مجله فلسفه علم
سال هشتم شماره 1 (پیاپی 15، بهار و تابستان 1397)

Kalām Atomism defended by Ash’arī and Mu’tazila both, also includes the geometrical Atomism. Geometrical Atomism considers lines and geometrical shapes consisting of indivisible things. In other words, from this view, line is made up of points. This view conflicts with the definitions in Euclid’s Elements and subsequently classical geometry. Fakhr al-Din Razi who defended Atomism in the last decades of his lifespan was aware of this inconsistency. Through the arguments relevant to Atomism, he tried to resolve the inconsistency. Although his efforts do not result in developing a new geometry consistent with Atomism, his arguments contain subtle points which are significant from the view of the history and philosophy of Mathematics. In this paper, I will investigate several arguments from al-Maṭālib al-‘Alīyah in modern mathematical notation. And I will analyze the theoretical background of the arguments to achieve a frame to see their significance from the history of mathematics point of view. It is to show how Razi examined another geometrical structure other than the classical Geometry of his age. Furthermore, I suggest that Razi’s arguments should be considered in the history of infinitesimals as a possibility

In this paper, giving some examples of modern sciences, I will show that some theories have been influenced by naturalistic presuppositions and one can then explain the empirical data these theories seek to explain through a religious approach. Resorting to these examples, the advocates of religious science want to show that just as presuppositions of science may be affected by naturalism so they may be influenced by religion, and therefore religious science is possible. In the final part of this paper, answering following questions regarding religious science, it is attempted to clarify some complexities of the debate: Does the idea of religious science endorse relativism indirectly? Religious science is justified by appealing to experience, or religion, or both? If appealing to religion is involved in the justification of religious science, does religious actions not involve in scientific activity? Does the possibility of religious science mean the lack of a distinctive border between science and religion? Evolution is a characteristic feature of scientific theories, and religious science is not an exception. Does the evolution of religious science not undermine religion? Does the argument for the possibility of religious science imply the possibility of religious science, in addition to the logical possibility of religious science? What perspective the proponents of religious science should define for their ideal?

Moritz Schlick divides our knowledge of reality and independent external world into two domains of conventional knowledge needed in everyday life, and scientific knowledge. Relying on this division, he shows how logical positivism is not in need of metaphysical confrontation with reality and external world in either of these realms.
The present article studies Moritz Schlick’s academic trend and the turning points of his scientific life, from the tradition of philosophical physicists to succession of Ernst Mach, and to his association with Vienna Cycle; and meanwhile attempts to answer the question of what has been his image of reality and independent world as ontological issues? What always has been taken into consideration about logical positivists is limited to their epistemological and methodological aspects. Here we intent to reproduce the ontological aspect of Schlick’s thoughts, taking into account the challenge that he and the Vienna cycle pose to metaphysics

From the view of Aristotle, Muslim philosophers and the Christian Philosophers of the middle ages, all sciences were under the umbrella of philosophy. But, after the development of modern science and the growth of empiricism, philosophy lost its glory and attention was given primarily to specialized sciences.
But during the second half of the twentieth century, the defects of empiricism became apparent and several trends emerged:(1) Some scholars mentioned that science can’t answer all questions of human concern and there is a need for a more general framework.
(2) There was a movement towards interdisciplinary studies, and there was a revival of philosophy among scientists.
(3) Positivists spoke of unified science, i.e. all sciences could be reduced to a single science, e. g. Physics.
(4) Many distinguished scientists mentioned that different specialties should be pursued under a holistic view, so they recommended to look for a worldview that works as an umbrella for all sciences.

Objectivity, as the ideal of science, especially human science, is criticized by Gadamer because it constructs an alienated experiment in human and causes an ontological obstruction. This ideal stems from the superiority of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason on modern science and also negligence of language by Western philosophical tradition. Although Dilthey attempted to provide a special place for human science using linguistic and hermeneutics tradition, due to his Cartesian foundations, and his instrumentalist attitude toward historical language and consciousness, he suffered from subjectivism and considered human science truth-less as Kantian aesthetic judgment. Rereading artistic experience and historical experience in Kant and Dilthey, and using Heidegger’s and Hegel's philosophy and also attending to the ontology of language, Gadamer organized hermeneutic experience so that its ideal is not objectification process, but the emergence of the subject itself in the language, and this is Sachlichkeit that is the disclosure of the subjectivity of subject or the objectivity of object.

Richard Foley is among the well-known theorists in epistemology and rationality. His theory of epistemology is known as ‘Subjective Foundationalism’. Studying his works, one finds out that the adoption of such a position in epistemology was due to the development of a rationality theory compatible with it. ‘Foundationalism’ is the distinctive feature of Foley’s epistemology which distinguishes it from views like coherentism. ‘Subjectivism’ is in opposition to ‘objectivist’ views like reliabilism. On the basis of this epistemological position, Foley puts forward an elaborate theory of rationality that being epistemic and, more importantly, being goal-oriented are among its main characteristics. He also replaces ‘reasonable belief’ with ‘rational belief’ in the theory of rationality. Involving concepts like ‘perspective’, ‘uncontroversial argument’, ‘deep reflection’, and ‘deepest epistemic standards’, Foley's theory of reasonableness associates a kind of subjectivism and relativism, but actually it is neither subjectivist nor relativist. This paper while investigates and reconstructs Foley's theory of rationality, attempts to disclose the rationality of the theory itself pursuing its implications. To do so, each of the elements of Foley's theory of rationality is referred to its existential foundation. The claim of the article on the rationale behind Foley's theory of reasonableness is that this rationality is not based on the validity of logical criteria but on the human existential states and elements

The history of pure science-applied science distinction goes back to 19th century. Philosophers of science and technology and science studies practitioners since then have been involved in how to separate pure from applied science. The linear model of the distinction is one of the oldest models on which the goal of pure science is acquiring knowledge, while applied science tries to solve practical problems. In this article, I will argue that the liner model to draw the distinction in nano-science is inadequate. So, another account is needed to distinguish them, provided that our assumption about the distinction per se in nano-science is applicable