نشریه جاویدان خرد
سال شانزدهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 35، بهار و تابستان 1398)

Aristotle is more concerned with sensory perception and experience than philosophers before him, treating it as a kind of knowledge. It seems that the role he assigns to senses in knowledge acquisition does not qualify him as an Empiricist, although it does for some commentators. Now we should see if there is sufficient ground for the attribution of Rationalism to him. Now can we attribute Rationalism to him? And if yes, then in what sense and to what extent is he a Rationalist? To answer the question, I begin by considering components of Rationalism (and those of Empiricism, for that matter), that is, innate ideas and intuition, and then discuss Aristotle’s position regarding these components given his various works, particularly the last chapter of his Posterior Analytics and with the focus on nous. Since there have been different interpretations of this chapter of Posterior Analytics, I deal with exegeses by commentators such as Jonathan Barnes and their claims as they concern my claim in this paper.

Logic is among the most crucial issues that Heidegger devoted himself to it from the very beginning of his university years as a student and afterwards in his teaching career. In fact, whenever he speaks about logic, he means by it, the traditional and not mathematical-symbolic logic or what is called modern logic. What he has told and wrote in regard with modern logic is too limited and often is described negatively. In traditional logic, too, he is not in search of attaining correct ways of thinking and reaching at sound arguments and deductions. Asking whether a syllogism is constructed in a proper way or not, namely whether the conclusion is drawn correctly from premises or not, is a question concerning the form of sentences in that syllogism and their formal relation. The validity of an argument is irrelevant to the content of sentences. Logic, for him, deals firstly with speech and as a result, with the truth itself. Contrary to standard interpretation that supposes proposition to bear truth, Heidegger regards it to be founded on disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) of Dasein. confrontation with being is made possible due to such disclosedness of Dasein. Therefore, in his philosophy, reconstructing the concept of truth should not be limited to the formal analyses of formal structure of sentences. Instead, concrete and alive application by which we attribute truth to those sentences must be taken into consideration.

One of the philosophical tools for understanding the truths of the universe is the domain of the subject between the subject and the predicate. This instrument, as it can conceal the truths of the universe by using it, eliminates many of the controversies that exist between the mystics and the intellectuals, such as the common sense or the spirituality of existence, its excessive use also distorts the understanding of the realities of the universe, The way in which the votes have been expressed among the ayatollahs in relation to the way in which they exist. In this research, the criterion of the realization of the carriage, which is an alliance or a relationship, is firstly discussed and, by adopting the basis, the modes of carriage and their role in understanding the truths of the universe, are discussed in such a way that God can achieve the proper conduct of names and attributes And it was immune from the extremes of this. One of the most extreme grounds for using the carriage is to refer to the nature of the existence of which, by adopting the correct basis on the criterion of carriage and the extent of its implication on the facts, one can identify the correct view of the creep in this regard.

Abstract One of the arguments advanced by Sadr al-Muta’allihin to prove the substantial motion is the argument through the mutual implication between nature and its effects and movements. Sabzawari has opposed this argument, and regarded it as a merely polemical proof which is compatible with the principles of Illuminationist philosophy, and incompatible with the foundations of Sadr al-Muta’allihin himself. The objections raised by Sabzawari shows that this argument in its Sadrian presentation is not compelling. Murtaza Mutahhari has tried to turn this argument into a compelling argument by reconstructing and revising it. This reconstruction, although it is ambiguous and is not completely compatible with Sadrian presentation, makes the scientific discussion of the above mentioned argument clearer and more upgraded (especially if it is refereed on the basis of analytic causation). But, firstly, this progress does not show the falsehood of Sabzawari's objections and considerations about the Sadrian version, and secondly, what has opened up the new horizons and promoted this discussion is the very objections and considerations made by Sabzawari.

There has been involvement in formation of Islamic art from different views; what Traditionalism involves in historical and comprehensive explanation of the art, and at the same time, confining its historical process. Present paper attempts to discuss formation of Islamic arts based on authentic Traditional views, including Schoun's, Nasr's, Burkhardt's, and Guenon's. Through the text, one could find comparisons between art historians' and traditionalists views. Furthermore, there is a presentation of historic process of characteristic types of Islamic arts. Accordingly, there is an attempt to discuss effects of Islam and consequent manifestation of Islamic arts, following general discussions about Iranian Pre Islamic legacy. There is statement about general historic development of some types of more defined and mostly known Islamic arts within the same framework, including coinage, painting, architecture, pottery and metallurgy, and finally textiles among many types of manifestations of Islamic arts. The authors bibliographically collected information and data.

The concept of kalahas been interpreted differently in Hindu religious traditions. It refers to magic or heavenly power in Vedas while in Hindu Monotheisms such as Advaita Vedanta it denotes to the deceptive and charming power of gods which is understood as illusion especially the enchanting (unreal) nature of universe as the extended phenomenon that is synonymous to Avidya or ignorance over unique property of ultimate truth. In this interpretation, kala is the veil of illusion over Brahman or transcendental truth. It is neither existent nor non-existent and eludes any definition.In Ancient Vedas, kala refers to magical and miraculous power connoting deception and enticement. In his second volume of the History of Philosophy, Radakrishnan states: The word kala in Rig Veda has been frequently used to refer to supernatural power attributed to gods, particularly Varuna, Mitra and Indra, In many ancient songs,kala has been admired as the power protecting the world. kala means deception and enticement which is an inherent previlage of Asuras against Devas with whom She is in an ongoing battle. The word Maya is rarely witnessed in Upanishads as the real basis of Vedante.In The Vaisesika Sutras of kanandakalaisdravya but The problem of Time in indianphilosophyis so difrrent.

Gnosticism is an esoteric movement that most scholars consider the belief in dualism as one of its most important attributes, because the contradiction between good and evil (light and darkness) and, the divide between the creators of these two realms, forms the basis of many of the gnostic thoughts. But according to the existing documents, Valentina, as the greatest and most influential gnostic movement, is far from dualistic thought, providing a monistic picture of God. Like the other Gnostics, Valentinus, with the separation of absolute power from the Creator God, sees the material world as the result of act of lower God. But the domain of the power of demiurge is not an independent realm, but under the realm of absolute power, and thus provides a path that is far from gnosis duality. In this paper, the content analysis method has been tried to provide the reasons for clarifying Valentinian's monistic thinking.

Normative conflicts are critical in ethical and legal arguments. But, Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) can not tolerate them and in sntandard deontic logics normative conflicts lead to contradictions. In this paper we review Deontic Logic literature and introduce two major approaches facing to narmative conflicts. One of them is accepting the existence of normative conflicts and trying to build Conflict Tolerant Deontic Logics, and the other is separating the obligations to Prima Fcie obligations and Actual obligations and rejecting any actual normative conflict, which necessitates formalizing two kinds of obligations (prima facie obligations and actual obligations) and the relation of them. Then we introduce Prioritized Adaptive Logics, which are useful in both approaches. In the last part of the paper, we search normative conflict arguments in 'osul al fiqh', which is the logic of Islamic legal system, and formalize some aspects of 'vajib', the Islamic obligation, in a prioritized adaptive logic format.

Traditionalism is the belief in the eternal Truth that comes from the Absolute and the Infinite, and is manifested in the traditions for human beings. The term symbol and its derivatives is a key word for traditionalists. The philosophical expression of symbolism can be seen in the Plato's theory of ideas. In Plato's philosophy, the foundation of symbolism is referred to as "the paradigmatic cause". The paradigmatic cause is the idea of an object which the creation is made according to it. Therefore, each symbol represents a supreme truth. The true basis of symbolism is that all beings, in different degrees, are interconnected and in the same harmony, they are aligned with each other. Hence, the symbolism has a supra human essence and is not a contract, and the truth of the object is somehow present in the symbol. Symbolism is the language of metaphysics and understanding the symbolic meaning requires wisdom.

One of the common interpretations of Sadra's epistemology is a view that, despite adherence to Sadra's existential look in explaining the truth of knowledge, has a meaningful difference in the other issues and results of the discussion, such as the relation between knowledge and mental existence, the determination of the essential known in the acquired knowledge and other similar issues, with Sadra's explicit opinions. The core of these differences is the belief in the separation and existential otherness between knowledge and mental existence, and from the results of this separation, we can point out that mental existence is in the shadow of knowledge, and the existence of knowledge is essential known, and the mental existence is accidental known. However, we will show in this study that the separation for Sadra is merely conventional, and that knowledge and mental existence from his point of view have an existential unity, and contrary to the above interpretation, this is the mental existence which is essential known in the acquired knowledge, and it is in the shadow of external beings, not the existence of knowledge.