نشریه مطالعات راهبردی جهان اسلام
سال بیست و یکم شماره 2 (پیاپی 82، تابستان 1399)

Undoubtedly, one of the main reasons for the Arab states to normalize relations with the Zionist regime, both in the past and in the present, has been to gain the consent and support of the United States. The trend intensified with the inauguration of Donald Trump, with Trump adviser Jared Kushner saying that as Trump entered the White House, Arabs became more interested in accepting Israel officially.
But this issue is not limited to the presidency of Donald Trump, but is also pursued during the presidency of Biden. Because the Arab governments intend to have the support of the United States in the days after January 20, 2021. In fact, "American West Asian policy" under Trump is being pursued by Zionist officials. Since the Trump administration did not have specific policies and priorities for West Asia - with the exception of pre-existing arms deals - and only sought to isolate the Islamic Republic of Iran, its policies were largely from the eyes of the Zionist regime. In fact, Benjamin Netanyahu was decisive in this regard. “Jared Kushner" played the role of Donald Trump's representative in this regard, and the Christian right wing in the White House determined Donald Trump's West Asian policy and practically reflected the policy of the Zionist regime.

There is no formal discourse or politics in Turkey that calls itself post-Kemalist, and this is the only theoretical concept that analysts have given to some individuals and groups in Turkey. The first politician who can be called a post-Kemalist is Najmuddin Erbakan, who came to power in June 1996 under Suleiman Demirel's government. The rise to power of the Welfare Party in the mid-1991s under the leadership of Erbakan was the first major separation of Kemalism in domestic and foreign policy. Criticism of the West and Israel, moderation toward the Kurds, use of Islamic literature and words, multilateralism in foreign policy, attempts to distance from the West and closeness to Islamic countries (so that he did not travel to any Western country and most of his trips was to Islamic countries) Disobedience to the Damato law and the continuation of relations with Iran and Libya, the signing of a 20-year gas agreement with Iran and the establishment of an Islamic organization were among Arbakan's post-Kemalist approaches.
Arbakan's post-Kemalist approaches failed much sooner than it seemed, and it was the Kemalists and the militaries that, with a white coup, ousted him from power in 1997. Nevertheless, the post-Kemalism project remained as a discourse at the heart of Turkish politics, and this time in the early 2000s, the AKP's political leaders once again had the opportunity to run for the Turkish government. But they took strong steps in their path this time.

Following the crisis in Syria, the Islamic Republic of Iran entered the country as a regional power supporting the government of Bashar al-Assad and took steps to support the ruling regime in various political, military, security, economic and media fields. In the light of the Nehzat actions in both hard and soft areas, the Islamic Republic of Iran tried to achive a set of strategic goals, including the survival of Bashar al-Assad, keeping Syria in the axis of resistance and, consequently, the territorial connection between Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, stop the spread and influence of the Takfiri ideology, as well as the preservation of the strategic backup and the support of Hezbollah in Syria in order to confront the Zionist regime.
Examining the Nehzat actions of the Islamic Republic of Iran during the Syrian crisis provides a roadmap in this field for the benefit of other political units that are members of the resistance and for decision-makers in the field of Nehzat.
The Nehzat experience of the Islamic Republic during the Syrian crisis shows that there is a two-way relationship between the Nehzat's actions in both the hardware and software fields, and in other words, diplomacy and the military field. In fact, soft movement actions without reliance on military and field capabilities do not have the necessary effectiveness in the field of diplomacy, and on the other hand, military and security actions without reliance on political and diplomatic attachments do not have the necessary impact in the field to change balance. .

It is not a secret that Sardar Shahid Ghasem Soleimani is known as an invincible general on the battlefield. But as far as the power of his military command is concerned, his human aspects have been neglected. This article intends to provide a suitable narrative of the purpose under study, relying on the method of narrative research.
The findings show that the concept of Velayat as a prominent human aspect governing the actions of the commander has diverted his interaction with the elites and the general public to such an extent that he considers working for the people as a means of nearness to God. He has a positive attitude towards others and therefore has knowledge and respect for the personality of others at the forefront of his interactions. Understanding the position of the external and internal audience and the ability to process the audience's thought, in order to promote understanding with them is one of his outstanding features and ultimately the school attributed to him.
The results show that three important communication currents can be seen in describing the human aspects of Sardar: the flow of social interactions (in the interaction between the righteous man and the dignified man), the flow of servitude (in the interaction between the righteous man and man as the caliph) and the flow of guidance ( In the interaction between the aspect of the divine caliph of man and the aspect of his dignity). These three streams are presented in the final research model.

The components that shape the Soleimani school have different dimensions and in the direction of psychic and horizon, which is manifested in the framework of how his personal action, knowledge and insight are constructed, and by using central core and identity-building, he has been able to create a coherent set of equivalence and regular chains. And follow the progressive in his monotheistic life. Such a school, which is based on a monotheistic paradigm and is a meaningful infrastructure and context for the activities of Martyr Soleimani, is based on cultural and ideological themes. Naturally, the set of components and elements in this paradigm that is supposed to play a role in this school and take steps towards its lofty goals, it is necessary to be in harmony with the value, insight and action systems in the personality of the martyr. The media is considered as one of the tools through which this idea is spread in various forms and themes and can act as an extension of school propositions in the field of geomedia to create poles of cohesive, geopolitical and geostrategic media. The present article, while examining the salient components of the Soleimani school's discourse, seeks to answer with a descriptive and analytical approach the question of what components or central and discourse idiots are in the style of  the Soleimani school's and what role or roles it can play in exercising the school's discourse power. Findings show that the Soleimani school-style media has a normatively monotheistic worldview, with social responsibility towards the people, add to Velayat, trans-sectoral discourse power, anti-colonialism and support for the oppressed.