فصلنامه نقد و نظر
سال بیست و پنجم شماره 4 (پیاپی 100، زمستان 1399)

According to Heidegger, Western nihilism arises from it is metaphysics-stricken history beginning from Plato. Since it ignores existence and concerns itself with existents, metaphysics leads to nihilism. Heidegger’s solution for dealing with metaphysics and nihilism is to turn our attention to art. Art reveals a world that has already existed, thereby it creates a people and its history and overcomes metaphysics. The problem in this article is how metaphysics leads to nihilism and how art overcomes metaphysics. By adopting an analytic-inferential method, the article aims to show that the problem lies in the relationship between metaphysics and art, on the one hand, and the sensible, on the other. We seek to show the relationship between the two in order to demonstrate the role of art in overcoming metaphysics. We conclude that metaphysics has relegated the sensible to an unreal existent, while art can create and realize the sensible from a non-metaphysical starting point, in which way it can make it possible to overcome metaphysics.

Most successful scientific theories are intermingled with, and involve the main components of, creative realism. That is, they are structurally related to realistic issues and concepts, and yet they inspire imagination without being grounded in illusions or pre-established principles. Based on theoretical models and by adopting an analytic and library method, this article seeks to provide an analysis of creative realism as part of the process of discovering new theories and notions in science. We conclude that notions of creative realism cannot be achieved without structural connection and imaginative provocation, since structural connection preserves the most crucial similarities and the deepest features of the previous notion in the present notion, and imaginative provocation provides us with consequences of a new notion and effective scientific possibilities in the relevant field of cognition. The criteria for evaluation of creative realism are powerful epistemic means by awareness of which scientists and inventors can achieve the features of a notion which increases creative realism.

There tend to be key concepts in the thought of any philosopher which represents their intellectual system and serves as a ground for the existence and understanding of other concepts and thoughts of his. The concept of death is such a key concept in Plato’s thought. In his philosophy, there is a profound relation among the concepts of philosophy, catharsis, and death. It seems that understanding them and explaining the relation among them might pave the path for a better understanding of his views. By adopting a descriptive-analytic method, we aim to show the connection among “philosophy,” “catharsis,” and “philosopher’s death.” The stages of this research are in accordance with Plato’s writings so as to open a door to an understanding of many concepts in his philosophy. We conclude that in his view, philosophy, the philosopher’s death, and catharsis are all grounded in the same foundation. It is true that philosophy is a particular kind of discourse between two persons, death is the separation of the soul from the body, and catharsis is the purification of the soul from bodily attachments, but all these three cases involve a common concept of the soul’s separation from flowing things and its turning toward the real and eternal being. Thus, not only do they have the same function in terms of their instances and none of them is possible without the other, there is also an implicit correspondence in their concepts as well.

Imam Khomeini and Meister Eckhart are two well-known Muslim and Christian mystics, respectively. In their mystical views, the spiritual traveler’s soul will finally be annihilated in God’s being. In this article, we are concerned with whether the doctrine of annihilation (fanā’) has the same intellectual foundations in their views? Their views are comparatively considered in analytic-inferential terms in order to learn about the nature of the soul’s annihilation. One common assumption made by both is the soul’s immateriality, which prepares the ground for an account of the soul’s epistemic annihilation. The soul’s journey begins with love in the views of Imam Khomeini and Eckhart. For the former, the annihilation and transformation occur in the traveler’s soul through a manifestation of divinity at the stage of Oneness (Aḥadiyya), while for the latter, annihilation occurs at the stage of Unity (wāḥidiyya) which is higher than the stage of divinity and existence. At any rate, the manifestation of divinity and the intuition of the Lord occur at the stage of divinity or Eckhart’s stage of Unity, which is for Imam Khomeini the stage of divine determination. For this reason, annihilation is the soul’s epistemic and existential transformation and its being affected by divine names and attributes, rather than the destruction of the soul. For both of these intellectuals, the major accomplishment through the soul’s annihilation is the “intuition of the unity of existence,” in addition to the soul’s emptiness from anything but God.

A requirement for theological discussions today is to account for the role of kalām (Islamic theology) in solving practical problems and to show the consequences of theological theories. This article seeks to account for practical consequences of the theory of the embodiment of actions as a philosophical-theological theory. In this article, I tackle the question: How does the theory of the embodiment of actions impact the solutions to theological problems, particular the problem of resurrection? By adopting an analytic-library method, I show that this theory plays a crucial role in justifying and rationalizing doctrines such as bodily resurrection, divine justice, crime-punishment proportionality, eternal life in the Heaven and the Hell, the nature of the book of actions, metempsychosis, and God’s kindly power in afterlife punishments.

Barzakh (the intermediate world between this world and afterlife) and psychological changes therein is a controversial issue in Islamic philosophy and theology. Knowledge of the nature of man in barzakh will have a tremendous impact on solutions to issues of happiness and misery as well as human perfection. As to existential degrees, barzakh is lower in existential strength and intensity than intellect and higher than matter, and as to its characteristics and consequences, it enjoys those of both sides. According to Ḥasanzādih Āmulī, the human soul is embodied in an afterlife body in proportion to its psychological characters. The intensity of one’s existence is due to knowledge and actions. Adopting an analytic method and by considering the imaginal world (‘ālam al-mithāl) in Ḥasanzādih Āmulī’s view, this paper seeks to provide a clear picture of the relation between the human nature and his eschatology in the world of barzakh, on the one hand, and his this-worldly knowledge and actions, on the other hand. We conclude that the imaginal body always accompanies man, with abstract shapes, forms, and sizes; that is, those that are detached from matter. Moreover, after reaching a degree of perfection, the soul can leave the natural body, and in barzakh it can undergo perfections through knowledge and action.

Since Sunni Muslims do not accept textually implied imamate and caliphate, they propounded the theory of the righteousness of all the Sahaba—Prophet Muhammad’s companions—in order to establish a trust in the media of conveying Islamic doctrines and rulings from the Prophet to the next generations, and they did so by making a recourse to a number of Quranic verses and hadiths. In this article, I adopt a descriptive and analytic method to criticize the theory. The question here is: Are Quranic verses concerning the Sahaba’s faith compatible with the theory of Sahaba’s righteousness? In this article, we consider Quranic verses associated with the theory, such as those regarding forerunners in faith, persistence on faith, the pledge of faith, degrees of faith, false profession of faith, weakness in faith, and giving up the faith. I conclude that the theory of the Sahaba’s righteousness does not rest on a firm ground. In fact, Sahaba were, just like other followers of Islam, susceptible of major sins as demanded by the human creation and personal desires, and some of them actually committed such sins.

One major reason offered by the Shi‘a for Imam ‘Alī’s rightfulness for imamate and immediate succession of Prophet Muhammad is his superiority over all people except the Prophet. Fakhr al-Rāzī, a Sunni exegete and theologian, has in his book, Al-arba‘īn fī uṣūl al-dīn (The Forty in the principles of the religion), criticized the reasons for Imam ‘Alī’s superiority, such as al-Mubāhala Verse, being the first Muslim, being more knowledgeable, jihad, courage, and other hadiths implying his virtues. In this article, I deploy the views of Shiite scholars and adopt a descriptive and analytic method to consider Fakhr al-Rāzī’s objections. I conclude that none of his objections to the reasons for the superiority of Imam ‘Alī over others is valid.