پژوهشنامه متین
پیاپی 86 (بهار 1399)

Social capital is among the most important sources of power in human groups and societies. University is one of the main contexts for the formation of social groups and development of social capital. University functions as a fundamental institution, which can be a basis for learning how to produce social capital. Imam Khomeini considered the role of university and seminary as a very important one in developments and growth of social capital, where the correction or corruption of the society takes place. The objective of the present research is to study and identify the factors influencing the development of social capital in the universities with emphasis on Imam Khomeini’s viewpoints, and, also to design a model for its development. This research is qualitative and its statistical population consisted of university professors and experts. The sample was selected through targeted sampling method until saturation (50 interviews). Theism, Islam-centrism, service for the sake of God, belief in divine supervision as well as abidance by law, religion and ideology are among the factors that constitute the foundation and requirements for the development of social capital in the universities. These factors were codified under causal conditions. The findings of the research indicate that based on Imam Khomeini’s viewpoints, trust, participation, accountability, social solidarity, security and preservation of Islamic values are among the consequences of the adoption of appropriate strategies in evaluation and development of social capital in the universities.

 In religious communities, interaction based on legislative method tends to trivialism and the study of extrinsic layers. Therefore, an effect-oriented approach receives priority in comparison with a cause-oriented reflection. On this basis, full observance of and object-oriented approach to the factors supporting Sharia precepts, that are very helpful in quality of deduction, fall into oblivion in the course of jurisprudential action. It is urgent to pay attention to such argument, particularly in invigorating Shia jurisprudence in its interaction with modern crises. Addressing Maqasid al-Sharia (the objectives behind Sharia law rulings) in Ijtihad (the use of reason to arrive at knowledge of truth in religious matters) results in dynamism of jurisprudence and appropriate response to the newly emerging issues indeed. In this paper, developed by a descriptive-analytical method and through compiling library documents, the role of Maqasid al-Sharia in dynamism of Shia jurisprudence has been studied. A review of practical methods and manners of the jurists in deducing religious precepts led to the conclusion that the best method for the use of reason to arrive at knowledge of truth in religious matters is Ijtihad by virtue of fundamental texts and supervision of Maqasid. This means the objectives behind Islamic rulings, as the principles and generalities of Sharia law, play key roles in interpretation and clarification of religious tests. Resorting to the principle of Maqasid al-Sharia in deducing precepts and using this element in determining the extent and strength of the texts, Imam Khomeini argues that distinguishing authentic texts from unauthentic ones, conflict of evidence, inferring precepts on newly emerging issues, etc. would result in dynamism of Islamic jurisprudence in terms of compatibility of the precepts with the progress in the society and appropriate response to the newly emerging issues.

Coexistence of the followers of various religions and faiths under a single government as well as the jurisprudential rule of Ilzam (obligation) have facilitated behaving non-Shia Iranians and recognizing their personal status and capacity according to their religious rules and regulations. Upon passing the single-article bill on observing personal status and capacity of non-Shia Iranians in 1933, the lawsuits of officially recognized minorities on last wills shall be subject to rules and common law of the religion of the deceased one unless in cases related to public order, as stipulated in the second clause of the law. The rule of Ilzam has been underscored in two articles of 12 and 13 of the I. R. of Iran Constitutional Law. While studying the law governing the last will and reviewing its jurisprudential basis, this paper has presented an appropriate response to the following question: Does the single-article act include cases with Shia and non-Shia sides in the lawsuit? In response, the phrase “non-Shia Iranians” may refer to cases where lawsuit parties are both non-Shia Iranians, thus it may be inapplicable to cases where a Shia Iranian and a non-Shia Iranian are involved. Therefore, in this case judgment will be based on civil law whereas it can be claimed that by virtue of the rule of Ilzam the priority will be with the aforesaid religious laws.

Right of inheritance is a branch of private law with a longer history than other majors. It is impossible to distribute inheritance without identifying the degree of succession. In the meantime, French law contains one of the oldest and ordered written rules on inheritance. Some of the jurisprudential arguments on inheritance have similarities with the French law. In this paper, descriptive-historical method has been employed, and, relying on Imam Khomeini’s viewpoints, attempts have been made to study the degree of succession in distribution of inheritance in two independent Islamic legal systems that have both been established based on the Holy Quran. We have compared and contrasted the two with the French law to identify the roots of differences in Shia, Sunni and French inheritance laws.

The theory of “interpreting words in their common meanings” is a highly valuable practice in understanding words from the Holy Quran that are impossible to understand based on their denotative meanings. This theory, while sticking to the privilege of surface meaning, prevents falling into inappropriate interpretations and misunderstandings. It can also help getting higher meanings from normal words. Advocates of this theory claim that words have been made for broader meanings than what we actually imagine. Meanings, like the world of being, possess layers and underlying meanings. Among advocates of this theory, Imam Khomeini has made a statement worthy of deliberation. Contrary to this, Mostafa Khomeini rejects the theory as a chimerical and logically unfounded practice with its roots in confused discussion of theosophical and common issues. This paper has applied a critical approach to clarify the two views wherein we came to the conclusion that although Imam Khomeini’s statement on this theory is facing serious challenges, unlike Mostafa Khomeini’s view, it does not ever signify unfoundedness and inaccuracy of the theory of Ruh-e Ma’na (meaning spirit of the meaning, another name for the theory of Ma’ani Ammeh, or interpreting words in their common meanings).

Offer and acceptance are the most important issues in formation of Islamic contracts and transactions. Offer and acceptance are sometimes realized by expression and at other times by action. The latter, known as Mut’ah marriage signifies a private and verbal temporary marriage contract. The offer in contracts has long been the focus of attention of jurists for which various viewpoints have been expressed so far. In view of the prominent jurists, the expression of offer and acceptance in marriage contracts is a precondition, although some resort to generalities of the contracts and pertinent traditions to reject conditionality of offer and acceptance to expression. This is because expression in contract is out of question and its validity is inconsistent with the related laws. This paper has studied legal and jurisprudential aspects of Mut’ah marriage with an approach based on Imam Khomeini’s views through a descriptive-analytical method. We have reviewed opinions by Imam Khomeini and other jurists to analyze the soundness of Mut’ah marriage.

 The wife’s right of refusal in case of the husband’s refusal to pay her mahr (the obligation, in the form of money or possessions, paid by the groom to the bride at the time of marriage) under certain conditions and circumstances is valid in Islamic jurisprudence and law. In Civil Law, articles 1085 and 1086 stipulate the right of refusal. Different interpretations of the articles have led to the Supreme Court decision on a unified judicial precedent, again raising different questions and interpretations that are inconsistent with the jurisprudential precedent. Of course, the jurists’ statement is apparently rich enough to bear maximum interpretation of the right of refusal. However, since consensus is the most important reason for validity of the right of refusal, and because consensus is a proof by expression, when in doubt, we should consider its degree of certainty. Here, the degree of certainty stands for sexual submission. Thanks to Unified Judicial Precedent 718 we should suffice to degree of certainty and accept the application of affirmation of the right of refusal to obedience and its renunciation to sexual submission. Imam Khomeini, too, was positive on this viewpoint. Abundance of different rules by civil courts after issuance of the Unified Judicial Precedent 718 indicates that this article of the Civil Law is yet to be interpreted by virtue of legal and jurisprudential criteria. An interpretation compatible with the legal logic is the one differentiating object of the right of refusal from the object of renunciation of the right of refusal.

This paper studies the connection between government and non-private properties by reviewing opinions of the jurists to present a jurisprudential analysis on possession of these properties and their legitimate use by the government. In other words, we intend to present a jurisprudential view and a general formula for compatibility with the status of individual vis-à-vis government properties. The possession of non-private properties must be realized upon prior permission of the infallible Imam or religious leader. By permission of the Imam we mean revering the title of the Islamic leadership and the position of the guardianship of Islamic ummah, which is taken from the opinions of Sheikh Tousi, Sheikh Mofid, Allameh Helli and Imam Khomeini. Therefore, any possession, confiscation, and assignment of these properties must be upon prior permission of the Imam. In the absence of the Infallible Imam, the right of issuing permission will be with his successors or religious leader of the Islamic community. The innovation of this paper includes discussing instruments for guardianship of Islamic ummah, powers and possession of non-private properties by the ruler, and dividing them into private and non-private properties.