نشریه فقه و حقوق خصوصی
پیاپی 1 (بهار و تابستان 1397)

Right in Islamic jurisprudence entails two meanings: First, right in its general sense, means property and decree and in its specific sense it means right. The examples for this denotation of right are the right of fatherhood, right of guardianship for the ruler, right of administratorship, right of custody and the like. Although these are interpreted as right in the literature of the jurisprudents, they are all examples of decree. Second, right in its particular sense is vis-à-vis property and decree. Therefore, it has been said that the jurisprudents who put right in front of property and decree, they mean a type of religiously obligatory decree, which is also called religious decree or the decree of the Legislator. However, in cases we consider decree in its general sense, either obligatory or enacted, it is clear that right (like property) is a type of enacted decree. Therefore, decree in its general sense is attributable to its particular meaning (second meaning). On this basis, when right is compared and contrasted with decree, the denotative meaning of the two is involved and when in jurisprudence, jurists talk about the effects and consequences of right, like the capacity to waiver, and transfer, they mean that right possesses these effects as an enacted decree and its independent rational validity. On the contrary, the obligatory decree lacks such characteristics. This paper is an attempt to study the relationship between obligatory decree and enacted decree, and as well as the viewpoints of theoreticians at law and the independent viewpoints. Attempts also have been made to discuss the criteria for distinguishing right from decree and the procedure and criteria for judgment when doubt is raised about right and decree. In case of the absence of criteria, what shall be the basis for performance?

Cancellation is reached when both parties have consent over the termination of the contract. This means the end of the contract effects and the resulting commitments. This, however, relates to the future; therefore, it is not like nullification of the contract. It does not have retrospective impact, and consequently it does not affect the pre-cancellation consequences. This point has been neglected by some and in their explanation of rules regarding provisos after cancellation they maintain that all conditions are nullified including attributes, performance and collateral events. Pursuant to this, the Civil Code in Article 246 stipulates that when a contract is terminated by  mutual consent, its terms become null and void, whereas rules regarding and effects of each proviso are different and Article 246 shall not be attributable to all of them. This means that the condition of attribute is not within the prerogative of the said article and hence it is not nullified, but also it returns to the initial owner according to the subject of transaction. The condition of collateral events, due to its certain characteristics, is realized immediately after the conclusion of the contract, thus it cannot be nullified or waived either. In the meantime, only the condition of performance, either negative or positive, is nullified due to cancellation although it leaves behind consequences that are analyzable.

Resale of goods, by virtue of the Article 88 of UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) is a non-judicial practice and an exception that in addition to preventing incurrence of losses, is a solution to the undecided state of contracts without having to nullify the previous contract. This paper intends to study the possibility of justification of this practice based on Iranian law. The author has applied an analytical, descriptive and comparative method to first understand the resale of goods according to the Convention, and identify similar institutions in Iranian law and jurisprudence. Seizure of property of debtor is among the cases that can justify resale of the property accordingly.

In Islamic Sharia law, with respect to the rule of the association of profit and loss, basically the principal capital return is not guaranteed. Therefore, gaining real profit is always associated with the possibility of loss and damage. Whereas in Islamic financial mechanisms such as commissioned manufacture bonds, the payment of the nominal value included in the bonds is guaranteed by the publisher in due date. Therefore, the owners of the bonds who are the investors of transactions will not sustain a loss or receive a reward for the reduction or increase in the value of the project upon receiving the nominal value of the bonds (principal capital). However, an analysis of the procedure for publication of the bonds, makes it clear that in commissioned manufacture bonds based on interest, the receipt of nominal value of the bonds will be realized according to the entitlement of the owners in due date proportionate to the total value of the amount due. Also guaranteeing the principal capital by the publisher of the commissioned manufacture bonds is  according to the liability of the seller to pay for the object of sale. Moreover, the owners of the bonds as the buyers only own the amount due in duty of the debtor and they shall have no right in project thus commissioned. In this sense, any increase or reduction in the value of the project will have no effect in the amount of their claim. Whereas the owners of commissioned manufacture bonds along with rent with an ownership option are the joint owners of the project, thus in case of increase in project value in connection with the nominal value of the bonds, they are entitled to claim the value added. This is because according to the rule of logics the owner of actual property deserves to take a share of the increase in value of actual property value as he is to sustain the damages incurred on the actual property. Similarly, the reduction in project value in proportion to the nominal value of the commissioned manufacture bonds along with the rent with an ownership option, must be attributable to the joint owners, i.e. investors.

The world today, compared to the past, has undergone several changes. Many of the yesteryear man’s usual issues are done quite in a different manner. The procedure of Islamic judgement and arbitration is a part of jurisprudence that has not undergone the necessary changes yet. The question of this paper is: what are the needs to change Islamic juridical procedures and judicial system? Taking into account the religious principles, particularly legitimacy of the judge as well as distinction between arbitration on the divine rights and the people’s rights based on jurisprudence, and also, arguing that social rights are distinct from the divine rights, attempts have been made in this research to propose some changes in the juridical procedures which include: setting up of different courts congruent with the nature of the forwarded cases such as individual personal rights, society’s rights, and divine rights. The judges dealing with the first two groups of rights are to be elected by the people, while the judges handling the cases related to the divine rights and pertaining issues are to be appointed by the ruler of the Islamic state.

The fundamentals of absoluteness of collective knowledge can be accurately explained in two separate categories: First, absoluteness of collective knowledge in rational terms, i.e. free from practical canonical principles. Second: Absoluteness of collective knowledge in terms of Sharia law and with a view on those principles. This paper intends to study the first section. To that end, prohibition of the conclusive discord and the necessity of the conclusive consent has been studied. In the course of these discussions, it will become clear that although the prohibition of the conclusive discord is easily provable, proving of the necessity of conclusive consent has only two logical solutions: First, the rule of incumbency that is attributable only according to Mohaqeq Araqi’s theory of interpretation of collective knowledge. Second, absoluteness of the probability of religious duty in each segment of the collective knowledge that will be accurate only based on the negation of the rule of indecency of punishing the one who has not received the penal warrant. Also in this paper, attempts have been made to provide responses to the doubts posed by the opponents of the prohibition of the conclusive discord and the necessity of conclusive consent and the refutation expressed by Shahid Sadr to the rule of punishment of the one who has not received the penal warrant.