نشریه کلام اسلامی
پیاپی 112 (زمستان 1398)

The existence of God is one of the most important issues in the first philosophy. The necessary being is a being whose existence is not dependent on anything else and the creation argument is the argument that the existence of God is proved by the existence of his creation, and this is a kind of dependence for proving the existence of God, and creation is separate from God, so we must accept that something other than God is involved in proving the existence of God. But philosophers, have noticed that it is better if the proof of the existence of God does not depend on something else, but relies solely on himself. Therefore, since his existence is not based on his creation, it is better if his proof is not based on his creation. This type of argument has been called the the argument of the truthful and Ibn Sina claims that he has interpreted such an argument; Because the objective existence, which denies sophistry, is either obligatory or possible, and in both cases it is proved to be obligatory, and on this basis it claims that its argument is the argument of the truthful; Because the proof of God's existence is not based on something else- that is, his creation. But Mulla Sadra, emphasizing the correctness of Ibn Sina's argument, does not consider it to be the argument of the truthful. The present article, based on the analysis of Ibn Sina's argument and the analysis of Mulla Sadra's critiques, shows why Ibn Sina's argument is not the argument of the truthful from the point of view of Mulla Sadra. Therefore, the range of arguments that have followed Ibn Sina's argument is not the argument of the truthful. Of course, these arguments are superior to the creation argument, and therefore, according to Mulla Sadra, Ibn Sina's argument is close to the method of the argument of the truthful. In the end, we will mention why Mulla Sadra's argument is true.

Mulla Sadra has given several answers to the problem of evil. He considered good as an existential thing and evil as non-existent, but offered two definitions of good and evil. In the present article, after examining the relationship between evil and non-existence, and the prime matter and entity, Sadra's seemingly contradictory statements in this regard were explained and Sadra's final opinion was introduced as the equating of evil with non-existence. On the other hand, according to the doubt in the unique reality and in the fundamentality of existence and in the union of the matter and form, as well as the question of the possibility of movement in abstractions, which is one of the essential principles of Sadra's Hekmat Motaalie, the material and abstract boundaries have been removed and the five probabilities of the universe posed by Aristotle in solving the problem of evil were reduced to three probabilities and caused the return of natural evil to metaphysical evil. Examining the moral evil, we finally came to the conclusion that the return of all evil to metaphysical evil, and the most central answer to the problem of evil based on the principles of Hekmat Motaalie is the non-existence of evil. Also, Sadra's general view of the world as a personal unit proved the superiority of the world and the system that governs it through the efficient and ultimate cause of the world, and attributed the evil in it to the existential need of the world.

The Imams, based on rational and narrative arguments, believe that all the prophets and messengers of God are infallible towards all abominations, including the condemned fear. However, according to the text of the Holy Quran, some prophets have been frightened, and have been forbidden. Some deniers of the infallibility of the prophets, by quoting such verses, have raised doubts about the infallibility of the prophets. The present article, using a descriptive-analytical method, examines this issue from the point of view of reason and narration, and by dividing fear into praiseworthy and reprehensible, shows that the prophets are infallible towards reprehensible fear and praiseworthy and natural fear does not contradict infallibility. And further, has answered the doubts of the deniers of the infallibility of the prophets.

What is called "exaltation" in this article is the argument that Ibn Taymiyyah has made in his books about the repentance of the prophets and their innocence from sins. According to this argument, the prophets were not innocent of their sins and always prayed to God for their sins. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, this repentance does not contradict the position of the prophets and does not cause their dignity to be diminished, but such repentance leads to the elevation of their position; Because God Himself has commanded repentance and called Himself repentance. In the present study, attempt to evaluate Ibn Taymiyyah's view on the truth of the prophets' repentance from sins by a descriptive-analytical method and with a critical approach. In the end, it is concluded that his view is inconsistent with such things as: the truth of repentance, the consensus of scholars, and explicit verses of the Qur'an.

The scope of the Imam's knowledge is one of the most important issues of the Imamate, which has long been discussed among Islamic theologians. Imami theologians agree that the Imam should have a comprehensive and complete knowledge of the teachings and rules of religion, but have some differences about the Imam's awareness of the facts of the world of creation and past, present and future events, the interior of human beings, purgatory news, and resurrection.Undoubtedly, one of the main sources of this difference is two categories of narrations, some of which discuss the Imam's knowledge about the mentioned cases and others speak about the increase of the Imam's knowledge. The content of the second category of narrations is to increase the knowledge of the Imam at a specific time that conflicts with his knowledge of the above-mentioned matters. In the present article, the conflict between these two categories of narrations in terms of document and meaning will be resolved.

Zayn al-Din Bayazi is one of the prominent Shiite scholars in the ninth century AH. Using the sciences in which he was considered a professor, he was able to compile valuable works in theology. He hold a special place on reason, and makes extensive use of rational reasoning. However, he is not unaware of the authority of revelation and uses this method of knowledge in its place. The same approach and method caused the emergence of pure theological works from him with the color and smell of reason and at the same time having the authority of revelation.