مجله معارف منطقی
پیاپی 9 (پاییز و زمستان 1397)

Historical Arguing -among the Muslim scholars- has been essentially organized on the basis of the logical significations of words. This logical approach to the relation between a word and its synonym is to a large extent influenced by the Muslim Logicians and in particular by their idea of triple significations: accordant (Motabeghi) , included (Tazammoni) and implicative (Eltezami)). However this well-known trinity is not very useful in the hermeneutical analysis of the historical propositions. The present paper shows that other significations could be found beyond the text and it's Regarded Point (RP). The Significations of a Single Tradition (khabar-e-vahed) - as a distinct unit in the jurisprudence studies - is expandable in a hermeneutic approach. In this regard, beside the RP of a Single Tradition, two other new expressions emerge. These significations which can be justified based on the Meta Regarded Point of Tradition (MRP) are: «Inverted Frequency» and «Contextual Frequency». Basically two levels of Historical Arguing can be distinguished in historical arguing: Level one which focuses on RP and level two which is based on MRP.

Modified propositions are among the propositions raised in Aristotle's logic and transferred from Aristotle’s logic to Muslim logicians through Ibn Honain’s translation. In his translation, he has referred to these propositions as "opposition in propositions with actualized and non-actualized subjects". Apart from defining these propositions and dividing them according to their revocation and actualization, the opposition of propositions has been raised as one of the judgments of the propositions called the square of opposition. Propositions with non-actualized subjects do not have a square of opposition, because they are not mistaken for negation. But the propositions with actualized subjects, which may be actualized or non-actualized because of their predicate, in the two states of negation and affirmation, have a quadrilateral or square form, and their relationships are examined in the width, length, and diameter of square so that the modified is distinguished from negation. The disagreement of the logicians in the meaning of non-actualized and modified caused a change in the shape and relationships of this square. Following this change, this square evolved from the quadrilateral to the cubic form, which involved a change in its inner aspects and meaning. Thus, by comparing the views of logicians, it will be explained why and how Aristotle shaped this square; Farabi put it in order and Ibn Sina expanded and deepened it.

Bedaye al-Mojtahid va al-Nehaye al-Moghtased by Ibn-e Roshd, referred to as Bedaye al-Mojtahid in this paper, is a book about comparative fiqh, in which a special logical method is used based on the philosophical mind of Ibn-e Roshd. To prove this claim, in this paper we have differentiated between knowledge of casuistry and comparative fiqh, and the basis of comparative fiqh is supposed to be dialectics which is the basis of argument, not lessening adversary. Therefore, the present paper seeks to introduce this kind of comparative fiqh and its logical method and to show the signs in Bedaye al-Mojtahid. The discussion has been presented in three pivots: 1. comparative fiqh is based on good dialectics and is different from rebuttal writing; 2-Good dialectics is an introduction to the argument; 3. Ibn Rushd's philosophical mind has used this subject in Bedaye al-Mojtahid.

For two propositions to be contradictory, in addition to differences, the eight - fold unities are also needed. It is commonly believed that Mulla Sadra has added the unity of prediction to the unities of subject, predicate, space, time, condition, relation, particularity and generality. In the late Islamic philosophy, the word “unity of predication” is used as an expression to indicate the fact that two propositions are contradictory only when besides having all the other necessary conditions, they are both either primary essential predication or common technical prediction. In the following paper, we will be showing first that this expression is not, as it is known today, used to indicate the distinction of primary essential and common technical predication in the history of Islamic philosophy, and has a wider use. Secondly, it shows that its addition to the conditions of prediction, even in its common sense, is not Mulla Sadra’s innovation. Meanwhile, historical evidence for five different meanings of this expression will be presented, three of which are different from its common usage. Also it will be made clear that the common meaning of this expression, i.e. its usage to refer to the primary essential predication and common technical prediction, will take several new meanings in the wake of different interpretation given of them so far.

Scholars of rational knowledge have long believed that theoretical concepts, such as theoretical affirmations, should lead to self-evident perceptions; otherwise, they will involve infinite regression and there would not be concepts. And then they were encountered with the question of the source of the self- evident concepts. There were several views in this regard. Some believed that cause of self-evidence is generality and others believed in simplicity; some agreed with intuitive knowledge and still some others believed in differentiation. Using a problem-solving approach, this paper firstly distinguishes between concepts and affirmations, and then argues that in theoretical affirmations, validity is considered an important issue and the validity of affirmations is dependent on evident affirmations. But in theoretical concepts, validity does not matter; rather, knowledge of concepts is considered and knowledge of theoretical concepts is dependent on the knowledge of evident concepts, otherwise they will end in infinite regression. Secondly, due to the self-evidence of evident concepts, the ideas of intuitive knowledge, generality, simplicity and differentiation cannot provide an accurate explanation of it. Therefore, the simplicity view, together with of the intuitive knowledge of the known is the only view that is able to present a rational justification for the mystery of the self-evidence of evident concepts

The history of the technical discussion of the question of the distinction of knowledge and its criterion goes back to the time of the formulation of logic. In his book “argument”, Aristotle argues that the criterion for the distinction of knowledge is the discrepancy in subject and, consequently, the discrepancy in the issues and foundations of knowledge. Muslim logicians such as Farabi and Ibn Sina have also discussed the distinction of knowledge in terms of the differences in subjects or of different states of the same subject. While Aristotle and the Muslim logicians following him have argued that the criterion for the distinction of knowledge is the epistemological nature of demonstrative knowledge rather than the absolute knowledge, their view does not contradict the argument that the criterion for the absolute distinction of knowledge can be in subject, method, or end. Therefore, the criterion for the distinction of demonstrative knowledge cannot be imposed on the criterion for the distinction of non-demonstrative knowledge. Contrary to this approach, some believe that the criterion for the distinction of all knowledge is the end or purpose of the formulation of knowledge. Others believe that the criterion for distinguishing all knowledge is the congruity in their problems. Still some argue that there is no real criterion for the distinction of knowledge and that such distinction is merely arbitrary. The following paper shows that these views are incorrect and incompatible with the teachings of Muslim scholars. It is also pointed out that Muslim scholars have expressed various interpretations of the distinction in the subjects of the knowledge, these interpretations suggest two kinds of general and partial distinction in knowledge, and the relation of differences and commonalities of knowledge can be of several kinds in the partial distinction.