فصلنامه مطالعات بنیادین و کاربردی جهان اسلام
پیاپی 4 (تابستان 1399)

The relations between Iran and the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council countries have had many ups and downs since the foundation of this council in 1981. One of the primary purposes of the PGCC was the confrontation with the Islamic revolution and its ideology. This trend has been strengthening by the expansion of Iran's regional power and its missile and nuclear capabilities. With the beginning of uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 and the following expansion of regional competitions, the examination of the PGCC approach toward these developments and its reaction to Iran and the Axis of Resistance as Iran's strategic depth seems noteworthy. Accordingly, the present paper attempts at answering this question: Which security strategy has been followed by the PGCC toward Iran since the Islamic Awakening? 

A review of the existing literature on relations between Iran and the PGCC and their pattern of reaction to the security agendas of the other side shows that despite the existence of many publications and papers in this field (Sadeghi and Naqdi, 2014; Shirazi and Niko, 2014), the issue of the Security Council's security strategy on Iran has so far not been considered from a theoretical or analytical perspective. Some of these papers have even restricted this relationship to the dynamics of Iran and Saudi Arabia (Abuelghanam and Tahboub, 2018; Veisi, 2018; Koushki and Hoseini, 2015). In this regard, it is possible to refer to studies which have examined the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the form of an aggressive realism approach (Mahdian and et al., 2016).

The paper's methodology is an analytical-descriptive approach, and the authors adopt offensive realism as their theoretical framework. Library resources and other content sources, such as articles and dissertations, are used as the main sources of this research.

With the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the signs of a shift in Iran's regional power equation gradually became apparent. Accordingly, the monarchies (members of the Cooperation Council) saw Iran's growth in nuclear, military, and regional power as a serious threat to their very existence and survival. In response to such development, balancing was used as one of the main components of the Security Council's strategy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran.The escalation of the unrest in the Middle East as a result of the Islamic Awakening coincided with the Council's uncertainty about Iran's intentions (especially Iran's nuclear capability, missile program and regional policy) and its positive assessment of the capabilities of its rulers. Iran's aggression (economic power, military equipment and capabilities, and its political potential to form a coalition led to the aggressive behavior of the Cooperation Council.

At the heart of the PGCC's policies and strategies is their attempts to prevent Iran from becoming a regional hegemony. In line with Trump's strategy for the securitization of Iran's regional policy and managing the Palestinian conflict through the unilateral plan of the century deal, Axis of Arab ties with US plans have expanded.The PGCC, especially Saudi Arabia's Bandwagon Front in the council, has adopted an offensive approach toward Iran and used direct and proxy wars, building of international and regional alliances, and balancing and transferring responsibility to determine their purposes

In today's world, education is the fourth dimension of foreign policy. Educational cooperation is a kind of investment for the future of diplomatic relations among nations. Since the most political elites are selected from academia, the expansion of international scholarships and the admission of international students are two ways of introduction of their cultures and communities to the future political leaders and the senior executives around the world. Academic relations can also develop political and economic relations between the governments. It is argued that from an economic point of view, science and technology diplomacy can save countries’ national economies, because, first, it accelerates countries’ scientific development; second, it creates a wealth of economic experience and connections, and third, it expands trade, industry, science, and national gross income as an economic resource. From a cultural point of view, the most important function of science and technology diplomacy is to spread and export the values, principles, norms, and meanings of the national culture of countries to the international arena. One of the pillars of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran since the ninth government onward has been to expand the relations with Asian countries in the form of Look East Policy. This article tries to analyze and evaluate a part of Look East Policy, namely science and technology diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward the countries of the Southeast Asia region, especially the Islamic countries of this region. On this basis, we first address the issue of what is science and technology diplomacy and what are its components, features, and dimensions. Secondly, what are the goals and manifestations of this type of diplomacy? Third, what is the place of science and technology diplomacy in the Look East Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and finally, how is Iran's science and technology diplomacy evaluated in relation to the Islamic countries of Southeast Asia, namely Malaysia and Indonesia?

If we want to study the science and technology diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward the Islamic countries of Southeast Asia, namely Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, this study has to be done based on documented data. Unfortunately, there was no data on the country of Brunei in the research process, and therefore, this country was removed from the list of countries which were surveyed. There were also scattered data on scientific and technological cooperation of Iran on the one hand and Malaysia and Indonesia on the other hand, based on which the data of this topic has been adjusted. However, the science and technology diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward the Islamic countries of Southeast Asia is significant in some indicators, including joint scientific productions with researchers from Malaysia, the establishment of a Persian language department at Putra University Malaysia and the conclusion of memorandums and academic agreements, but in some respects it still needs further strengthening. It seems that before addressing other indicators of the science and technology diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward the Islamic countries of Southeast Asia, the issue of reviewing the Look East Policy should be on the agenda of the country's policymakers. Accordingly, the Look East Policy should move away from the initial reactionary and reflective status and become a strategic and long-term plan of Iran's foreign policy. The Islamic Republic of Iran can easily expand its cooperation with the mentioned countries in various fields, including science and technology, by belonging to the civilization of the Orient and having some cultural and religious commonalities and historical relations with the inhabitants of the Southeast Asian countries. Therefore, it must take a strategic and long-term approach to the great society of the East and devise a suitable strategy to make optimal use of the maximum capacity of Asian countries and promote its national interests.

In this regard, due to some cultural and religious commonalities, and historical relations with the countries of Southeast Asia, it is possible to come up with proposals focusing on different dimensions of diplomacy, which can be viewed as strategies for expanding science and technology diplomacy under the Look East Policy:• Holding joint scientific conferences and meetings in various areas;
• Identifying the scientific capabilities of the Islamic countries of the region and trying to strengthen relations in those fields;
• Compilation of a science and technology diplomacy document and determining the position of Islamic countries in the Southeast Asian region;
• Making efforts at further expansion of the exchange of professors and students between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic countries of the region;
• Promoting cooperation of national scientific and technological institutions with their counterparts in the Islamic countries of the region;
• Establishig Persian language departments in Malaysian and Indonesian universities;
• Using the capacity of regional institutions and organizations to expand scientific and technological relations;
• Holding training courses for Iranian ambassadors and diplomats in the countries of the region to get acquainted with science and technology diplomacy as well as the scientific developments in the country of mission.

The region of West Asia has long been the focus of numerous crises. On the one hand, the presence and intervention of supra-regional powers have exacerbated these crises, and on the other hand, ethnic-religious difference is the prominent feature of this region, which is one of the main causes of many crises in the region. Numerous factors, from the role of the region in energy supply to the expansion of the influence of trans-regional actors and the pursuit of containment policy, have attracted the attention of great powers to the region at different times. At the regional stage, ethnic and especially religious factors have in many cases led to dispute and crisis, and in some cases even to war. Therefore, according to these facts, the stressors in the region can be classified as follows: the presence and involvement of supra-regional powers in the regional issues as an external factor and ethnic-religious differences as an internal factor.As Buzan (2002) says, "The West Asian security crisis complex is a clear example of a conflicting structure, in addition to being particularly complex and extensive. Determining the exact date of this crisis in the region is difficult. However, the various aspects of the formation of crises in the region have a long history."

 The paper's methodology is an analytical-descriptive approach

Given the unstable relationship between Persian Gulf and West Asian actors and the increasing tensions among them, the main question of the present study is the possibility of forming a Secure Community in the region. According to the theory of Secure Community, how is it possible to form this society in the West Asian region? The response based on the theoretical frameworks is that according to the theory, the West Asian region could, in the most optimistic view, see a tightly – coupled and nascent Secure Community.In fact, the theory of Secure Community is based on cooperation and convergence  that has been proposed in the field of security, especially regional security. According to this theory, countries enter into a process of convergence that essentially avoids non-peaceful ways of resolving disputes among them and provides constructive interaction among actors to enforce laws and fulfill obligations among them.

Multilateral approaches to resolving regional issues, understanding common threats, tackling regional problems without resorting to force, expanding multilateral co-operation with respect to sovereignty, and interfering in the internal affairs of each other are essential requirements for the formation of Secure Community, while these capacities are not widely used in today West Asia.

Water resources in the international river basin, both surface and groundwater, are of vital importance to the countries located in that basin. The natural flow of water and its crossing national borders may lead to cooperation; however, it can also cause tensions, conflicts and sometimes wars between states. Due to its importance all over of the world, transboundary water resources need more attention from political and diplomatic circles. Therefore, transboundary water management is a central issue in world and foreign policy. The present study investigates water diplomacy role in settlement of the Nile international water dispute.

This article aims at promoting cooperation and resolving disputes in international basins. The main question is what role has water diplomacy played in resolving international disputes in the Nile Basin.
It is hypothesized that water diplomacy has contributed to the peaceful resolution of disputes by increasing cooperation with water institutions and international agreements in the basin.

A descriptive-analytical method is adopted to examine this hypothesis with the conceptual framework of water diplomacy. In addition, SPSS statistical software is used.

Based on the data taken from the website http://gis.nacse.org/tfdd/treaties.php, we dealt with water issues and related issues in order to analyze the events related to the Nile Basin and the treaties and international organizations (RBO). The findings of the study, which are concluded by analyzing the events of the Nile International Basin, show that water diplomacy in the context of smart foreign policy can address bilateral threats such as environmental threats, climate change and water supplies scarcity to develop bilateral and multilateral transboundary cooperation. Another finding of the study is that most of the tensions in the Nile Basin are of the type 10 tension, i.e. intense verbal conflicts such as severe  condemnation of actions or policies; condemnation of leaders, their systems or ideologies; postponing meetings of state leaders; refusals to attend meetings or summits, severe propaganda attacks, lack of support; blocking or vetoing policies or proposals that are specified in the United Nations or other international bodies. However, more hostile tensions are also seen in the form of hostile political and economic actions among the countries of the basin.

According to what was stated in these papers, it can be concluded that water diplomacy by using diplomatic tools and appealing to institutions and organizations in the river basin has been able to help reduce conflicts in the Nile Basin, but the success of these institutions in resolving the problems and the chapter on the Nile Basin cannot be overstated. We saw that in 1989 and 1990 the number of tensions increased and it can be concluded that the increase in tensions and their continuation led to a decrease in the number of international institutions and agreements for the settlement of conflicts in 2002, which in result led to the formation of eleven institutions, and this made the conflicts reduce until 2004, but due to the lack of cooperation of some countries, especially Egypt, we saw an increase in the conflicts in this basin in 2005. On the other hand, the cooperative approach of countries has been effective in reducing and avoiding conflicts in the basin. For example, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya have had more participations in institutions than other countries, and therefore they are considering participations in international organizations and treaties. (چه کشورهایی؟) have less tensions and conflicts, but Egypt has had more water tensions than other countries due to the lack of a cooperative approach. In short, the management and governance of transboundary waters poses significant challenges and opportunities for foreign policy makers and diplomatic agents to prevent conflicts and seize opportunities, including the development of regional cooperation. In relation to the decrease in water quality, socio-economic development of communities and increasing demand for fresh water, the necessity of the two issues of conflict prevention and the development of regional cooperation is constantly increasing. Environmental change is likely to exacerbate current socio-political disputes over water and intensify them in the future. This will be especially noticeable in areas that do not have the requisite institutions to develop regional cooperation.

Salafi extremism has been one of the most important dynamics in the Islamic world. Extremism has developed from the identity components of the internal foundation as well as the external structural pressure. For this reason, Salafi terrorism has become the main cause of regional unrest and a threat to international security. In addition to explaining why and how this problem arose, what is important is the continuation and change in the future situation of the Salafi movement in the Islamic world.

Accordingly, the main question of this study is what are the factors affecting the future trend of Salafi extremism in the Islamic world. The theoretical framework of constructivism is used to find the answer to this question. In such framework, we can pay attention to three levels of analysis, domestic, regional, and international. Also, structure and agent effects. In the following, the method of futures research is used with emphasis on trend research. In the process of research, the main factors that existed in the past are extracted. Based on this, future trends are identified .

Based on the research method, a conceptual model of the influence of extremism (agent) and the international system (structure) is presented. Based on this, the most important factors that affect the future of extremism are examined. Some factors seem to undermine extremism. These factors are considered a disadvantage such as internal divisions of extremist Salafi groups. Some factors that are mainly structural are presented as possible factors. Possible factors in three levels of domestic, regional, and international analysis, in the long term, cause extremism in the Islamic world. Also, in the medium term, extremist groups show behaviors in the face of the new situation. This case is also mentioned as a comparative action in research.

The main hypothesis of the research can be presented as follows: The interdependence of the structure of the international system and Salafi extremism with the escalation of bilateral violence has been a focal point in the four-decade process of Salafi extremism in the Islamic world. (e.g. the existence of sectarian states, identity competition, power imbalances, security gaps) and international (hegemonic structure, cultural unification pressures, the creation of a virtual nation) were considered for the continuation of extremism in the future. Of course, Salafi extremism with components such as changes in the geography of operations, the evolution of terrorist activity, and the redefinition of the Salafi invitation will lead to adaptation to new developments.

 On the eve of the beginning of the 1400s, one can stand on an adventurous century and consider the nature and fate of the various tragedies of this century full of advice and lessons: from the very costly world wars and the establishments of new countries with the fragmentation of formerly established countries to So-called humanitarian interventions and proxy wars. But among all these serious disasters, the most recent of them, the establishment of an Islamic state in a large part of Syria and Iraq, contains strategic and valuable lessons. Unfortunately, an accident of this magnitude was aborted in our country by ideologues, journalists, and researchers, while Iranians and Iranian academies could have resorted to international references on the pillars and the future of ISIS and similar groups due to Iran's forced involvement in this affair. It is a great loss and despair for Iranian masters to resort to Western sources to understand the roots, methods, and future of ISIS movements, while the war took place near the Iranian borders and thousands of Iranians were involved in this abnormal war, and could be treasury of data and analysis. Anyway, the fire of ISIS's claims has been extinguished. The first and the most simplistic assumption is that ISIS has disappeared and the way to deal with its re-emergence is to strengthen the special strike and counter-terrorist forces. The main question, however, is that, assuming the possibility of the re-emergence of ISIS or a similar group, where is the most favorable region in the Islamic world for such terrible groups to play, and what are the signs and symptoms of ISIS hosting. The present study tries to test the hypothesis that the main element in the jihadists' choice of al-Qaeda/ISIS is the feeling of occupation, and the main indication for estimating the place of emergence of ISIS or quasi-ISIS is the concept of statelessness.

Various answers have been given as to where ISIS will appear, but the method of analysis and research of this article is completely different. Most scholars on jihadist and fundamentalist groups emphasize one or more of the following components to explain the location of ISIS: Failed States  Jihadi mercenary army  Extension of the Caliphate: Revival of Islamic sharia on the earth with the establishment of a Model Islamic State Contrary to the above three assumptions, which have fallen into the etymological stage of ISIS and are incapable of understanding the present and especially the estimation of the future, the present paper looks into the future by focusing on radical Salafi movements (of the ISIS type), not through conventional futures studies and the arrangement of numerous and unusable scenarios in policy-making. In this study, focusing on the main texts and main repositories of ISIS thought, we explain the present and speculate the coming years.

It seems that wherever the influence of the government is not deep or whatever area that can be equipped, hidden and escaped, the establishment of ISIS is favorable. Based on this fact: Border areas such as Kandahar, Afghanistan, or any other area bordering Diyala province in Iraq, mountainous and inaccessible areas such as the mountainous areas of Tora Bora as well as the mountainous areas of western and even northern Iran, uninhabited areas such as remote southern villages in Kerman, and financially poor areas such as South Khorasan province have the potential to host Takfiri-Jihadi groups. The main sign of the announcement of the presence of ISIS and similar groups is the start of explosive operations, abductions, and suicide attacks, the occurrence of which is a sign of the start of operations of radical groups. These cases have been addressed in detail by radical fundamentalist theorists, and as noted, the most important role players are Abu Bakr al-Naji, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and Abu Qatada al-Palestinian. Therefore, as it is emphasized in the previous sentences that the way to recognize and deal with Takfiri movements such as ISIS is to first understand the driving force and emergence of Takfiri movements, and in this regard, it is needed to focus specifically on the component of the feeling of occupation and the experience of occupation and exclusion. And secondly, to avoid surprises it is necessary to take Aqaba and the intellectual reservoirs of this kind of movement in study centers seriously, because it seems that Iranian universities and study centers are more preoccupied than familiar with the currents of thought. They are Western thinkers.

Now, after getting acquainted with the mechanism of determining the areas of operations by Salafi-Takfiri groups, the objective and practical question is which areas have the talent to host ISIS and similar groups? Can ISIS be stationed in any area? What are the areas and squares that are likely to be of interest to them? According to the six rules and regulations mentioned earlier, it seems that wherever the influence of the government is not deep or whatever area that can be equipped, hidden and escaped, the establishment of ISIS is favorable.

In the recent years, a scientific look to the future and the attempt to obtain a scientific perspective of the future to make a strategic plan suited to the coming changes of the future have found a way to the academic circles, and this has let futures studies become an approved methodology among the researchers. Future studies helps decision-makers to get prepared to confront with the different scenarios and reduce the costs of decisions by giving a picture of factors affecting the future and a view of probable futures. So, the ability to identify the probable scenarios in the future relations of Iran with its neighboring countries can be one of the many applications of futures research, and the preface to that is the identification of the key factors affecting the future. Turkey is one of the most important neighbors of Iran. Iran and Turkey are two important and effective political players in the region. They have various geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-cultural competencies that help them be supplementary partners for one another. Of the common features of Iran and Turkey is their alternate sovereignty over many West Asian countries throughout history. This has influenced the culture of those countries. But due to special features of this region, the political, security, and economic aspects of the relations between these two countries have been highly stressed, and cultural relations have been to some extent neglected. Therefore, the cultural relations of these two countries are not at a reasonable level, despite the presence of potential capacity.

The present study follows a future studies approach to find the answer to the question of what are the key cultural factors affecting the future of Iran-Turkey relations. This research is exploratory in nature, practical in purpose, mixed in data gathering, and correlational in data analysis. In the current research, first, effective cultural variables on the future relations of Iran and Turkey are identified. Then, based on the experts' opinions, factors and grounds that affect Iran-Turkey relations are determined. Variables whose impact is confirmed by experts will be cultural factors affecting the future of Iran-Turkey relations. This study will also examine the factors in terms of importance and uncertainty to grasp the key cultural factors affecting the future of Iran-Turkey relations. Experts in this research are grouped into two categories: executive and academic.

Cultural variables affecting Iran-Turkey relations were identified by examining written sources and interviewing experts. These variables are: Ethnic commonalities between Iran and Turkey, which considers the ethnic commonalities of Turks and Kurds in the two countries; ethnic differences between Iran and Turkey that indicates the amity/enmity patterns; historical-cultural commonalities in the Persian language which deals with the Turkish people interest and teaching Persian in Turkish universities; religious commonalities between Iran and Turkey, which refers to the two countries being Muslim and to Islam as a common religion; religious differences (Shia-Sunni) between Iran and Turkey are also discussed; common cultural customs (weddings, mourning, food culture, music, art, etc.) and cultural connections and exchanges (holding film, music, and book week-rituals) are also factors that affect Iran-Turkey relations. Variables like Pan-Turkism and the probability of Turkey supporting Pan-Turkic separatist groups in Iran, the relationship between Iran and the Alawites in Turkey, the national registration of Iranian cultural and scientific figures by Turkey, the competition for soft power in West Asia, the competition for soft power in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and Iran's relationship with Shiites and supporters of the Islamic Revolution in Turkey were also examined.

By distributing a questionnaire among 35 experts on Iran-Turkey relations and adopting the IPA analytical method, the factors whose importance and uncertainty were higher than the threshold value were identified. Except for the variable of national registration of Iranian cultural figures by Turkey whose validity was not confirmed, other variables were identified as cultural factors affecting the future of Iran-Turkey relations. Finally, with the identification of the threshold value, the five factors of ethnic commonalities between Iran and Turkey, Pan-Turkism and the probability of Turkish support for Pan-Turkish movements in Iran, competitions for soft power in West Asia and Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as Iran's relationship with Shiites and supporters of the Islamic Revolution in Turkey were identified as key cultural factors affecting the future of Iran-Turkey relations.