مجله فلسفه و کلام اسلامی
سال پنجاه و دوم شماره 2 (پاییز و زمستان 1398)

In her 2014 paper "Internalism About Reasons: Sad But True?", Kate Manne defends a version of Internalism about normative reasons for actions. She starts by considering the interpersonal context of reasons to emphasize how reasons are limited by psychological states of the agent. Then, she defends a necessary condition for reasons; i.e., Ideal Reasoning Thesis, which every theory of reason should satisfy. However, she claims, externalism fails to do so. On the contrary, we suggest that it is not clear whether the process of Ideal Reasoning happens in an ideal or non-ideal time. Furthermore, it seems preferable to take time to be ideal too. Clearing the ambiguity about time makes externalism able to satisfy Ideal Reasoning Thesis and, thus, the argument for internalism fails.

Why religious beliefs and activities in many different cultures and at all times have been so widespread is a problem that has been addressed by many philosophers and scholars in the field of religion in the last few decades. Evolutionary ideas attempt to answer this question by studying religion as a natural phenomenon. There are two groups of evolutionary theories about this issue: by-product theory and group selection theory. In this paper, while analyzing the two aforesaid theories, we show that the two are not so much successful in answering the problem. Our analysis shows that these two theories are challenged on four main axes: (1) ambiguity in the concept of "evolutionary adaptation of religion" (2) the limited and incomplete definition of religion (3) explanatory limitations and (4) the lack of distinction between the natural and rational foundations of religious beliefs.

The present research has focused on the concept analysis of art and artist and the analysis of statements such as “This is an art work” and “Zaid is an artist”. We try to show the consequences, if these concepts and statements are regarded as i'tibariat. After determining the epistemological foundations of art and showing the relation of art with truth, art as a means of leading humans to real perfection, the relation of art with individual and social lives and showing the indefinability concept of art and artists, we show that I'tibariat can be divided into conventional and non-conventional ones.

Knowledge by presence has been a matter of dispute in theology. In this paper we attempt to answer the question how and in what way the knowledge by presence of the One will be achieved based on Plotinus and Rumi’s Views. It has been assumed that: there is a possibility of knowledge by presence for understanding the One through Nous; however, it will be achieved in the final step of Knowledge by presence, even by going beyond the Nous. The method of this article in understanding and analyzing Rumi and Plotinus’s discourses is comparative accompanied by the interpretive approach. The importance of the article, especially in the field of intercultural studies, is that although, contrary to Rumi, Plotinus mysticism is not bound to revelation and this mystic did not have much to do with the religion of his time (Christianity), the relative similarities are found as to the possibility of Knowledge by Presence to the One and its quality, apart from the difference in logic and expression.

In theological studies, the concept of personal God implies predicating to God attributes such as consciousness, will, life, power, goodness, and interlocution. These are God's attributes according to the sacred books of Abrahamic traditions. According to the followers of Open Theology, the way that classical theology describes God is incompatible with the Bible. They try to solve this by reconsidering and redefining divine attributes such as divine absoluteness, absolute simplicity, and perfection. In relation to the dichotomy of transcendence/personification of the Divine Truth, Allameh Tabatabei, however, finds a third way such that both parties receive the stance they deserve without sacrificing one for the other. Firstly, taking advantage of philosophical rules, he proves the viability of the predicating the personal attributes of perfection to God, and then in the next step, after making a distinction between the stations of Oneness and Unicity, he attributes transcendence, formlessness, and impersonality to the former, and attributes of perfection to the latter.

The imami-shi'i philosopher and theologian, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi in his great and influential work, Tajrid al-iʿtiqad, had advanced three arguments for what is commonly called "intellectual moral good and bad" (husn wa qubh 'aqli). Two of these three arguments are what we call respectively: "epistemological argument" and "mutual-reverse argument". Both of the conclusions and premises of the arguments are ambiguous and open to more than one interpretation. This paper separates epistemological and ontological aspects of each argument and after advancing their logical structures assess each one. On authors' opinion none of them can fulfill neither to prove the belief of people of justice ('Adliyya) nor invalidate their opponents' theory.

According to logical pluralism, there are several correct systems of logic. Most types of logical pluralism are based on the acceptance of logical relativism which means that the correctness of a system of logic depends entirely on distinct components of that system. Nevertheless, Beall and Restall claimed that they have proposed a kind of pluralism that is presented in a single language and does not entail accepting relativism. In this article, having introduced some of the most important types of logical pluralism, we tried to show that, contrary to Beall and Restall, their pluralism (i) cannot be presented in a single language; (ii) involves accepting a kind of relativism. Based on these results, we have tried to show that, by introducing a view titled “minimal monism”, if one wants to consider Beall and Restall pluralism as a credible perspective in this area, it is necessary for him to accept minimal monism.

The contemporary companions of Sadraean philosophy consider the problem of the materiality and immateriality as a gradational one; so, they have determined no other criterion of distinction between the materiality and immateriality than the perceptibility. This paper is aimed to show that, in Sadraean philosophy, to be material or immaterial is dependent on the existential levels of the existents. Thus, we attribute the materiality and immateriality simultaneously to the existents. Therefore, there is no external border between the two. The agent of attributing materiality and immateriality to the existents is the mind and our perspective. To be abstract or material are subjective as well as a priori categories of the mind to understand the realm of reality (or existence). The aforementioned conception of materiality and immateriality affects other problems, including the relation of the accident to the eternal, the relation between the soul and body, the immortality of the soul and eschatology.

There are two meanings of "Can" in the tradition of Islamic thought. Philosophers have adopted their definition regarding the notion of necessity and Theologians (Mutakallimin) have chosen theirs based on the contingency. In the former view, the agent is capable if he is able to choose to perform actions (he would have done otherwise if he had willed to) and not prevented by external barriers from fulfilling his wishes. On the other hand, in the latter, capability is contingent; Meaning the agent must have the possibility to do otherwise. Razi assumed that these two definitions can be referred to each other. Nasir al-Din al-Tusi believes that there is a significant discrepancy between two kinds of agencies: God and Human. In the case of human agency, these are interchangeable, but in the case of God, they are not. In this article, I elaborate on these claims. Then, I illustrate these definitions are not interchangeable, even in the case of human agency because the only reason was used to support this claim, i.e. contributory causation, has many flaws.

The aim of present study is to find   an answer to the following question: “What is the relationship between science and Shabah (Phantom) theory from Mulla Sadra’s point of view?” Mulla Sadra analysis about Phantom theory is summarized based on his lexical network and special existence approach. The following 4 stages shows his analysis about the theory: 1) Detection of contents of Phantom theory, denegation of the match between external existence and mental image, acceptance of existence effect of image and introduction of image as a cause that helps knowledge acquisition with his own special existence view,  2) useful expression that shows Phantom develops knowledge for qualities and what are inexistent,  3) introducing criticisms for Phantom theory and examination of criticisms, and 4) presenting a mental existence theory that develops science for qualities and what are inexistent and it also presents scientific reasons for other existents. We show, although strongly criticizing the Phantom theory, Mulla Sadra uses this theory for developing his mental existence theory. Although we do not insist on this conclusion, we believe this view will make the puzzle of relationship between science and Phantom theory enter a new stage.

Al-Farabi’s view on individuation has two versions: one is his strict view in his works and the other is what Mulla Sadra ascribes to him. His clearly expressed view in his Ta’liqat is that individuation is due two categories of time and position. However, Mulla Sadra argues that al-Farabi holds that it is due to how something exists. In what follows, the author is, first, seeking to clearly define the concept of individuation according to al-Farabi. He has, then, gone to determine how the verbal and logical structures of the proposition denoting al-Farabi’s view is. And, third, what the proposition denoting al-Farabi’s view on individuation bears to his indicative core idea in his web of meaning. The conceptual analysis has shown that, for al-Farabi, individuation is a relational concept. The propositional analysis proves that al-Farabis’s view on individuation of position is suffering from vagueness though. The systematic analysis demonstrates that the issue of individuation has been proposed for the later al-Farabi as a question and it bears a tie to his indicative core idea through existence. Nonetheless, it does not mean that one might refer to al-Farabi’s view on individuation as a proof to ascribe the primacy of existence theory to al-Farabi.