نشریه جستارهایی در فلسفه و کلام
سال چهل و نهم شماره 2 (پیاپی 99، پاییز و زمستان 1396)

Some of the philosophical teachings of the Qur’an are about God and His Attributes. The Shi’ism has rated justice as one of the Attributes of God on the rank of principles of religion; because it was on the issue of justice that the rational Shi’as have always had disagreement with the Sunnis. Does Divine justice, however, enjoy equal status among different Shi’a denominations? Justice has been studied on different levels in the works of the Twelver Shi’a scholars; but the Isma’ili works have been studied very briefly and implicitly. In this comparative study, it has been attempted to identify and analyze the
status of Divine justice and its peripheral discourses, such as rational good and evil and God in Twelver Shi’ism and Isma’ilism from the
perspective of the influential thinkers. With respect to the intellectual capabilities of Shi’ism, the issue of Divine justice emerges from within the discourse of determinism and free will because there is direct correlation between belief in determinism and justice on one hand and belief in free will and negation of justice, on the other. From a historical point of view, from the period of Fatimid Isma’ilis, in which the status of Imam was exaggerated, until the Alamut Isma’ilis, degrading the concept of Imam caused the degrading of the Isma’ilis’ rationalism; they distanced from the rational good and evil and thus dealt less with Divine justice. Being under the influence of the two main elements of “Anti-rational prestige of education principle” and “association with Sufism”, Isma’ilism places too much emphasis on the role of Imam in the creation system, in education and guidance, in political and social issues, in interpretation of sharia, in his infallibility and being the Lord of Resurrection (Qāʼim al-Qiyāma). One of the most important findings of this research is that because of this very exaggeration in “learning” from the Imam and impressionability from “Sufism” in specific periods, the Isma’ilism has inclined toward legal good and evil and has distanced from the basic teachings of the Twelver Shi’ism based on the principality of justice, reverence for intellect, and human free personality

In this research the viewpoints of ‘Abd al-Karīm Jīlī on religions have been studied. It is thereby indicated how Jīlī, under the influence of Ibn ‘Arabī’s ilāh al-mu‘taqad (the deity conditioned by dogma), has judged about other religions (idolaters, naturalists, dualists, Brahmins, Jews, Christians, etc.). Besides, the reports made by Jīlī concerning religions are in some instances similar to and resulted from the views of other writers up to his own era. Meanwhile, Jīlī’s interpretation of Islam is a special one. Given the importance of Muhammadan truth in Jīlī’s viewpoints and opinions, he has used the phrasing “general religion” concerning Islam and has viewed the religions of other Prophets as partial ones. In this phrasing, “general religion” is resulted from the Prophet’s (S.A.W.) great union (ma‘iyyat- kubrā) and status of gatheredness (jam’ al-jam’), which is present in the entire realms of being and all human beings. This presence conforms to the appearance of the Face of Allah (Wajh Allāh) in the unveilings of mystics

It is tried in the present article to analyze the pattern of epistemological science and opinions of the Islamic philosophers, especially Mullā Ṣadrā from two epistemological and ontological perspectives and to touch upon some of its ambiguities and
inefficiencies.
According to the provided analysis, essence is lacking in any epistemological content from the point of view of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy; Mullā Ṣadrā’s existential implication of scientific essences has some ambiguities and inconsistencies in his philosophical system; no evident criterion has been presented for authentication of the scientific perception and their conformity to the advanced studies and the mechanism of acquiring rational perception is exposed to serious disputes.
To provide a solution, three fundamental problems in the essential pattern of science is pointed out in the final part of the article:1. Disconnection of object and subject; 2. Essentialism; 3. Dichotomy of meaning and existence.
The author maintains that phenomenalism theory of meaning is the final solution for surmounting the above-mentioned perplexities

The word dīn (religion) is of a certain lexical and connotative meaning, of which obedience and restriction are the semantic and connotative requirements. The term “Ali’s (A.S.) religion”, which has a meaning different from the application of the word sunna for the Prophet’s (S.A.W.) caliphs (e.g. Abu Bakr’s sunna ‘Umar’s sunna), has been used by the Imams (A.S.), followers of Ali (A.S.), and his enemies. In the traditions of the two major sects, the addition of the person’s name to the word dīn is not exclusive to Ali (A.S.). Rather, it has been applied to ‘Uthmān, Mu’āwiya, Yazīd, spiritual heirs (awṣiyā), angels, Fāṭima (S.A.), and Ḥusayn (A.S.),
as well. In the end, with a study of the hadith sources, it is clarified that the legal
and judiciary approach and the political approach of Ali (A.S.) is the main reason for the exclusive addition of the word dīn to the name of Ali (A.S.) among the caliphs. Contrary to what some orientalists believe, “Ali’s (A.S.) religion” is the same as “The Prophet’s (S.A.W.) religion”. It is worth mentioning that Ali (A.S.) had certain specific legal, judiciary, and political principles distinguished from the caliphs; but due to people’s disobedience of the laws of concern to him and their insistence on executing the sunnas of the caliphs prior to him, some of these sunnas were executed during Ali’s (A.S.)
Rule and this was never interpreted as non-actualization of Ali’s (A.S.) legal-judiciary sunna and sīra

Allāma Muhammad Bāqir Majlisī is regarded as one of the greatest revivers of the Shi’a hadith and among the matchless and successful promoters of Imamiyya theology in Isfahan school of thought. Irrespective of the legal and hadith innovation and services of this
Shi’a scholar, his epistemological poetry collection is blended with lasting achievements in theology and religious studies. Unfortunately, however, this dimension of Majlisī’s thought has been of less interest to the researchers in comparison to his hadith dimension.
With respect to this research vacuum, the present writing is intended to undertake to renovate and provide a pattern of understanding religion in his theological thought. Among the most important findings of this research is regarded to be the critical reappraisal and analysis of the epistemological components and elements of this pattern such as: traditionalism and regarding tradition as prior to intellect; paying attention to the paradigm and peripheral atmosphere of issuance of text and speech; necessity for loyalty to the text with minimal approach in adopting ta’wīl as a method; conventional realization of the language of religion, and the principle of conscious control of preconception in the process of understanding. However, since Majlisī’s pattern and style of traditionalism has not been free from methodological deficiencies, for removing this deficiency and completing and expurgating his perception pattern, the author has
presented and expounded adoption of the discursive approach and the principle of authenticity and validity of intellect as one of the basic components in the dialectics of understanding religion

Metempsychosis is connection of the spirit to another body proportionate to it after disintegration of its own body. Avicenna has provided three arguments on invalidation of metempsychosis. According to the firs argument, the prerequisite of metempsychosis is the conjunction of two spirits in one body; and according to the second argument, the prerequisite of metempsychosis is a time lapse taking place between disconnection of the spirit from the first body and connection to the second. Rāzī’s criticisms of the first argument results from fallacious reasoning on the following instances: oneness of humankind species; invalidity of random volition; soul’s need for body in performing actions; existential and not essential capability of body in relation to the soul and non-priority of the reincarnated soul in relation to the contingent soul in connection to body. Rāzī’s objections to the second argument results from non-deliberation on the following notions: the principle of “no idleness for existence”, entitlement of the partial souls to celestial body; freedom of soul from the body in case of being actualized and inequality of the souls that die with the souls that are born.

The Philosophy of Thomas Nagel, the American philosopher, includes a varied expanse of philosophical problems, from mind to political philosophy; but the relationship between all these varied and multiple philosophical realms in his thought is the subjective and objective Issue. Man’s ability to look at the philosophical issues from the objective and subjective perspectives and the contradiction of these two perspectives create a collection of philosophical issues, whose resolving and understanding from his point of view is not possible without paying attention to the objective and subjective look. In this article, I have tried to present an explanation and elucidation of Nagel’s look at the objective and subjective issue and to clarify the meaning of Nagel’s objectivism. Based on the two books, “The View from Nowhere” and “The Last Word”, I would show how Nagel’s objectivism has developed. According to this analysis, Nagel’s objectivism has two forms: the objectivism based on an objective self that can separate oneself from specific and limited perspectives and acquire a more comprehensive understanding of self and reality; and the objectivism based on the
human mind structure, which is limited to the specific epistemological restrictions in looking at the world and even doubt in the foundations of one’s knowledge, that is the very limitations resulted from the thoughts that are impossible to escape from. Then, I will touch upon the point that these two perceptions of objectivism and the claim that in some philosophical realms one should use the first type and in some other realms the second type, would initially create a kind of inconsistency in Nagel philosophy but attention to the general framework of Nagel’s objectivism can resolve this inconsistency