نشریه خردنامه صدرا
پیاپی 98 (زمستان 1398)

Weighing one’s actions in the hereafter is a definite matter and one of the important stages of auditing them based on the Qur’anic verses and the several traditions which have been quoted from Infallible Imāms (‘a). What has created multiple disputes regarding the problem of criterion includes the quality of measuring actions, the truth of having a criterion in the hereafter, and some other details which have been mentioned in the Holy Qur’ān and some traditions. As a philosopher and commentator of the Holy Qur’ān, Mullā Ṣadrā has tried to clarify this theorem based on his own rational principles and relying on Qur’anic verses and traditions. Following a descriptive-analytic method, while explaining Mullā Ṣadrā’s views of the truth and nature of the measure, the criterion for knowledge, the criterion for actions, and the weight of actions, this paper undertakes to evaluate them in terms of their consistency with Qur’anic verses.

Regarding the “principle of presupposition”, which is one of the important principles in the realm of philosophy, philosophers are unanimous in support of the “necessity of positive affirmation; however, there are some disagreements among them in relation to the “necessity of fixed affirmation”. Two theories have been presented on fixed affirmation: many well-known philosophers maintain that fixed affirmation is not necessary, while some others believe in the opposite. Mullā Ṣadrā is one of the followers of the latter position. He has quoted the theory of the lack of the necessity of fixed affirmation from one of its believers without providing the source. Some of the commentators of his works have attributed it to Sayyid Sanad in addition to Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī and ‘Allāmah Jalāl al-Dīn Dawānī. Nevertheless, the quoted theory does not correspond to what is found in Sayyid Sanad’s manuscripts and, conversely, he appears to believe in the “necessity of fixed affirmation”. The argument of the lack of necessity of fixed affirmation belongs to his contemporary thinker, ‘Allāmah Dawānī. Finally, the authors conclude that, while benefitting from Sayyid Sanad’s theory, Mullā Ṣadrā has provided a specific theory which is different from his.

Corporeal resurrection has been a controversial issue among Islamic mutakallimūn and philosophers since long ago. Mutakallimūn have demonstrated corporeal resurrection in a different way from philosophers based on their own fundamental principles and approach to the truth of Man. Among philosophers, the Peripatetics employed specific ontological and anthropological principles in order to explain spiritual resurrection and, in the light of such principles, Illuminationists developed their idea of Ideal resurrection. Moreover, based on a series of specific eschatological principles in his own philosophy, Mullā Ṣadrā explained the nature of corporeal-spiritual resurrection. This study aims to examine the role of eschatological principles in the reconstruction of the theory of corporeal resurrection and concludes that the failure of mutakallimūn and Peripatetic and Illuminationist philosophers in demonstrating corporeal-spiritual resurrection originates in their lack of access to certain eschatological principles, which is the reason why Mullā Ṣadrā did not agree with their theory of resurrection. Because of their lack of access to such principles as “gradation of existence”, “the soul as the reason for the thingness of human being and body, and “immateriality of the soul and the faculty of imagination”, mutakallimūn granted a material nature to human resurrection and their joys and pains in this process. Similarly, not having access to some principles such as “immateriality of the faculty of imagination”; “external effects of concepts, dispositions, and habits, and “nature of vision and the soul’s invention of immaterial forms similar to external forms”, Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī encountered some difficulties in their demonstration of corporeal resurrection.

This paper aims to present the views of four prominent Imamite mutakallimūn of the age of Imām Ṣādiq(‘a), which was considered to be the period of the flourishing and prevalence of kalāmī discussions, regarding the problem of capability based on rijālī books, indices, historical works on sects, and narrations. The findings indicate that some thinkers such as Zurārah Ibn A‘yan, Hishām Ibn Salīm, and Mu’min al-Ṭāq believed in capability before act and sometimes limited it to health. However, Hishām Ibn Ḥakam maintained that capability depends on five things, some of which are realized before the act and some during the act.

Despite the existence of different and, at times, contradictory views regarding ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s theory of mentally-posited things, almost all the studies carried out in this field unanimously presuppose that this theory is essentially of an epistemological nature and is intended to justify a series of human perceptions that have no equal in the outside. Although this presupposition is not wrong, it fails to explain all the realities regarding the theory of mentally-posited things. Here, the authors try to demonstrate that this theory is basically of an ontological rather than epistemological nature. Given the quality of propounding this theory in al-Wilāyah and al-Insān treatises, it appears that consideration is one of the specific features of the being of an immaterial Man who lives in the physical world. This is a feature that makes some human acts which are in a way related to material affairs possible.

Conduct is a keyword in Suhrawardī’s political system. In his view, conduct or wayfaring begins with self-knowledge at the individual level and moves them ahead to the social and political level and, finally, to ruling over a society. Suhrawardī’s intended ruler is a philosopher who, through self-knowledge, steps into higher worlds, including the world of Ideas, which is the first world higher than the world of bodies in Suhrawardī’s philosophy. Through wayfaring in this world, the philosopher turns into an intermediary between the world of human beings and the world of God and angels. Through self-knowledge, wayfaring in the world of Ideas, and obedience to God, the philosopher further reaches the level of the spiritual leader, Imām, and leadership of the world. By considering the ruler as the spiritual leader or Quṭb and as an individual who is capable of connecting with the world of Ideas and mediating between God and human beings, Suhrawardī investigates politics, governance, ideal governance, and utopia in the light of a new philosophy. His views in practical wisdom and, particularly, politics correspond to his views in theoretical wisdom concerning some principles such as gradation, nobler possibility, wrath and kindness, and gradedness of the world. For Suhrawardī, as the world of Ideas, which among his own innovations, mediates between the world of matter and the world of omnipotent lights, the philosopher-ruler is related to the world of Ideas and mediates between human beings and God and also angels. The ruling of a ruler with the characteristics intended by Suhrawardī is never idealistic, far-fetched, or limited to specific people; rather, it is quite real and possible. Such a ruler pays attention to people’s happiness not only in the material world but in the hereafter.

The nature of health and sickness and their relationship with each other is the first and most necessary theoretical issue in medical philosophy, upon which all other discussions in this field depend, and which has provoked several theoretical and practical controversies. Similar to some Islamic philosophers, Mullā Ṣadrā has also dealt with this problem. In his discussions, he explains Ibn Sīnā’s standpoint in this regard and defends him against his critics, the most prominent of whom is Fakhr al-Din Razi. In doing so, Mullā Ṣadrā follows the common wisdom of his own time and defines health as a state or condition of the soul through which mental acts are properly issued from their own specific sources and emphasizes the psychological nature of both health and sickness. Being more straightforward than Ibn Sīnā, Mullā Ṣadrā corresponds the relationship between health and sickness to that between habit and non-habit. However, he does not clearly refer to his position as to what comes between health and sickness. A study of Mullā Ṣadrā’s works indicates that, apart from his direct references to the nature of health and sickness, one can define health as “a mode of the existence of the soul which enables it to perform its acts properly at the level of physical and elemental body” based on the principles of the Transcendent Philosophy. In the same vein, through emphasizing the ontological nature of health and non-being nature of sickness and, accordingly, their being graded, one can refute the existence of any boundary or intermediary between them and, as a result, portray a distinct picture of health and sickness.