مجله تاملات فلسفی
پیاپی 24 (بهار و تابستان 1399)

In this paper, first Physicalism is defined by the suggestion of David Lewis, and through the use of the concept of Supervenience. Afterwards, it is explained that among a variety of Emergentist's positions, a small number can be chosen to have an ontological inconsistency with Physicalism. In this regard, the Substantial Emergentism, based on the thoughts of Hasker, Lowe and Toner, and the Causal Emergentism, based on O'Connor and Wong's ideas, and their incompatibility with physicalism is explained. In the following, the relation of each of these ideas, with each other and with Physicalism and Cartesian Dualism, is analyzed. In the end, based on a metaphysical analysis, a new Emergentist's position is proposed; which its ontology is not a basically different plan from Physicalism, but at the same time inconsistent with it. It is also explained that the non-differentiation of this proposal with physicalism in terms of its ontological outline is its advantage over the emergentist's positions which are examined in this paper.

According to Cavell, on one hand relation between moral values and the reality based on the grammatical criteria of Wittgenstein is not rational; on the other hand, disability of moral criteria is not logical .From this point of view, the claim of having access to the pure reality is meaningless, because there is not a logical possibility of such success that one can or cannot do it. In other words, we don't have the natural possibility for having a logical and rational way to solve moral problems. Therefore moral issues are not rational.From the view of Cavell’s Wittgenstein, meaning is appearing during using language game inside its form of life. So, in the process of responding to an ethical request, Wittgenstein's human, responds to the reality in certain situations, depending on the conditions, with the intention and moral judgment, Thus from his view point, before using words in moral language games, we do not have meaning.

In his Illuminationist Hikmatic System, Suhrawardi started from himself and his intuitive self-conscousness and then he reached at the God. On the one hand, he found the identity of himself and his light causes as “presence by oneself”, and on the other hand, he explained the agency (origin-ness) and the other-consciousness of substantial lights by illuminationist relation. According to those parts of the philosopher’s constructive works which are devoted to the explanation of the identity and determination of the status of illumination and intuition in the spheres of existence and cognition, one can conclude that “existence” and “presence” are identical in Suhrawardi’s philosophy and the necessary generality of this function can be proven based on the self-consciousness and other-consciousness of the Light of Lights. By this approach, any possible gap between ontology and epistemology are systematically overcome. In fact, by tracing the knowledge by correspondence (mediated) back to the knowledge by presence (immediate), by founding the human cognition upon the intuitive necessity and certainty, Suhrawardi left behind the challenge of unrecognizability of correspondence between known-by-itself (the subjective) and known-by-something-else (the objective), and explained the recognition of personal identity.

Information technology makes possible the relationship between people around the ‎world. Hence, the information ethics theorists, such as Charles Ess, are trying to ‎propose a global ethical theory. Ess believes that this global theory in the field of ‎meta-ethics requires some kind of pluralism, in the name of interpretive pluralism, ‎and in the normative field of care ethics, virtue ethics and confucian ethics. This ‎paper, by using library research method and conceptual analysis, while introducing the view of Charles Ess, illustrates some of the most ‎important theoretical gaps in his project. His interpretive pluralism does not solve ‎the problem of relativism in relation to ethical judgment about “the other”. Also, his ‎defense of interpretive pluralism based on two incorrect assumptions. First, he has ‎supposed that cultural differences necessarily entail ethical differences; secondly, ‎he argues that pluralism is an accepted theory in all ethical approaches of the world. ‎In the normative field, the defense of the ethics of care, virtue and Confucius, in ‎contrast to consequentialism and deontologism, is not justified. The critiques do not ‎falsify the whole project, proposing a global information ethics; these clarify the ‎future paths of research to strengthen it.‎

10- Levinas, E., 1993, God, Death, and Time, Trans. Bettina Bergo, Stanford University Press 11- Levinas, E., 1998, Of God Who Comes to Mind, trans: Bettina Bergo, Stanford University Press, California (A) 12- Levinas, E., 2003, On Scape, Trans. by Bettina Bergo, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 13- Levinas. E, 1991, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. by Alphonso Lingis, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 14- Levinas, E., 1969, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Duquesne University Press 15- Llwelyn, John, 1995, Emmanuel Levinas: The Genealogy of Ethics, (London and New York: Routledge) 16- Newman, Michael, 2000, “Sensibility, Trauma, and theTrace: Levinas from Phenomenology to the Immemorial” in The Face of the Other & the Trace of God, edited by Jeffrey Bloechl, Fordham University Press 17- Putnam, Hilary, 2004, “Levinas and Judaism”, The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, Cambridge university press 18- Urbano, Ryan, 2012, “Approaching The Divine: Levinas on God, Religion, Idolatry, and Atheism”, in Logos, volume 15, number1 19- Visker, Rudi, 2000, “The Price of Being Dispossessed: Levinas's God and Freud's Trauma”, in The Face of the Other & the Trace of God, edited by Jeffrey Bloechl, Fordham University Press 20- Westphal, Merold, 2000, “Commanded Love and Divine Transcendence in Levinas and kierkekaard”, in The Face of the Other & the Trace of God, edited by Jeffrey Bloechl, Fordham University Press

Existence is the basis of Mulla Sadra's philosophy and his particular philosophical views. In the meantime, the question of the authenticity of existence is of great importance and is the basis of important debates in transcendent wisdom. Sadra has interpreted existence and essence in different interpretations, and each of the contemporary exponents of transcendent wisdom, on the basis of his own particular accepted principles, such as, acceptance of Sadra's personal unity of existence or form, and Sadra's various interpretations of existence and essence, somehow relate the essence to being. Mulla Sadra's commentary and commentary carry that interpretati. The present study is a descriptive-analytic one which seeks to determine the correct interpretation of the type of relationship of nature to existence. Therefore, in this paper, the interpretations of contemporary scholars on the question of the nature of the relation of nature to existence, are described and criticized. The author needs to distinguish between the ontological argument (the world of proof) and the epistemological one (the world of proof) in order to interpret the relation of nature to existenceIn this case, the apparent contradictions in Mulla Sadra's word will be resolved. Thus Amoli's Javidian theory that nature is the limit of existence, although true, seems to be true, but not true, since it only specifies the type of relation of nature to existence in the world of proof.

The main concern in this article is the study of the role of conceptual metaphors in the field of ethics. After defining and conceptual metaphor, with emphasis on the views of Lakoff, Johnson and Movement, generality, inherent conceptuality, and system structure as the three main components of this kind of metaphor introduced, and its structural, ontological and guiding types were discussed. It was also stated that morality is a metaphorical nature and can not be conceived without conceptual metaphors. The introduction of metaphor to morality is shaped in two main forms: metaphorical conceptualization of metaphorical concepts and conceptualization of a particular moral situation. On the basis of these two points, the probability of falling metaphorical ethics in the context of relativity and critique and analyzing it continued to work. The main findings and innovations of this paper are in the design of three criteria for measuring the efficiency of metaphors in the field of ethics. The type and extent of the effect of metaphor on ethical reality, the type and extent of the effect of metaphor on moral motivation and the type and extent of the effect of metaphor on the objectification or tangibility of moral concepts are criteria that can both prevent relativity in metaphoric ethics and facilitate their grading of value.

In his so-called Open Question Argument, Moore (1903) argues that the concept of "good" cannot be defined on the basis of natural concepts as well as non-natural ones. Following Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992), Paul Bloomfield has explained the non-reducibility of the concept of good based on its normativity. Moreover, he claims that the normativity is commensurable and similar to the so called normativity of meaning. According to Wittgenstein's rule following argument, meaning is normative, namely, expressions' meaning have action-guiding role; in other words, meaning normatively constrains an expression's use in language. Our aim in this paper is to consider Bloomfield's claim and compare normativity in ethics with the normativity of meaning. In order to do so, we will elucidate the open question argument and the normativity of meaning. We will then reconstruct Bloomfield's argument, and finally argue that, contra Bloomfield, the normativity in ethics and the normativity of meaning are not similar.

AbstractEmergent dualism is a recent view about the nature of the soul introduced by William Hasker in 1999. He moves away from the main stream reductionist and physicalist theories about mental properties and mind and advances a view which has affinities with MullaSadra's bodily Hoduth of the Soul. In this paper, we examine these tow theories comparatively.A working theory about the nature of the soul have to provide us with plausible answers to two main problems: the problem of pairing and the problem of the survival of the soul after the bodily death. Emergent dualism endorses the emergence of a novel substance from a physiological base which has irreducible mental properties and is a distinct endurable entity. While this theory has similarities with Sadraean view, there are differences in the way of articulating the arguments as well as background metaphysical theories. These differences are particularly important in addressing the problem of the survival of the soul after the bodily death.

The present article to examine the topic of self-knowledge of the mystical and philosophical dimension from the point of view of the two eastern and western mystic philosophers sheikh shahabudinsuhrawardi and sorenkierkegaard with comparative look. Kierkegaard consistently belives in his philosophy to handle the general affairs and the nature of things has causel the human to not know and ignor his ownself.sheikheshragh also in numerous works especially in his encoded stories have always been the factores of human neglect of its essence including human downfall attachment to its belongins and his entangled in prison body. What Kierkegaard as existential movement to achieve self-knowledge express at different stages. He most approached suhrawardis mystical teachings because he introduces heart to God and endeavours with faith and seriousness for evolution in the inner that are the most important tools of self- knowledge. Of course in this regard there is fundamental difference with suhrawardi because in his thinking he has no belief in using rational propositions and analyzes in relation to the question of self- knowledge. However suhrawardiapplay the only correct way to your own truth to both the rational and the mystical method which complement each other.

In this article we examined the conflicts of Avicenna as an Aristotlian philosopher and two groups of Islamic theologians on the applicability of mathematical idealizations in natural philosophy. for our aim, we considered two ideal thought experiments suggested by theologians in which the geometrical idealization was emphsised. by considering the reactions to theses cases, we found that there are two different views on applicability of this method in the theologians' side, their metaphysical assumption, atomism, led them to a limitless method which could make their theory satisfactory and one of the ways among this boundless domain is mathematical idealization. in the other side, Avicenna and the other prepatetic philosophers didn't require this method for proving their metaphysical assumption and also believed in some bounded method in natural philosophy, in which hypothetical possibilities weren’t allowed. according to this limited method, mathematical idealization counted as an abstract hypothesis and may noy be used in concrete natural inquiries

In this article, we try to investigate and compare the thought of the two intellectuals of two completely different cultures, an Iranian thinker and poet Saeb Tabrizi, a German thinker and philosopher Nietzsche. Nietzsche, with the predominance of the elements of Dionysius against the elements of Apollonius, opposed the intellect, and Saeb was also influenced by the style of Hindi and with such things as the expensive psychic reason; incompleteness; arrogance; weakness and disability; capturing; enchantment; controversy; Tragic in his poems. Nietzsche and Saeb were both heavily influenced by the tradition of Hindu Buddhism, and in this tradition the intellect was incapable of understanding the nature of reality and human life. To illustrate the similarity of these two thinkers, we divide the article into two parts. In the first part, we discuss Nietzsche's irrationalism, and in the second part we deal with irrationalism of Saeb, and in the section of the result we have evaluated this issue in the form of a diagram to these two thinkers. In this article we have tried to use the main sources of these two thinkers..