مجله فلسفه و کلام اسلامی
سال پنجاه و سوم شماره 2 (پاییز و زمستان 1399)

Apophatic theology, as an important theory in the field of the language of religion, has many supporters in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic theology, and a firm link continue to exist between them in the three areas of ontology, epistemology, and semantics of divine attributes. Based on the findings of this research, Allameh Tabatabai, in some philosophical and mystical treatises, and in some instances in his Tafsir al-Mizan, while passing through positive theology in the field of the ontology of divine attributes and being influenced by some mystics, especially Sayyid Ahmad Krbalaeie, accepted apophatic theology in this area, and believed that great philosophers such as Farabi, Ibn Sina and even Mulla Sadra did not have any idea of this viewpoint. According to Allameh Tabatabai, the infinitude of the divine nature on the one hand, and the limitation of abstract understanding, on the other, justifies the apophatic theology and prevents the acceptance of positive theology while confirming the variety of the concepts of perfection on the divine nature.

Since the emergence of non-classical logics in the twentieth century, the assumption that logical knowledge is a priori has been challenged. Currently, logicians speak of preferring one logical theory over another and presenting a model of rational choice. “Inference to the best explanation” is a proposed model for the rational selection among scientific theories, and in this paper, we show that logical theories have the necessary features to apply such a methodology in the field of logic. Particularly, we show that such preferential treatment is not merely a liberal choice of a logical language, as Carnap supposed, but the inconsistency with some accepted evidence leads logicians to choose a logic theory that is compatible with that evidence. The Meaning variances of the logical constants are one of the issues that challenge the commensurability of logic theories. Having explained different solutions to this problem, we try to defend the best one in a way that avoids criticism.

One of the philosophical issues that can be followed by the works of Shaikh al-Ishraq is the principles of action. According to Shaikh al-Ishraq, the principles of action are: perception, preference, desire and will. The action depends on the present knowledge of the body and its powers, the preconceived notion of action and the acknowledgment of its expediency and priority. After imagining an action, doing it requires its preferring to do to its quitting. This preference occurs on the basis of the domination of desire or on the basis of affirmation of expediency. After preferring action, man becomes interested in action because he finds it his perfection. With the formation of desire, the will is also formed. With the determination of the will, the action is done. If the action is a physical one, it also requires the active faculties. In this article, after introducing each of these principles, its various dimensions have been studied from the point of view of Shaikh a-Ishraq, and finally, some differences between Shaikh al-Ishraq's point of view and Ibn Sina's have been stated.

This paper argues that the nature of reason has a prior and undifferentiated knowledge, purely and necessarily, of what religion is. Accordingly, whenever the reason encounters the reality of religion, based on this prior knowledge, it succeeds in recognizing this reality, and whenever reason encounters a pseudo religion, it does not accept this kind of religion and put it aside on the basis of that undifferentiated knowledge. Based on this undifferentiated knowledge, many of the definitions of religion are disregarded. Eventually, this knowledge is revealed both in theoretical and practical reason and the two are related to each other. These foundations in theoretical reason are the origin of the being, the guide of existence, and the ultimate world, and in practical reason, are the origin, the guide, and the world of morality. The principles and the bases of being and morality are the knowledge of the nature of reason that together provide a definition of religion that can be accepted by all the people and can be far from personal and individual opinions. By this definition, we can get closer to the universal knowledge of religion.

In the recent decade, the proponents of the Common Consent Argument have considered traditional interpretations of this argument futile, and instead, have presented a new format of this reasoning that was relying on the common agreement among people in many historical periods in the past, it provides the best explanation of the truth of theism. The present study aims to answer the following questions: Has theism been a collective belief in all human societies during the history? Can we conclude the truth of a belief based on the assumption of some collective consensus over that belief? The results of the study indicate that using empirical independent evidences, the first premise of this argument states that many people in the past and nowadays believe in the existence of some supernatural and sacred Supreme Being or deities. The second premise of this reasoning relying on epistemic Universalism, denotes the likely truth of common religious beliefs among people, although the interpretations of the theory of evolution are considered as a serious competitor against the justification and truth of such beliefs.

One of the greatest challenges faced by physicists and philosophers, in relation to the principle of causality, is the interpretation of uncertainty relations. Thus, several views have developed on this issue, a couple of the most important and yet contradictory of which are the views of Boehm and Heisenberg. Mulla Sadra’s philosophy has, also, provided some responses in its ontological and philosophical encounter with this issue. Hence, the present study, based on these principles and the certainty of causality, intends to explain, compare and analyze some fundamentals like the improvability of causality, the distinction between real and preparing causes, the concomitance of the real cause with necessity and cognation so that some light is shed on the darker aspects of the issue. Finally, the term “incertitude” is recommended to be used as an alternative for “uncertainty” due to cognitive errors induced by homonymies and particular philosophical sensitivities.

The mover (muhrek) is one of the basic elements of motion (hrakah). Mulla Sadra considers the distinction of the origin of motion, its end, its distance, the moving (muteharek), and time as a conceptual one, and believes that all of them have only a single instance; however, some philosophers, including Mulla Sadra, believe in the distinction of the mover instances. Unlike the motion and the moving that are distinguished only in accidental motions, the motion and the mover is necessarily different in all forms of motion. In substantial motion, the motion and the moving unite, but in accidental qualities, the motion is distinguished from the moving and is considered as a property.In substantial motion, motion in the moving is essential and there is no difference between the motion and the moving, and the moving substance is the source of motion in the accidental qualities. Although motion inherently exists in motion substance, it does not suggest that the motion needs no causes, but on the contrary, in this case, the need of motion for the cause is more. In the present paper, first, the difference between motion and the moving substance is showed. Then, the seven arguments of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi on the necessity of the existence of a mover distinct from the moving are proposed and the differences between the perspectives of Mulla Sadra and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi are discussed, and by using the substantial motion theory, for the existence of unmoved mover will be argued.

In his categorization of the unblesseds and infidels, Mulla Sadra mentions of a group, called innate infidels, whom he believes that they are born infidels. Innate infidelity contradicts with some of the other Mulla Sadra’s views, human divine nature, which is mentioned in Quran, human free will, and the unity of human genesis. We will show that the motivation of infidelity in human without power won’t result in infidelity or determination. Human tendency to infidelity is in consistency with his/her divine nature and its consequences like eagerness to the pure beneficence because human nature is a synthesis of different desires.

In this essay, we will sort out William James's arguments in his ‘The Will to Believe’. These arguments range from an argument against Clifford's model of evidentialism, an argument for the right to believe and an argument for the will to believe. There are two micro-level arguments, as well, that are the argument to have more true beliefs and the argument to have less false beliefs. James uses the two latter micro-level arguments for his three former macro-level arguments. The totality of the structure of his arguments rests on two foundations: credulity and the dispositional theory of belief. Without these two foundations, none of his arguments in his The Will to Believe work. They will be presented before delving into the discussions about James's arguments. James's arguments have an evidential model which is different from Clifford's model of evidentialism. Therefore, his arguments against Clifford's model should not be construed as against evidentialism tout court. At the end, certain corollaries of his arguments will be discussed.

For the first time, it was in Greek that reason was recognized as the only source of knowledge in contrast to mystical views. It was by Aristotle that this approach was highlighted. For this reason, we know Aristotle as an outstanding and an ultimate instance of Greek reason. In this article, based upon the early Christian theologian views, our hypothesis is that common sense, that we know as Greek reason, was the only source for knowledge. Accordingly, we have studied some of the great early Christian theologian views to find their concept of reason. Our conclusion is that when Christian theologians had characterized reason as worldly or human wisdom, they would have meant it the very Aristotelian-Greek concept, namely, the only source for common knowledge. In contrast, according to them, there was another source of knowledge, namely, “faith” that was gained not by the reason but by the Grace.

Avicenna defines “future possibility” as the negation of any necessity in the future. He considers the absence of the object as the wrong condition for this type of possibility. In this research, the concepts of general possibility, special possibility, contingency, and future possibility are formulated. The author then proceeds to demonstrate that the definition of the contingency, as presented in the Book of Healing (Kitāb al-Shifā), suffers from ambiguity. Finally, the author explores the question of whether the addition of some condition, which was added after Avicenna, to the definition of future possibility, namely, “the negation of necessity conditioned by predication”, is warranted or not. Two analyses of future possibility will then be presented and the author attempts to show that Qutb al-Din Razi had proposed the aforementioned condition before Sabzivari. As will be shown, this condition is not compatible with Avicenna's modal system.

It seems somehow difficult to defend the Cartesian view about mind-body causation, considering nowadays neurologists’ findings about the human brain and philosophical critiques to it. However, Jonathan Lowe, based on some revisions on some of Descartes’ presumptions and also sketching a new plan of mind-body causation, tries to present a new view, being also in the framework of Substance Dualism. In this article, we are trying to show Lowe’s model superior to the Cartesian one. So, at first, we will show some important problems with which substance dualism confronts, such as the causal nexus problem, the pairing problem and the causal closure problem. After that, we will explain that Lowe has the ability of figuring out the causal nexus problem and the pairing problem by reconsidering some of Descartes’ presumptions. Also, considering the mind position and its role Lowe assumes in the physical world, he cannot only explain the voluntary actions of human, but also reconcile his view with causal closure principle, although it seems that his view needs more clearness in some aspects.

Through considering the real correspondence between human and the levels of existence and the two methods of finding truth: “intuition”, in Hikmah al-Ishragh, and “esoteric commentary”, in al-Hikmah al-Muta'aliyah, it can be possible to reach some form of knowledge.In this article, through studying the aforementioned two methods in Hikmah al-Ishragh, and al-Hikmah al-Muta'aliyah, we examine the obtained knowledge, which can be called intensification knowledge (al-ilm al-ishtidadi), and can be introduced as a new kind of knowledge.