soul and spirit and finally determine their fate in the process of the trans-substantial motion and becoming. Accordingly, one’s spiritual and inner health depends on their awareness and behavior. The science of psychology, particularly humanistic psychology, greatly emphasizes the critical role of spirituality in organizing individuals’ life, character, and behavior. According to some existentialist psychologists, such as Frankl and Jung, mental or spiritual health comprises one of the important elements of a healthy personality.

In this paper, while demonstrating the representativeness of the concept of the one based on the single referent and rejecting the possibility of abstracting the single concept from multiple referents, the writer refutes Ibn Kamuneh’s paradox regarding the argument of the oneness of the Divine Essence and explains the essential unity of Almighty Truth. His paradox holds true based on the principiality and heterogeneity of existences and the principiality of quiddity; however, it is refuted based on the principiality and particular gradation of existence. This study was carried out following the descriptive-analytic method and a critical approach. Its most important conclusions include: 1) Concept and referent are essentially one; 2) Abstracting a single concept from multiple referents in terms of multiplicity is impossible; 3) Common truth is the origin of abstracting a single concept; 4) The unity of concept represents the unity of the referent; 5) Attributing the title of the necessity of existence to its truth is the same as attributing an essential entity to the essential thing, and the concept of the necessity of existence is derived from the innermost of the necessary existence without a determining and causal mode; 6) Ibn Kamuneh’s paradox regarding the argument of the Oneness of the Necessary being is rejected based on the impossibility of deriving a single concept from multiple referents, and 7) If the Necessary Being is considered to be pure existence or simple, no objection will be leveled.

There are some disagreements among philosophers on the pre-existence of the soul, that is, the existence of the soul before joining the body, whether it is originated or pre-eternal. Mulla Sadra maintains that the soul – the soul qua soul – originates in the trans-substantial motion of the body (corporeal origination) through particular individuation. However, he agrees with its pre-existence and considers it to be a rational one. When discussing this issue, he investigates, criticizes, and rejects Suhrawardi’s arguments on denying pre-existence. The commentators of Mulla Sadra’s words have always asked the question of why he did not agree with Suhrawardi’s arguments on denying the soul’s pre-existence based on his own particular individuation so that they would appear unanimous with respect to this problem. At least, this is what one could understand from Suhrawardi’s words and arguments. Accordingly, some of the early and contemporary commentators criticized him and believed that his objections to Suhrawardi’s words were unfounded. In this paper, while briefly referring to the fundamental principles of Suhrawardi’s arguments and Mulla Sadra’s related criticisms, the writers explain the main reason why Mulla Sadra refused to accept Suhrawardi’s view about the pre-existence of the soul.

There is no doubt about the co-existence of the body and the soul in worldly life. However, there are some debates on the accompaniment of worldly body and the soul in other worldly life. Based on Ibn Sina’s principles, worldly life cannot have an otherworldly life; however, some effects of the worldly life of the body stay with the soul until eternity and affect Man’s otherworldly and eternal life. In Ibn Sina’s view, the body plays an essential role in the occurrence of death. This is because its change and annihilation are the reasons behind the separation of the soul from the body and, as a result, the end of worldly life. Upon the beginning of the otherworldly stage of life, the unity of the soul with the material body is ruptured; however, the effects of some of the worldly acts and behaviors of the body are not destroyed and, rather, affect the quality of the final destiny of human beings and their lives in some way. The actualization of complete connection with the Active Intellect, which becomes possible through overcoming all physical barriers and limitations and the true perception of spiritual pleasures and the essence of the soul are among such effects. The behaviors rooted in the bodily configurations that have penetrated the soul remain until the next life and play a role in providing the context for the happiness and misery of the soul and determining the quantity and quality of its otherworldly rewards and punishments.

The problem of the simplicity or combination of the derivative is one of the controversial issues which, in spite of its similarity to mentally-posited discussions, has sometimes affected philosophical debates. The present paper reports on the results of a critical study of Jurjani’s reasoning regarding the simplicity of the derivative. In his view, whenever the derivative is assumed to consist of “shayin lahu …”, in case of attaining the concept of “shay”, interference of general accident in differentia occurs. However, in case of attaining the extension of “shay”, the transformation of the possible proposition through the necessary happens. In the first case, the differentia fails to be a differentia, and in the second case the direction of possibility is removed from the world of reality. In order to explain the quality of the transformation, a solution has been presented which analyzes the concept of portion and the role of limitation and determination in the predicate. Here, the writers, in spite of considering this argument to be perfect, clarify that the given reason for demonstrating the simplicity of the derivative is inefficient and is only capable of deriving the concept or referent of “shay” from the truth of the derivative.

Like Mulla Sadra, Hakim Sabziwari is an advocate of the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible. However, unlike him, Sabziwari has spoken differently and adopted different positions regarding the correlation argument, which is Mulla Sadra’s most important argument for demonstrating the above theory. Sabziwari has sometimes called it imperfect and referred to its defects and, at other times, he has viewed it as a perfect argument and defended it. This paper analyzes and examines his different statements about the correlation argument. In conclusion, the writers maintain that Hakim Sabziwari’s interpretation of Mulla Sadra’s argument is a specific one which is, in some cases, inconsistent with Mulla Sadra’s words. They also question his reasons for rejecting this argument; however, they declare that Sabziwari’s various positions with respect to the correlation argument could be considered to be, more or less, consistent with each other.