مجله نامه مفید
پیاپی 41 (فروردین و اردیبهشت 1383)

The concept of ‘active intellect’ as a stage of the human soul first appeared in the writing of Aristotle. To peripatetic exponents or commentator of Aristotle’s works, philosophers like Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Al – Kindi and St. Thomas Aquinas, this type of intellect is that of Aristotle. Alexandeer of Aphrodisias referred to it as an absolute non – material existent independent of human beings (Aristotelian unmoved mover).The most significant peripatetic view of the active intellect as the last divine intelligence in the chain of longitudinal intelligences, something contingent, non – material and independent of human beings can be found in the philosophy of Ibn Sina.Avecinna’s active intellect is considered to have a wide central function in peripatetic ontology. This type of infellenct as a link between non – materials (longitudinal intelligences) and material existents is taken to be the source of multiplicities in the material world and responsible for administrating the sublunary world.Its primary function is to give corporeal form to matter (the four elements) and intellecetual form to the rational (non – celestial) souls pertaining to the emanation of universal forms, composties and intelligibles through this intellect to the rational soul along with its passing from pure potency into actuality. The Necessary Being’s Knowledge of changing particulars is fulfilled through the agency of active intellect.In this way, the active intellect plays a wide sublime functional role and is considered an element of peripatetic philosophy.

The picture Kuhn gives for the usual development pattern of nature science can be put in the following manner:Prior facts – normal science – crisis – revolution – modern normal science – modern crisis.Kuhn’s view is considered to be of significance in that it puts emphsis on the revolutionary aspect of scientific development (change). Kuhn maintains the scientific change occurs by ‘revolutions’ in which an older paradigm is overthrown and is replaced by a framework incompatible or even incommensurable with it. It is also of importance because it gives a very significant role to the sociological factors (distinctions) in scientific communities. Since the publication of the Structure of Scientific Revolution, there has been the question whether the picture Kuhn gives for the history of natural sciences can be applied to mathematics. It seems the answer is ‘no’. For it is clear that the nature of mathematics is such that it denies the most important aspect or characteristic he attributes to the scientific change, i. e., revolution.In this article, the writer seeks to show that the transition form Eucleadan geometry to the non –Eucleadan geometry of Kuhn’s revolution lies in mathematics. Of course, this does not mean that all the constituents of what he thinks of developmental pattern of nature science are true of the realm of mathematics, Rather, two important distinctive features, revolutionary and sociological aspects of nature science, can also be applied to the realm of mathematics. In other words, Kuhn’s idea of ‘change’ is really possible in mathematics. Whenever we are concerned with the Kuhn’s “paradigm”, widely accepted by scientific communities, the change brings about revolution.

Ta’wil or interpretation is considered to be one of the most essential aspect of human thinking.This article seeks to cast light on mullā shdrā’s views on ta’wil and its epistemological validity (significance) by providing clear evidence from his works. Mullā Sadrā thinks of interpretation as the key to the understanding or disclosure of hidden or esoteric meaning. He maintains that the Qur’an itself explicitly refers to interpretation as that which discloses the truth.Mullā Sadrā’s particular attitude towards human being, the Qur’an and the universe plays a significant role in understanding the truth (haqiqah). While applying interpretive or hermeneutic method and expressing its epistemological validity, Mullā Sadrā did not restrict himself to a certain form of understanding the truth, and paved the way for creativity and dynamism through authenticating the inner or esoteric meaning (batin).Having denied literalism, which emphasizes the literal interpretation, Mullā Sadrā recognizes various understandings, of course each with its particular condition – through penetrating the inner or esoteric meaning (batin).

Paradoxes have always been important and controversial issues in both philosophy and logic. Paradoxes of acting rationally establish a sub-class of paradoxes: Problems in which we usually encounter a dilemma of making one of two inconsistent decisions, while there are apparently rational and persuasive arguments for both. Thus we will be in a dilemma or a paradoxical situation. Newcomb’s Paradox is the most celebrated example of this kind of Paradoxes. The aim of studying paradoxes and attempting to solve them is to defend Rationality.In Newcomb’s Paradox, there is a predictor who predicts the decision of the agent and also determines a part of the situation of the problem, which depends on his prediction. In this paradox we also encounter an apparent (alleged) inconsistency between two principles of choice, namely: Dominance Principle and Expected Utility Principle; because it seems that though the agent’s decision and the predictor’s prediction are causally independent, there is an epistemic dependence between them. In order to solve this paradox, we need to consider and study the possible mechanisms of predicting the future and then solve the problem in each case. We will show that the Backwards Causation interpretation is logically impossible and the Common Cause interpretation is the only possible one. Then we will consider Newcomb’s Paradox in two cases: 1- a common cause problem with an infallible predictor; 2- a common cause problem with a fallible predictor. We will argue that in the first case, no rational decision is available and in the second case there is no conflict between two principles of choice and choosing two boxes is the rational decision.

Kripke applied the notion of possible worlds to present formal semantics of modal logic. However, the application of the notion of possible worlds is not restricted to modal logic semantics. Rather, this notion has also been used in certain theories of philosophy of language or philosophy of logic in such theories of the nature of propositions.In view of the increasing significance of the notion of possible worlds, the present article studies in short the views certain contemporary theoreticians have raised on the nature of these worlds and their alleged characteristics. To do so, the writer first gives a very intensive account of Kripke’s metaphysical views on the nature of possible worlds and the two chief approaches to the notion of possible worlds under the titles of realism positivism and abstractionism and goes on to make a comparative analysis in this regard.To meet this purpose, the writer deals with David Lewis’s view as the most influential representative of realism positivism and Alvin Plantinga’s view as the distinguished representative of abstractionism.

Muslim philosophers base the correspondence theory of truth on the analysis of the sentence structure, considering sentence as the truth-bearer and reality or noumen as truth-maker. Having discussed the application of this theory in the Islamic philosophy and the recognition of its prinviples, the article seeks to make a comparative analysis as to the potentiality or capacity of this theory in relation to modern logic and its theories in the study of chief elements of the structures of propositions, along with the distinction between reality and thought. According to this analysis, the ‘truth- bearnig’ sentence and ‘truth’ are predicates of one state of affair whose fulfillment is a function of the fulfillment of the correspondence ‘relation’, while ‘correspondence’ is a predicate of affairs indicating the relation between the state represented by the sentence and the state has actually happened. Therefore ‘truth-maker’ is not the reality or the noumen but the mentioned relation exists between the states of affairs. In addition the fulfillment of correspondence is a function of fulfilling access of reality or noumen.

In his works, Spinoza offers various definitions of ‘human will’. He defines the human will as something internal or mental, whether it is an idea, desire or appetite; the idea of good or evil; the desire by which one strives to preserve his being. One can claim that Spinoza, in his definition of human will, sometimes refers to ‘will’ in its ordinary sense and sometimes in its particular sense and sometimes to its literal sense.

Philosophical hermenutics is associated with the name of Gadamer. Notwith-stanging the fact that the theory of hermeneutics was of peculiar status before his new version of it, but it was Gadamer who changed this theory in its contextual and literal form into a philosophical or existential one.While preserving Heidegger’s central insights, Gadamer showed that the understanding of oneself and one’s possibilities as being in the world is temporal and situates historically. In other words, one’s being is historically constituted and is our understanding or knowledge too. This cognitive limitation is not merely rooted in our present situation or the extent of our knowledge so that one can hope to overcome in future. Human nature requires this and there is no way out of this. According to Gadamer, the factors which place restrictions on human knowledge or understanding are history and language. Therefore, our knowledge is always limited and relative and one cannot claim to have absolute knowledge or attain the truth in its totality. The problem raised, and the accusation directed to Gadamer, is that in case one cannot give an absolute account of truth, all the accounts can be regarded as identical and one account cannot be taken to have priority to others.Explaining exactly Gadamer’s philosophical grounds for the truth and the cause of our limited knowledge, Brice Wachtear Hauser tries to give an answer to the question raised and show that from the principle that one cannot arrive at the absolute truth does not follow that we are all in the same position in relation to the truth and equally in a far distance from it.In other words, although we cannot fully attain the truth, we can stand closer to it than the others.