نشریه مطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی
پیاپی 27 (پاییز و زمستان 1399)

The Emergence of the new Independent States in the Northeastern Region of Iran has provided a variety of opportunities and challenges to this country. Iran’s Economic Relation with central Asian republics has dramatically fluctuated in recent decades due to the effects of different factors. A combination of factors such as common historical ties, the impact of the security situation in the region, Muslim population and economic attractions, has highlighted the importance of developing relations with Central Asian countries. In this regard, Iran’s relations with Central Asian countries have been affected by bilateral, regional, and international developments. < p class="a">The main question that has been raised in this study from the political economy perspective is which bilateral, regional, and international factors have had a prominent role in forming Iran relations with central Asian republics? The hypothesis is that in comparison with international and regional factors, bilateral factors have had a prominent role in forming the nature of Iran’s relation with those countries. Bilateral issues like tensions with Turkmenistan in connection with the gas prices and with Tajikistan regarding the Islamic Resistance party and the negative historical memory that originated from Babak Zanjani’s Money laundering have immensely affected Iran’s relations with these countries. These bilateral issues have shown their effects on Iran’s economic relations with these countries since 2013 and again intensified in 2016, so the value of Iran’s export to Turkmenistan decreased from 1 billion dollars in 2014 to 400 million dollars in 2018. < p class="a">Interestingly, during the previous sanctions regime, which was intensified in 2012, we saw an upward trend in the value of Iran’s exports to Turkmenistan. Corresponding to Tajikistan, the value of Iran’s export to this country decreased from about 217 million dollars in 2017 to 78 million dollars in 2018 before the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the imposition of new sanctions against Iran. This subject shows the critical role of bilateral factors in comparison with regional and international ones. Expanding cooperation in the fields of trade, mutual investment, energy, and agriculture are counted as the main context for cooperation with these countries. Strategies such as trying to reconcile bilateral issues and building trust through active political and public diplomacy, adopting multilateral diplomacy for multilateral economic cooperation with economically influential countries, cooperating with these countries in the field of extraterritorial cultivation and implementing free trade agreements with Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are proposed to strengthen Iran’s economic security concerning these countries. < p class="a">Regarding the regional variables, most experts consider the Russian factor and its sensitivities to its Near-abroad as the main obstacle to the expansion of relations with Central Asian countries. In this regard, Russia cannot tolerate the presence of other regional powers in Central Asia due to the importance of its near-abroad, including Central Asia, in its foreign policy doctrine. Nevertheless, the study of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan’s trading partners shows the strong presence of China, Turkey and European countries in their trade and economy.  Therefore, although Russia is particularly sensitive to the presence of other powers in the region in the security, military-economic and trade spheres, it is gradually accepting the presence of other regional and international players. Therefore, regional variables and Russia’s factor cannot be considered as determining factors with regard to Iran’s economic relations with Central Asian countries. < p class="a">Corresponding to the international factors, given that the US economic ties with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are weak, their economic ties with Iran are less affected by the US sanctions. In this research, an attempt has been made to examine each variable by using descriptive, analytical and positivist methods.

The concept of development, which was formally introduced to the international community after World War II, has undergone various changes. Initially, development was a one-sided term that could mostly imply economic progress. But by the passage of time, it gained different facets and definitions. Therefore, in modern time development is a multifaceted concept that includes different aspects of life, from economic growth to social, political, and the latest and most prime one, human development. Nowadays, development is a key issue in governments’ national plans and these governments try to use all their potentials and possible opportunities to pave the way for the progress and development of their country. Central Asian states are also attempting to consider special programs for progress and development. This issue is highly regarded in the policy-making process in the third decade of independence of Central Asian States. Kazakhstan for instance could turn into a developing country by preparing the required infrastructures. They could even do better than other neighboring states in the region. However, it was a long bumpy ride for this country. In the first decade of independence, there was a lack of ruling power in the region. In addition to the domestic problems that Russia and Kazakhstan were facing at that time, Kazakhstan had no choice but to boost its economic ties with western powers like the U.S that had already planned to gain the advantage of the region’s hydrocarbon resources. This period of time is referred to as the discourse of distancing from Moscow and turning to the west. Having regained power, Russia tried to return to Central Asia. Therefore, five states began improving their ties with Russia again. But in the third decade, the CIS countries including Kazakhstan realized that they need a better understanding of development based on their national potentials and demands. Kazakhstan for example, perceived that it can neither ignore Russia as an old ally nor neglect the rapid pace of progress and development in the world and the western countries, in particular, therefore it tried to take a novel stand on both national and foreign policy to provide progress and advancement in the country.   In this regard, this research is an attempt to address the important question as to what is the development pattern of Kazakhstan during 2010-2020? To answer this question, authors introduce a hypothesis which suggests that Kazakhstan development pattern during 2010-2020 was based on exogenous and balanced development pattern. Kazakhstan implemented this pattern by employing multilateral diplomacy, using international opportunities, improving relations with both Western/Eastern powers especially the U.S and EU on the one hand and with Russia and China on the other. To make this clear, the article unfolds the programs and policies employed by the government of Kazakhstan and will also discuss various aspects of the development of Kazakhstan in brief. Not so long after the independence, the government introduced a brand new strategy called Kazakhstan strategy-2030. In addition to this early strategy, several other national strategies were introduced during the coming years. Among the main goals of these strategies were boosting economic growth, human development, citizens’ prosperity, social and inter-ethnic integrity, sustainable development, etc. Addressing the economic development of Kazakhstan, it had lots of fluctuations but in recent years it has been improved. Thanks to exporting hydrocarbon products, Kazakhstan is one of the main energy providers of the EU. China and Russia are amongst other top destinations of Kazakhstan exports. Aside from the statistics, it can be understood that Kazakhstan’s economic strategies are based on a balanced policy and multilateralism to gain the advantages of all possible economic opportunities. They mostly import from Russia and simultaneously export mostly to the EU via Russia. They are also benefiting from cooperating with the Chinese companies in building the infrastructure for the Belt and Road initiative in addition to connecting their national infrastructure program (titled Nurly Zhul) to the Chinese programs. All this indicates that Kazakhstan has chosen a balancing policy in its relations with great powers so they can benefit from every possible opportunity to enhance their developments. From the political aspect, Kazakhstan has seen Nazarbayev as its one and only president for 30 years. Even though he resigned from power, his leverage in political affairs is still felt. He is in charge of Kazakhstan National Security Council and Nur Otan, the most powerful political party in the country. He is also called the Father of Nation and is exempted from some issues such as investigations. Furthermore, his family members have critical positions in important economic sectors. However, in 2017, a series of constitutional amendments led to the transfer of some power from the government to parliament. But as observers report, parliament is not doing well in effectively overseeing the presidency. According to the statements of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, elections in Kazakhstan have consistently failed to meet international standards such as neutrality, consensus and transparency. The next important factors about Kazakhstan development are human and sustainable development. Over the past decade, Kazakhstan has been able to meet most of the indicators of human development and has made good progress in important indicators such as social welfare, health, education and employment especially when compared with its neighbors in Central Asia. The growth of these indicators is another sign of the correct implementation of a balanced policy in the internal affairs of this country. Even if there were some challenges in implementing sustainable development goals, but as the recent national reports show, the situation has become better and more efforts are in progress to meet the whole criteria of sustainable development. Finally, Kazakhstan’s relations with its key partners including Russia, China, EU and the U.S show that this country has succeeded in implementing a balanced foreign policy and multilateralism. Having close military-economic ties with Russia as well as cooperating in infrastructural projects with China plus having strong political-economic ties with the EU and the US, all have made Kazakhstan the most successful country in Central Asia that could have implemented the balanced and multilateral policies to pursue its goals towards progress, growth and sustainable development. Therefore, it could be said that the pattern of development in Kazakhstan is an exogenous development one.

Mir Arab Madrasa was built in 1553 A.d by Seyyed Abdullah Yemeni Hadramauti, nicknamed Mir Arab, one of the sheikhs of the Naqshbandiyya sect, and Friday prayer leader of Bukhara during the reign of Obaidullah Khan Sheibani (r. 1534-1539). Mir Arab granted the finance of Madrasa by trading Iranian slaves, captivated in the battle of Ghazdewan. Soon, it became an important center for religious higher education along with other Madrasas in Bukharaand students of religious sciences from all over the Muslim-populated areas of Russia and other neighboring towns entered Bukhara to continue their studies. Many Muslims of that territory were breaking into Madrasa of Bukhara, passing Postgraduate and returning to their homeland as an imam or a Khatib in Madrasa or mosques. Namely, Tatar, Hafizuddin Bernagwi, accepted the offer of Khatib in 1850A.d/1267A.d also Ali Mufti  bin Walid, was originally from Semey, Kazakhstan and graduate of Bukhara Madrasa, appointed as Kokand’s mufti in 1865A.D/1282A.H. Many Tatar and Bashkir scholars who studied in Bukhara became known as “Bukharais” after returning to their homeland. In addition to the significant credit they presented to their community, they also enjoyed a privileged social and saintly status. The educated youth of Kazan found promoters in capitalists, to train scholastics in the way they had been taught themselves. Till the end of Emir Mohammed Alim Khan’s rule, coincident with the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, the Mir Arab Madrasas were held on (from 1910-1920 A.D/ 1329-1339A.H). During the Soviet Union era, after the fall of Bukhara by the red army, the mentioned Madrasa like the other seminaries was closed in years till 1945A.D following parley between the head office of Muslim clergies in central Asia and Kazakhstan and the ruling party reopened in 1946 A.D. Traditional national architecture is peculiar to this building a square yard surrounded by two floors of cells, two big domed halls in the left and right corners. Two-store loggias that are adjoining the main façade in the center highlighted with a portal. The inner yard is adorned with composed carved mosaic. In the center of the madrasa, there is a shrine of Ubaydulla emir of Bukhara, who had ruled the city from 1533 to 1540 A.D. At the head of the building, you will see a burial place of the spiritual guide of the khan Miri Arab, whose honor the building got its name. Life in the Mir Arab SCHSA began with the private study of several brief tracts: Awwal-i ‘ilm , a short track that covered the essential requirements (zururiyat) of Islam in a question-and-answer format; Bidan, an exposition of the basic rules of Arabic grammar in Persianand Adab-i muta’allimin, which covered the adab of the student. After that, the student read Sharh-i Mulla, a commentary on Ibn Hajib’s Kafiya (which the student had already studied) by Abdurrahman Jami, the Timurid poet; written in Arabic, this was the first book studied with a mudarris. At the same time, the student started studying formal logic with an assistant teacher, using the Shamsiya of Najmuddin Qazvini (d.1276); when he was ready, he moved on to the Hashiya-yi Qutbi, a commentary on Shamsiya; concurrently with the Hashiya, the student was introduced to theology (‘Ilm-i kalam ) through the ‘Aqa‘id of Abu Hafs Nasafi (d. 1142), which he read with an assistant teacher. Later, the student moved to various glosses on this book. These were followed by the Tahzib ul-Mantiq wa’l kalam , a tract on logic and dogma by Sa’duddin Taftazani (d. 1381); Hikmat ul-‘ayn by Qazvini, a tract on natural science and metaphysics; Mulla Jalal, a commentary by Jalaluddin Dawwami (d. 1502) on the ‘Aqa‘id ul-adudiyat of Abdurrahman b. Ahmad al-Iji (d. 1356), a tract on Muslim beliefs. There was no formal termination of studies in the madrasa and many students lingered on for decades. The core texts, however, could be mastered in nineteen years. Formal lessons took place four days a week. The entire study group assembled; a designated reader (qari, elected by the students) read out the passage to be discussed; the mudarris then translated the passage (if necessary) and proceeded to explain and comment on it; a disputation involving the students concluded the lesson. There was no compulsion to take courses at the madrasa of residence; indeed, at many madrasas no lectures were held at all. A student was free to learn from any professor in the city. The Madrasa year, lasting from September to March, was short, allowing students to work productively in the summer. Indeed, many students left Bukhara for their villages in October to gather the harvest. At the same time, sons of Ulama began madrasa education with a distinct advantage in cultural capital and wealthy students could always hire others to tutor them. This article intends to answer this question by using historical and archival sources and in a descriptive-analytical manner looks for what role have Bukhara Madrasas played in the spread of Trans-Islamic culture? Therefore, to respond to this question, Mir Arab Madrasa, which is considered to be the most important and largest Madrasa in Bukhara, has been chosen as a case study. Hence, the prominent position of Bukhara Madrasas in the spread of transcendental Islamic culture will be explained.  The research results show that the Madrasas of Bukhara, of which Mir Arab Madrasa is an example, have been the center of protection of the discourse of the Islamic tradition of this land. Moreover, these people played an important and effective role in propagating and spreading Islamic culture among the Turkish and Tatar peoples of the Qabchaq Plain and protecting the Islamic identity of these people against the domination of Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union.

Due to the unbalanced distribution of resources as well as unique political geography in the age of globalization based on international political economy, the global geopolitical systems alone are not able to meet their needs in various structural and functional areas to meet their interests and shortcomings to each other. They are interdependent. Among them are geopolitical capacities for cooperation and interaction to achieve common interests between neighbor-centered political actors, energy geopolitics (energy sources and energy transit corridors), and positive hydro-politics (cooperation in common water basins). On the one hand, the increasing population growth and in line with it, the scarcity and unequal distribution of water resources, has increased competition for water resources, especially shared water resources in the border areas between the countries. Under these conditions, border rivers can provide the basis for cooperation between neighboring states based on the principles of diplomacy and understanding of geographical realities. On the other, the existence of energy resources and transit corridors, specifically in this respect, choosing the optimal way to reduce geopolitical dependence, can pave the way for cooperation between the countries. As a regional power in Southwest Asia, Iran has numerous neighbors and long borders, including land, sea, and river, with different political approaches; Iran’s long borders and its numerous neighbors offer a range of opportunities and threats. One of the sources of threat and opportunity in relation to Iran’s neighbors is hydro-political issues in border rivers and the role of Iran’s position in energy transfer. Cooperation on water issues based on water diplomacy and the hydro-structuring approach can pave the way for cooperation in other geopolitical dimensions, including energy geopolitics. Therefore, Iran, with its wide border rivers, needs to establish cooperation based on the principles of diplomacy and formulate strategies to generate opportunities in the surrounding environment to enhance its regional power. Turkmenistan is one of the influential countries in the periphery of Iran with long borders and common water resources in northeastern Iran. Central Asia in general and Turkmenistan, in particular, are among droughty countries and this situation has led to a divergence in Central Asian countries. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan, as a downstream state is in dire need of water resources on its borders, including on its border with Iran, for its sustainable development of agriculture and industry. On the other hand, given that cooperation with Turkmenistan is part of Iran’s geopolitical interests, so ties based on common geopolitical factors with this country can have profound effects on enhancing Iran’s power on the Central Asian geopolitical scene. Turkmenistan is Iran’s gateway to the Central Asian region to establish relations with the countries of this geostrategic region. One of Turkmenistan’s challenges is how to transfer its energy resources to the world markets. The country is landlocked and has no access to the high seas, so its political future and independence depend on choosing optimal routes to transfer energy resources to consumer markets. On the other hand, Iran’s geography connects different regions and considering that Iran connects the two water zones of the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, this country has a great capacity to create a corridor in the transfer of energy resources. Accordingly, the present article seeks to find a suitable answer to this question of what effect the two factors namely water resources and energy transfer have on relations between Iran and Turkmenistan by using a qualitative method and library resources. It has been hypothesized that “the most favorable practical context for the promotion of Iran-Turkmenistan relations lies in the two areas of hydro-politics and geopolitics of energy because the two countries are complementary to each other in these areas”. But the situation of Iran in the international system with the West has shown that despite the existence of favorable grounds based on common geopolitical factors, these relations have not formed fully yet. According to the findings of the article, Turkmenistan needs water supplying cooperations in border rivers, including joint rivers with Iran, to create sustainable development in the field of agriculture and industrial growth. Given the growing importance of water resources, water diplomacy between the two countries and the allocation of more water by Iran to Turkmenistan, as well as the establishment of joint water projects in the border areas, this can pave the ground for cooperation in other fields. Turkmenistan is also one of the richest countries in the field of gas resources. Iran can turn Turkmenistan’s vast gas reserves into one of its energy supplying hubs in the future. What limits Turkmenistan’s energy policy face is its landlocked location and lack of access to international waters; therefore, one of the main goals of Turkmenistan is to get out of geographical isolation and diversify its energy transmission routes to reach global markets and reduce dependence on Russia. According to the findings of this article, one of the countries in the periphery of Turkmenistan that can reduce its structural shortcomings is Iran. Iran has a unique geopolitical position and with its long sea borders, it connects several geo-economic regions of the world. On the other hand, Iran, as a regional power, needs to build constructive relations with its neighbors in foreign policy and Turkmenistan can be a link in establishing relations with the geopolitical region of Central Asia. What has limited the good neighborly relations between the two countries despite unique structural and functional capacities is the situation of Iran in the international system, but the international system is dynamic, and in the future, Iran will be at the focus of regional cooperations.

In 2013, China launched the New Silk Road plan as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. In this plan, “the near abroad” states, especially Central Asians, will have an important contribution. Russia was initially reluctant and pessimistic regarding China’s move, taking it as another step by China to expand its economic and political influence in Russia’s sphere of influence and its backyard, but then joined the plan and was turned into one of its backers. In recent years, China has gained widespread influence and presence in countries that have been separated from the Soviet Union, especially in Central Asia. China’s current total exports to five Central Asian countries are higher than Russia’s level of exchange. China’s entry into the post-Soviet region as a powerful player adds a new layer of complexity to Moscow’s efforts to manage interactions with members of the Eurasian Economic Union, particularly Belarus and Kazakhstan. But Russia’s main concern seems to be the interference of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative with the Eurasian Economic Union. Another reason why Russia is skeptical about China’s plan is that Russia has extensive plans in the field of regionalism with the seceded countries from the Soviet Union in the political, economic, and security realms. This makes Russia look at the zero-sum game approach with any similar plan put forward by the great powers in the realm of co-independent states. Another Russian concern is the geopolitical implications of China’s plan. In connection with the Belt and Road Initiative, China, as a general practice in foreign policy, has sought to avoid the geopolitical literature and present its plan in the context of soft policy and economic and cultural cooperation. The plan of one-belt one-road is a Chinese-oriented plan. This plan is comparable to the US Marshall Plan after World War II. Although China insists on calling this a win-win plan, other analyses could turn it into a win-lose for Russia in the long run. The issue that worries Russia is that China’s plan is not as normal as its bilateral relations vis –a–vis Russia. When China gain access and dominates the infrastructure and financial sectors of the post-Soviet sphere of influence, including energy links, banking, insurance, mining, etc., it will have practically dominated all these countries, leaving no room for Russian activism. As such, the Silk Road Economic Belt is more than a crossroad and will provide a platform for China to increase its political influence in the heart of Eurasia. The main point that considers the plan of Chinese one-belt one-road a long-term threat to Russia is that China is investing billions of dollars in neighboring countries within the framework of detailed and multi-dimensional contracts. Regardless of the economic and commercial dimensions of these contracts, which could leave less room for Russia, the issue is the security of large infrastructure investments. In other words, the region in which Russia has been trying for decades to prevent Western and NATO’s influence, and virtually any non-Russian power is witnessing China is expanding its all-out influence. According to this, the question of this research is that despite Russia’s initial pessimism, what is the reason for Russia’s entry into China’s new Silk and Road initiative? In response, the hypothesis is that following Western pressure and sanctions against Russia after the Ukrainian crisis and the emergence of economic problems and political isolation, Russia decided to reduce its economic and political vulnerabilities by participating in China’s new plan. Russia also defines the Eurasian Economic Union project in line with China’s plan and seeks to reap its benefits by cooperating with the project. The research method is quantitative and the method of data collection is based on library and reliable internet sources. The main variable is Russia’s soft power balance and the dependent variable is Russia’s cooperation with China in the one-belt one-road initiative. Finally, given the increasing pressure from Western countries on Russia in recent years, especially after the Crimean crisis and EU economic sanctions and increasing pressure from NATO, Russia has responded positively to China’s Silk and Road plan despite its initial reluctance. Of course, part of the reason for Russia’s acceptance of this plan was the inevitable economic expansion of China in Russia’s adjacent regions. However, Russia still has various and powerful instruments to counter and sabotage the Chinese plan, especially in Central Asian countries. In particular, Russia itself is the creator of plans and institutions for regional convergence such as the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union, which in some cases contradict China’s plan. However, Russia did not oppose the Chinese project by redefining these institutions and taking a new approach to the possibility of “linking” the Eurasian Economic Union with the Chinese one-belt one-road initiative. For more than two decades, Russia has sought to prevent foreign and Western powers from entering the post-Soviet space by signing treaties, making agreements, establishing organizations, and even making political and economic pressures, especially in the field of energy. However, it has not been able to meet the different needs of the developing countries in its vicinity so the cooperation of these countries, especially the Central Asian countries with powers that were outside of the Commonwealth of Independent States was inevitable. Therefore, Russia seeks to reduce the possibility of western countries’ presence by accepting the presence of China, which is a potential long-term threat to Russia. Something that can be called elimination of evil by a worse evil. Russia’s neighboring regions are immediate and vital danger, but this country alone is not able to make a balance toward the West. Therefore, by aligning with China, it seeks to increase its balance of power with Western countries especially the United States. Hence, the key to understanding such Russian cooperation with China is the concept of balance, when issues exceed the balance, Russia also has considerations against expanding Chinese influence.

The present study compares the soft power and cultural presence of Iran and Saudi Arabia in Central Asia and the cultural activities of both countries in this region after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The research seeks to answer the main question: “How successful has Iranian cultural diplomacy been in Central Asia compared to Saudi Arabia’s cultural diplomacy in the region?” the research also seeks to make comparisons between the two country’s diplomacy and cultural practices in Central Asia and also compare possible contradictions of these countries cultural practices. While analyzing the basic and main goals of Iranian and Saudi cultural diplomacy, the paper examines the strengths and weaknesses of the two countries’ cultural presence in the Central Asian region, the damages each country’s cultural presence impose on the other one’s interests, and possible ways to improve the quality of Iran’s cultural activities in the region. This article has been written in a descriptive-analytical method and its answer to the main question is that both Islamic Republic and Saudi Arabia have achieved some success in the field of cultural activities in Central Asia. However, given the fact that Saudi investment has increased dramatically in the region including in the cultural sector in recent years, Iran needs to pay more attention to the Central Asian region with which it has more commonalities than Saudi Arabia. This necessity is highlighted so that Iran won’t fall behind in this important regional competition. In the 21st century, the communications revolution has increased interactions among various players within the international system, making it easier and more effective to influence the public opinion of other countries. Today, public opinion has become so important and influential that governments see it as an important and effective pillar in their decisions. As a result of this increasing importance of public opinion, governments, in addition to traditional ways of communicating with other countries, also use public opinion to influence different groups of people. Countries pursue their national interests and political goals as well as the promotion of their influence among people in other countries by using new, different, and indirect methods, the most important of which are public and cultural diplomacy. Central Asia has turned into a symbolic feature of the international relations geography in the Post-Cold War era. The economic problems that the countries of the region have faced since the collapse of the Soviet Union have gradually turned into political issues. For this reason, political, economic, social, and religious ties of five Central Asian countries with other states have drawn international relations researcher’s attention. Among these, we can refer to the European Union’s special attention to the vast oil and gas reserves of Central Asian countries to provide its energy needs. Traces of Iranian, Islamic, and Chinese civilizations can be seen in Central Asia. Islam has always been part of the identity of the people of this region in a way that has played an important role in the ethnic and national unity of the people of these countries both before and after their independence. In addition to the religious commonalities, Iran has common cultural and historical backgrounds with Central Asian countries and the Caucasus, while Saudi Arabia has only the first feature which is religious similarity. According to some intellectuals, Iran’s weak cultural diplomacy and lack of access to intact opportunities have allowed Saudis to open up their place among former Soviet Muslim states and consequently influence their way of thinking. Saudi Arabia has been very active in the field of public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy in various regions including Central Asia. This aspect of Saudi diplomacy focuses on religious issues and the propagation of Wahhabism. Saudi Arabia makes the most out of the existence of the two holy shrines in its territory as well as other historical backgrounds to provide the world with its definition of religion in the form of cultural diplomacy. Economic support has also allowed the country to create various institutions and media centers to promote Wahhabism. Of course, some researchers believe that this goal will not be very successful due to the limitations and weaknesses of Wahhabi thoughts and also different weaknesses of the Saudi political system. The leaders of Saudi Arabia have always done their best, by using all their capacities to expand Salafi ideas. An example of this development is in their ongoing activities is the Muslim World League; the league is in the view of some scholars, the main arm of Saudi Arabia’s cultural diplomacy in the world. Given that the majority of Central Asians are Sunni Muslims, such activities have made some effects.  Comparing cultural diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Central Asian region, it should be noted that Iran pursues, in general, expansion of the Persian language and cultural symbols such as Nowruz, but Saudi Arabia tries to influence these societies through the expansion of Salafism thoughts. Saudi Arabia has addressed the expansion of Salafi thoughts in various forms. Iran’s cultural relations with Central Asia which are mainly managed by the Islamic Culture and Relations Organization have been pursued in various fields; however, the remarkable point is the inactiveness and negligence of the organization and other relevant cultural institutions toward Saudi Arabia’s activities in the region in recent years. The neglect has led to the growth of Wahhabi and Salafi ideas by the Saudi propaganda apparatus, backed by petrodollars in Central Asia. Iran’s weak cultural activities have allowed the Saudis to increase their cultural presence in the region with all their might and expand their influence in various fields. For the common cultural capacities and similarities between Iranian society and those of Central Asia, it will be possible to implement various cultural programs and compensate for the past shortcomings. This can happen if there will be regular and purposeful coordination and cooperation between responsible agencies, especially the Iran Islamic Culture and Relations Organization and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Taking advantage of cultural diplomats and experts, using potential capacities of  ECO, effective participation in various cultural festivals, launching foreign radio and television networks between the region’s nations that have a common language, enjoying cyberspace, and planning joint academic and tourism projects can pave the way for bringing Central Asian societies closer to Iran.

In recent years, many countries have been publishing documents with different names to advance their domestic and foreign policies which like a codified plan, performs as a facilitator for them in various fields especially in domestic and international arenas. Russia is also one of the countries in this respect. After the collapse of the Soviet Union various strategic documents under the heading “National Security Documents” were published. These documents were divided into four general sections under the concept of “Russian foreign policy”, “Russia’s military doctrine”, “Russia’s national security strategy” and “Russian Maritime Doctrine”. These concepts have been developed and approved by Russia’s National Security Council. Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to examine how to show the “other” in Russia’s national security documents with the emphasis on the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the periods between 2000 to 2018. Based on this goal, the main question of this research is how Russia defines and represents other countries of the world and based on this representation, shapes its foreign policy towards them? In answer to this question, at the beginning of the article and in the conceptual framework, we defined representation in international relations and stated that in international relations, the process of representing the boundary between the “self” and the “other”, is defined. Thus, the system of power in any political system, through the process of representing and giving meaning to the external reality, which is the same as the issues or other political actors, has identified “insiders and outsiders” and portrays other actors in different formats such as “friend”, “enemy” or “rival”. How this representation has a direct impact on the type of foreign policy relationship that government has with other actors? Therefore, in the representation process, “other” is defined and limited. In the second part of the article, by examining Russia’s national security documents from 2000 to 2018, we came to the conclusion that different countries are represented and defined for Russia in six different situations (allied, strategic partner, economic partner, important partner, dual status and threat). These six types of representations are: - Russia’s representation of members of the “Collective Security Treaty Organization” and “the Commonwealth of Independent States” as “allies”; - Russia’s representation of China and India as a “strategic partner’; - Russia’s representation of EU members as a “trading partner”; - Russia’s representation of the Islamic Republic of Iran as an “important partner”; - Russia’s representation of countries such as the United States as “dual status”; -Russia’s representation of extremist currents and ISIS as “other threatening elements”. In the third part of the article, we discussed how Russia is represented by Iran and we stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran is defined for Russia as an “important partner” in some areas and not as an “ally” or “strategic partner’ in other. Because out of a total of 12 documents published from 2000 to 2018, only four documents directly mentioned Iran. This shows that the Islamic Republic of Iran has not been very important for Russia and among various representations, Russia represents Iran as a partner that has common goals with it only in some limited areas. By studying these documents, it can be stated that in the documents of the concept of Russian foreign policy in 2000 and 2008, this country has requested the expansion of cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Also, for the first time in the concept of foreign policy in 2016, the comprehensive development of cooperation with Iran is emphasized, so in these documents, the Islamic Republic of Iran is considered as an important partner for Russia. But in the 2013 document, due to Iran’s nuclear dispute with the west, some clauses on Iran were merely aimed at resolving the issue peacefully which emphasized Russia’s mediating role. In addition to these clauses, which explicitly refer to the Islamic Republic of Iran, some cases implicitly mention cooperation and interaction with this country. These areas include cooperation in the field of energy, the issue of Syria and the division of the Caspian Sea, and the determination of its legal regime. The results of this study in relation to Russia-Iran relations and Iran’s position for Russia include the following: Iran is defined only by the Russian government as an “important partner” in some areas. In other words, the Russian government does not view the Iranian government as an ally or strategic partner in its representation of other actors in the international system. This representation is very influential in the type of relations and the nature of Russia’s relations with Iran. The degree of concentration or dilution of Russia’s support for Iran in various issues, such as sanctions on Iran or the nuclear issue, Russia’s view of Iran should be measured and understood following its strategic documents. Russia’s areas of cooperation with Iran, under its national security documents, have included energy, the Syrian crisis, and the determination of the legal regime of the Caspian Sea. One of the important findings that can be mentioned is that in the national security documents of Russia there is no mention of the country’s arms cooperation with the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but in practice, military and defense cooperation has been an important part of the overall relationship between the two countries since 2000. In this regard, there can be such things as the sale of Russian missile defense system to Iran in 2005; the signing of a military agreement between the two countries in 2015, the purchase of Iranian military weapons from Russia in 2015, the lifting of the ban on the sale of the S-300 system to Iran by Putin in 2015, objection of Russia to the anti-Iranian resolution of the Security Council on February 26, 2018. The practical result of vetoing the resolutions is the failure to pass new missile sanctions and it was to prevent the security of Iran’s missile case. The final finding is that Russia’s position on the nuclear issue of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to play a mediating role to strengthen its leadership status. In resolving regional disputes and problems, of course, playing this mediating role has been accompanied by a dichotomy in the government’s foreign policy on the nuclear issue. This research is descriptive-analytical research and the method of data collection is through the study of documents.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of a power vacuum in the region, as well as the liberation of these countries from the yoke of the Soviet empire, for various reasons that cannot be explained, this region became a favorable ground for religious extremist groups to operate. In the meantime, for various reasons this region has been of special importance for the two countries of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Russia. Iran’s cultural and historical commonalities with Central Asian countries are related to the past. In the past, Iran and Central Asia had a single geographical land. In addition to proximity, ethnic and religious commonalities have led to close ties between Iran and the region. This is why these countries have an adaptive approach to Iranian culture and customs. In general, Central Asia is of special importance for the Islamic Republic of Iran because of its cultural-historical and economic components, geopolitical features, and finally high position of security and political stability. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, with a special definition of these areas that were formerly members of the Soviet Union and with the title of being close to them, still claim these areas including Central Asia to be under its influence. Drug traffickers (narco-terrorism) have created many problems for the newly independent republics of Central Asia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Russia. To achieve their benefits, they transit these goods in Central Asia. This is because most of the terrorist forces in Central Asia, including the Taliban and some local extremist groups, have strengthened themselves by creating a network of drug transit networks, thus attracting the desired forces, accessing financial resources, and even significant information. There are many problems for the countries of this region. Negatively, the presence of the United States and NATO, as well as Israel’s security investment in the region and ultimately the emergence of extremist religious groups alongside the structural weaknesses of the governments of this region, poverty, corruption, and economic problems in most of these societies, are having their effects on their function as states. Drug traffickers have become an emerging phenomenon of narco-terrorism, prompting two major countries, Iran and Russia, to take action to prevent damages from the afore-mentioned issues and to protect the security, political, and even social borders. In this article, while examining the problems and difficulties created by drug traffickers for Central Asian countries, Iran and Russia, necessary information is collected through descriptive-analytical methods through books, articles, and internet resources. The main question is how drug traffickers have seriously endangered the security of Central Asian countries and consequently the Islamic Republic of Iran and Russia, and what strategies Iran and Russia have to take to manage this crisis? Have they adopted a foreign policy for the system? Inspired by the theories of defensive realism, the hypothesis suggests that drug traffickers have created economic, political, and security problems through terrorist operations in the region. Therefore, to control this problem by strengthening common borders with Central Asian countries and cooperating in bilateral and multilateral dimensions, as well as regional cooperation through established institutions and organizations, Iran and Russia seek to reduce the problems created by narco-terrorism in Asia. Russia, through bilateral and multilateral initiatives and institutional measures with the Commonwealth of the Independent States, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, has adopted strong domestic laws, accompanied by UN programs, has approved domestic programs, and finally institutional measures taken in ECO and Shanghai cooperation organizations all of which have sought to seriously counter narco-terrorism in the region. But it seems that despite the serious and acceptable internal and regional efforts of Iran and Russia and their comprehensive coordination to combat narco-terrorism in the region, these efforts are not enough so there seems to be a long way to go before final success can be achieved. Considering the issues raised above and the threats posed by drug trafficking and narco-terrorism for countries on the transit route for drug trafficking (including Iran and Russia) as well as the target and destination countries of these narcotic drugs (including European countries), the moves were taken to adopt a comprehensive and immediate action to gather the countries of the region and other trans-regional actors to form a comprehensive and immediate institution are not enough. To combat drug trafficking, regional and trans-regional organizations can come up with relatively short and immediate solutions. One of the most important regional examples of anti-trafficking and drug usage is the European Monitoring Center of drugs and addiction. The center is one of the institutions of the European Union, which aims to provide information and data. It is objective and reliable in terms of drugs and addiction. Another body is the US Commission on the Control of Substance abuse, which seeks to control and monitor drug abuse. Thus, regional, trans-regional and international institutions can be consolidated in the region and combat narco-terrorism with a new strategy that supports domestic, regional, and global efforts in this respect. These measures can be taken in the presence of all drug-producing countries, the countries which are on the transit routes and target countries for drug trafficking, in the presence of international security agencies, including the Security Council. Otherwise, it seems that despite all these efforts, narco-terrorism will continue to exist in the region.

China as a rising power tries to boost its position in different regions of the world including Central Asia and the South Caucasus. China has made a grand entry into Central Asia and has a growing presence in the South Caucasus region since 2013 by introducing a comprehensive vision of economic development with its Belt and Road initiative (BRI). This article provides a comprehensive insight into China’s strategy in South Caucasus. In recent years, researchers have become increasingly interested in China’s regional policy. Most of them believe that the essence of China’s “New Regionalism” is its desire for a multipolar world based on the principles of non-interference policy and the formation of supranational and transnational integration groupings to strengthen their economic potentials. China’s attitude to South Caucasus follows the fundamental principle which was mentioned above but“each region has its own unique characteristics” that cause it to become a point of special consideration. For example, South Caucasus is a traditional sphere of Russian influence. So, any changes in the balance of power and political-security developments in the region will have implications for Russia. Therefore, cooperation between the South Countries and regional organizations (i.e. EU and NATO) and trans-regional powers (i.e. USA) will cause Russian reactions. This while South Caucasus countries try to diversify their bilateral and multilateral relations to reduce economic and political dependency on Moscow. Despite the complicated political and security situation in South Caucasus, Chinese authorities have not shown security and political ambitions in this region. They just try to develop regional economic cooperation among China and South Caucasus countries. On the other hand, China has good relations with Iran and Turkey that will facilitate Chinese partnership with the South Caucasus region. The foregoing discussion raises this question: What is china’s strategy in South Caucasus? The PRC has employed a unique “cluster approach” to the Southern Caucasus. The importance of the south Caucasus in Chinese foreign policy is defined by cooperation with neighboring countries (Iran and Turkey) adjacent area and connection to the belt and road initiative. To analyze above-mentioned issues the authors used a research desk method; we used various international publications, like monographs, scientific articles, and statistical data. In this research, the descriptive-analytical method and inter-regionalism theory are applied to address china’s strategy in South Caucasus. The fairly recent phenomenon of inter-regionalism has begun to arouse the interest of scholars and has given rise to a new field of studies in international relations. Given the novelty of the field, it does not come as a surprise that the views which have been offered so far on the nature of inter-regionalism run the gamut from “Much sound and fury about nothing” to “A building block in an emerging multilayered system of global governance”. Although inter-regionalism emphasizes relations from outside. The Belt and Road initiative is known as a brand of Chinese foreign policy. Evaluating Chinese foreign policy in Eurasia without considering BRI cannot be a realistic approach. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an ambitious program that will connect Asia to Africa and Europe via land and maritime networks along six other corridors to improve regional integration and increase trade and stimulating economic growth. 1. China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor; 2. New Eurasia land bridge economic corridor; 3. China Central Asia-west Asia economic corridor; 4. China-Pakistan economic corridor; 5. Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic corridor; 6. China-Indo-china peninsula economic corridor. South Caucasus is the subsidiary land bridge in China-Central Asia Caucasus economic corridor. China has had relatively little geopolitical contact with the region and is thus free of the baggage associated with various regional conflicts. This creates favorable grounds for developing and deepening its relations in the region. China’s interests in the South Caucasus are essentially derived from its wider foreign policy agenda: securing access to new sources of raw materials where possible, creating a stable environment around China’s extended periphery and to some extent opening up new markets for Chinese companies. South Caucasus has served as a subsidiary bridge in BRI. The South Caucasus states themselves generally view China in positive terms, as an increasingly important trading partner and a source of much-needed investment. It seems impossible to achieve the developmental goal without access to resources and the international market in the contemporary World. China by considering the above-mentioned reality tries to improve its place in different regions of the world including the South Caucasus. Given that, this paper will attempt to answer the following question. What is the South Caucasus’s position in China’s long-term strategy? “China has formed a cluster approach toward the south Caucasus which means that south Caucasus importance in Chinese foreign policy defines by interaction with influential countries and a mega project like” the One belt one road initiative”. To analyze the above-mentioned issues, the author used inter-regionalism theory as a conceptual framework. This research was written by using the descriptive-analytical approach.

In 1932, Stalin dissolved the Soviet cultural organizations based on instructions. As a result of this instruction, the school of socialist realism was introduced as a new aesthetic method. The importance of this school in the structure of politics and art was such that from early 1930 until the fall of communism in the Soviet Union, the only official way to express creativity and publish works in all fields of art and literature was under the same title. The principle of the new guide, based on what was stated in the Communist Party’s ideology, calls for art and all cultural objects to be faithful to socialist ideals and the principle of class struggle. From this historical moment, a unique period in the political and cultural life of the former Soviet Union began, known as the “Age of Socialist Realism”. The link to this article aims to critically examine the relationship between art and politics in the Soviet communist system by focusing on the Stalin period. Since the study of this link requires an acquaintance with the ideology of Stalinism in the field of action theory, this doctrine is briefly described in terms of political and cultural aspirations. Given the spatial and temporal focus of the main question of this article, how can the reflection of the interests of power and politics in the field of art and literature of this period be analyzed? In answer to this question, it has been hypothesized that the aesthetic method of socialist realism has been emphasized as a link between the demands of those in power in Stalin’s communist era in the artistic and literary fields, from painting to music and film. As the research has shown, Stalinism is the nature and practice of a regime that, from the late 1920s, with Stalin’s domination of power until his death, has been violently and relentlessly pursued in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. Being aware of the importance of the work of intellectuals and artists, Stalin concluded that his great chauvinism, called “socialism in one country”, depended solely on the creation of the original aesthetics, which could be achieved by mobilizing the people of art and literature. The ideal would come true. In this sense, the importance of people like Zhdanov and some important artistic figures such as Maxim Gorky in shaping this school should not be overlooked. With the practical plan of 1932, all independent artistic and cultural institutions and other forces of civil society were suppressed, and with the imposition of social realism, only one criterion remained in the cultural sphere. To this end, after a reference to the meaning contained in the ideology of Stalinism, the historical and social contexts of the emergence of socialist realism (social realism) in Russia are described in detail. To prove the hypothesis, attention has been paid to explaining and analyzing the basic principles of the mentioned school. A study of the available sources and works in this field shows that the three principles that formed socialist realism represented a strong link between ideological interests in the cultural and artistic spheres. These include: 1. People’s populism in art: since the Soviet system claimed that genuine cultural achievement belonged to the people and served their needs, the people of art and literature were asked to produce works that emphasized the political components of populism instead of formalist meanings and artistic techniques. In this regard, by studying and referring to some works in this field, the important principle of art for peoples has been introduced. 2. Partyism in Art: Lenin, in his treatise Party Literature, predetermined the coordination of works of art in the Soviet communist system. Although the treatise emphasizes the principle of “free art in the service of the proletariat”, it was a line of distinction between original and committed art and harmful and useless works. 3. According to the aesthetic positions presented in socialist realism, each production work had a “basic design’ and a foundation that committed itself to ideological originality. The center of gravity of this project was based on the aesthetic principles of Marxism-Leninism. In this regard, the study of various works during this period shows that the people of art, along with the workers, are seeking to produce and shape what was called the “modern man of the council”. This means that the writers are at the forefront of the proletariat’s manual activity on the path to the realization of the communist utopia. In other words, the ideological commitment involved proving that politics and genuine art are acknowledging loyalty to the truth of just living in a council country. An examination of Stalin’s artistic and literary works reveals that socialist realism has always served class ideals by seeking positions such as optimism, Bolshevik humanism, and artist activism while eliminating the aesthetic gap between form and content. The consequences of this link between politics and art soon became apparent: totalitarian art, because all three central concepts in the aesthetics of socialist realism, namely populism, party commitment, and ideological attitudes, were deeply indebted to the politicized principle of “closed borders”. Under these circumstances, the desired form or artistic and literary style was not only independent, but the fluid nature of the ideological tendencies was prevalent throughout communist cultural works on the black or white side according to political circumstances. As many of the works that symbolized the commitment to the party and the revolution during Lenin’s time were destroyed and censored during Stalin’s rule. Similarly the post-Stalinist years, many works were not popular because of their mere political inclinations.

About 80 countries with over 1.1 billion populations don’t have regular access to healthy freshwater resources. According to Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development findings (OECD), due to the excessive usage and climate changes, lots of freshwater resources will be disappeared by 2030; therefore over 3.9 billion people all over the world will face a fresh water shortage. Lack of water resources will cause political, social and economic crisis and will also result in extensive migrations and finally triggers regional conflicts. One outcome of the colonization of tsarism and then the Soviet era was destroying natural infrastructures including water resources (e.g. drying the Aral Sea), creating marginal areas, and making Central Asian countries a single product economy. The single product agricultural industry in the Central Asian socialist economy completely depends on the irrigation system. To irrigate cotton planting farms in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, more than 90 percent of existing water supplies being used. This amount becomes more catastrophic where in some areas, about 10.000 cubic meters of water were used for every hectare of the cotton farm. After the independence, this competition continued between 5 Central Asian countries. Increasing cotton production in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan made these two countries pioneers in the world. Between 2004-2005, these two countries accounted for 65 percent of the world’s cotton production. This policy in the agriculture industry results in severe depletion of farms, excessive use of chemical fertilizer as well as a reduction in cotton production in the last ten years, so this reduction in addition to population growth, makes these 5 Central Asian countries import food products. Decreasing freshwater quality, increasing the amount of salt in the soil, and farms salinity along with fast population growth were some causes of appearing marginal areas in Central Asian countries. Marginal areas because of the lack of social, educational, healthy, and cultural services and facilities are a place for future crises. Based on the World Council’s estimates about International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) studies, Central Asia is among areas that are severely affected by water shortages; the drying of the Aral Sea was a disaster and some parts of Central Asia were depopulated. Based on World Bank predictions, water shortages in this area will reach 25 to 30 percent by 2050 and it is also predicted that the population of Central Asia will increase to 90 million. It shows that we should expect a different crisis in Central Asia in which the results will be expanded all over the area including the Middle East, Europe and Central Asia. On the other hand, the area is located at the crossroads of international interests in the new geopolitical and geo-economic conditions which were created in the last decade of the twentieth century. From then on, it has highlighted the importance of this region in political stability and global security. In new conditions, Germany was always trying to find a suitable place to increase its economic and political presence in the region. At the beginning of 1990’s, political leaders of Germany showed some signs of independence of action in foreign policy by adopting a multilateral policy in the international system and gradually approaching other centers of powers; to this end, areas such as Central Asia became a place to show the power and the economic, commercial and almost political presence of Germany. On the other hand, political and security conditions in Afghanistan and their effect on multiple crises in Central Asia as well as conflicts among Ukraine and Russia and its effect on the gas transmission to Europe increased the importance of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Germany as the biggest industrial unit in the European Union is the most important exporter of technology and industrial goods. Because of the dilapidated economic and production structure left from the Soviet Union, Central Asian countries have the potential needs to accept technology and Germany’s investment in different sectors. Therefore, during years after independence, Germany tried to take advantage of these needs and increase its share. But Central Asian countries tend to face the crisis due to different factors including extremism, terrorism, drug trafficking, poverty, unemployment, extensive addiction, tribalism, the unfinished process of state-nation building in these countries, fragile security and educational structures (intelligence Police), low legitimate governments based in Central Asia, the intervention of regional and trans-regional countries including Russia, China and United States and the most important factor water storages. A crisis that if remains pervasive, will not only have social, political, economic and environmental consequences in Central Asia but also leads to the growth of extremism, terrorism, increased drug trafficking, disruption in energy flow and migration to Europe. Also, it poses a serious threat to Germany’s interests, especially its economic interests in the region. Therefore, Central Asia and countries within its sphere became of strategic importance to Germany in various ways, including in diversifying energy demands, economic, trade, security and cultural resources after the end of the cold war. So, all these factors have caused concern in German Foreign policy and this country has tried different measures to manage water resources. According to the aforementioned items, by using a descriptive-analytical method based on the theoretical framework of neoliberalism institutionalism, this paper seeks to investigate German measures to manage water resources in Central Asia and prevent political and social crisis caused by lack of sustainable management in the field of vital water resources in Central Asia. The results of this paper show that despite obstacles such as lack of mutual trust between the governments, the dominance of some Central Asian countries, low level of cooperation between 5 countries of the region concerning water resources management, and a series of structural problems, Germany has been able to work through multilateral cooperation between institutions and scientific centers and carry out important and significant measures, both technical and academic. Data collection in this article is based on library methods.

Turkey is a multi-ethnic country that is inhabited by diverse Eurasian minorities such as Armenians, Georgians, Uyghurs, Laz, Zazas, and Circassians. Under the influence of historical circumstances, Turkey has religious, ethnic, linguistic, and national minorities. During their rule, the Ottomans conquered various regions, including Eurasian ones. Of Turkey’s 82 million population in 2018, 35% are minorities. According to the statistics, 18.9% are Kurds, 7.2% are Tatars, 1.8% are Arabs, 1% are Azeris and 1% are Yorks. The other 5% are minorities such as Armenians, Georgians, Circassians, Laz, and Balkans. Despite their small population, Eurasian minorities are highly diverse among Turkish minorities. After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey (1923), the constitution emphasized “Turkish homeland”, “Turkish citizens” and “Turkish existence”. The implementation of a policy of population unification based on Turkish identity led to the denial of minorities. This is although Turkey had made commitments to minorities in Articles 37 to 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), part of which relates to Eurasian minorities, especially Armenians. The treaty defined minorities as non-Muslims, including Greeks, Jews, and Armenians. They had legal rights, schools, and religious services. Events such as Expulsion, confiscation of property, forced migration, and massacres such as tragedies (1915) against Armenians, the massacres of Kurds in Dersim (1938), and the Alawites in Sivas (1993) are some of the bitter happenings in the history of minorities in Turkey. After the AKP came to power (2002), there were changes in Turkey’s Eurasian approach as well as attitudes towards minorities. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2009 in the city of Duzce expressed a desire for fundamental reforms in minority rights. He called his country’s past policies on minorities wrong and fascist. Subsequently, the issue of amendments to the 1936 law and the return of confiscated property of the Armenian and Greek religious minorities were raised. But this approach has changed since 2012 with a shift in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies. Due to the common concern of the international community about the consequences of the violation of the rights of minorities, in 1992 the “Declaration of the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities” was adopted by the General Assembly. Earlier, Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) emphasized the rights of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities. This Covenant is binding on all nations. With the development of the international law of minorities, and under the influence of the continuing unrest in some parts of Turkey and the strengthening of Ankara’s Eurasianist approach, attention has increased to the situation of Eurasian minorities. The purpose of this article is to examine the situation of Eurasian minorities in Turkey from the perspective of international law. The article seeks to answer the question of what is the status of Eurasian minorities in Turkey under Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the 1992 Declaration of minorities? The article hypothesizes that the legal status of Eurasian minorities in Turkey is not the same. This article, while theoretically explaining the concept of minorities and their rights, uses citation and descriptive-analytical methods. The results show that despite the positive steps taken to promote minority rights in Turkey, due to the dominance of the political view on the legal approach, the denial of minorities in the constitution, and the rejection of international minority rights instruments, the situation of Eurasian minorities in Turkey has been evolved from suitable to undesirable one. They are divided into satisfied and dissatisfied minorities. Satisfied minorities do not believe that their rights are systematically violated by the government. Some of these minorities have historically been absorbed into the majority culture in Turkey and their traditions and language have been destroyed or weakened. Therefore granting some rights to these minorities is not defined as a threat by the government. Some of these minorities have racial or cultural similarities with the Turkish majority or such similarities are propagated, such as Turkish Azeris or Chinese Uyghurs. Dissatisfied minorities believe that cultural and linguistic rights are violated, effective participation is denied, confiscated property has not been returned, forced integration into the majority happened, continued hatred dragged on, lack of access to a fair trial, historical renaming, and direct and indirect discrimination was implemented. This situation is contrary to the three principles emphasized in international minority rights, namely non-deprivation, non-discrimination and non-forced integration. The findings of the article indicate that Turkey’s approach to minorities is political, not legal. There is no legal guarantee in Turkey for the implementation of the rights provided for minorities in international law. The few concessions made to minorities, especially from 2002 to 2011, were mostly cross-cutting government action rather than a change in laws. The extent of ethnic affiliation with the Turkic race and religious affiliation with the Sunni-Hanafi religion has influenced the situation of the Eurasian-ethnic minorities. Despite this, the linguistic, religious, and cultural characteristics of most minorities have been weakened by Ankara’s approach. Over the past century the number of some minorities such as Circassians, Georgians, and Armenians, has dropped tenfold. It seems that Turkey needs to change its political approach to a legal one to raise the status of minorities to the level of international law standards. The first steps in this process are the acceptance of the four customary minorities in the constitution, joining the Declaration of Minorities, stopping the forced integration of minorities, stopping the Turkification of minorities, propagating and teaching the history and culture of minorities in textbooks to combat hatred, reforming laws dating back to the Ottoman period, and providing real statistics on minorities and promoting multiculturalism.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Security Environment around Iran underwent profound changes. At the same time with the removal of traditional threats from the Soviet Union, Iran faced new threats and opportunities. From the Iranian perspective, considering the diversity and plurality of the threats in this Region (South Caucasus), prioritizing the most important security threats was considered as the central issue of this study. The Research attempts to prioritize these threats in the region and offer optimal solutions. The Main Question is: What are the priority threats to the Islamic Republic of Iran from the southern Caucasus? The research hypothesis is that “through the southern Caucasus, the main threats to Iran are security and economic / geo-economic threats”. Also, the research method is surveyed by Questionnaire. Iran, with its significant border with two countries South Caucasus region, receives a lot of influence through the Caucasus region. For appropriate policy-making in the face of threats and the pursuit of national interests and objectives, the threats contained throughout this security complex must be examined at various levels, and then appropriate strategies could be extracted based on the prioritization of threats. What has preoccupied the researcher's mind is, first of all, what are the security threats to the Islamic Republic of Iran through Southern Caucasus? How is their priority in terms of importance? And how is it possible to deal with them? The sub-questions are: What are the characteristics of the security structure of the South Caucasus? What is the strategic importance of the South Caucasus region from Iran’s point of view? What are the appropriate strategies to deal with threats? The main hypothesis of the article is that: In the South Caucasus, the main threats to Iran are military-security and economic/geo-economic dynamics. The South Caucasus, which is called Transcaucasia in Russians, is the southern half of the Caucasus. The Caucasus is a region between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea, which is divided into two parts, the South Caucasus and the North Caucasus. The South Caucasus includes Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. In this region, in addition to the issue of land and border exchanges within the framework of disintegration programs such as the Goebbels project, the issue of energy transfer, ethnic movements and turning Iranian youth loyalty away from national identity, are the threatening dynamics which have been shaped against Iran. In this paper, the structure of the region is analyzed with a model based on the theory of security complexes. Components such as secure borders, dominant security ideas, regional polarization and intervening actors, crisis and conflict patterns, security issues and problems in the region are explained. The strategic features of the South Caucasus region from Iran’s point of view have also been explained. To answer the main question of the article, the Friedman test was performed on the survey results. The test results show that security and then geo-economic threats have the highest priority in the Caucasus.  Iran can have a strong presence in Chinese or European cross-border corridors due to its geopolitical situation, especially in road transport. Iran’s railway network, unlike other railway networks in the Caucasus, is technically compatible with the Turkish railway network in terms of technical standards, and therefore a good prospect can be drawn for the expansion of railway connections in the region. Iran also has a high capacity in the field of technology and engineering to implement different kinds of projects in the field of oil, gas, road construction, civil engineering, and urban planning. Iranian contractors can be used to meet the technical and engineering needs of Central Asia and the Caucasus. According to the authors, appropriate strategies for dealing with the threats are as follows: - Utilization of Iranian engineering-technical capacities in the region; - Cross-border linkage of infrastructures; - Defense diplomacy and cooperation; - Exploitation of Iranian superior political advantage and proper communication with all Caucasus parties; - Exploitation of the cultural connections between Iran and Caucasus countries.  The solutions for controlling the threats are: - Establishment of an office to assess the technical-engineering needs of the South Caucasus countries; - Exploitation of the Iranian technical and engineering capacities to meet the technical needs of the countries; - Expanding technical and military cooperation, meeting technical and weapons needs, economic agreements, training programs; - Monitoring the composition of arms purchases of countries; - Sensitivity to the appropriateness or incompatibility of arms purchases with the military strategy and conventional threats of each country in the Caucasus; - Reciprocal response in the establishment of intelligence centers, interception and reciprocal military operations; - Cultural activities as a lever of influence in countries; - Expanding social relations (relying on religious and civilizational elements as an alternative to ethnocentrism or Salafism);  - Strengthening defense diplomacy, expanding mutual defense and technical cooperation, arms exports, training programs; - Efforts to fundamentally resolve the issue of sanctions; - Prioritize different cross-border corridors to deal with geopolitical evacuation; - Capacity building of actors in the South Caucasus by promoting the status of the Economic Cooperation Organization; - Awarding university and seminary scholarships and familiarity with Islamic culture and civilization; - Inviting prominent scientific and cultural figures and acquaintance with Iranian and Islamic teachings; - Iran’s effective cooperation with the European Union and especially the Minsk Group for mediation; - Effective pursuit of the 3 + 3 plan with the participation of Iran, Turkey and Russia and rejection of any influence of governments that are not in this composition, such as the United States. In response to the main question of the article, by analyzing the results of the survey, the main areas of threat in the South Caucasus that could pose a threat to Iran’s national security were prioritized as follows: First the military/security sphere, second the economic / geo-economic sphere, third the cultural sphere, fourth the environmental sphere, and finally the political sphere. The above-mentioned results confirm the research hypothesis: “In the South Caucasus, the main threats to Iran are military-security and economic dynamics”. Also, the most important threat-based dynamics are as follows: Security activities of the rival governments such as Turkey, Israel, etc. in the region (expanding technical and arms cooperation, economic agreements, training programs), eavesdropping stations and spy systems, expansion of centrifugal and separatist views,  incitement of ethnic Iranians to turn against the Iranian government, development of international pipelines around the country without crossing Iran (Iran’s geopolitical depletion in the field of energy), severe pollution of the Kura-Aras water basin which is a threat to human, food and ecological security and finally constitution of autonomous units and autonomous regions, territorial displacements and border changes. There are also significant strategies for curbing threats that have been developed in the context of various economic, diplomatic, political, foreign, and cultural relations.

Gene-geopolitics or genetically geopolitics is one of the new issues in critical geopolitics. According to this issue, the hegemony of a state on a regional and trans-regional scale must impart cultural and historical homogeneity. Talking about hegemony is not possible without homogeneity and it is just being referenced to hard power, intimidation, and military potentialities. South Caucasia region includes three states of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. The position of communication of this region with the surrounding environment throughout history has shown that the pipelines for transferring energy resources are a determining factor in its special geopolitical and geo-economics conditions. The South Caucasus which is located in southwestern Russia is one of Russia’s peripheral or the so-called “near-Abroad” environments. The region has an important role in the Eurasianism policy of Russia and Moscow has tried to prevent the dominion effect of Ukraine developments. This paper by adopting the descriptive-analytical method tries to answer this question that what is the hegemonic status of Russia concerning the significance of south Caucasia in its foreign policy? For now, Russia is considered a central power in the region and has gained considerable influence into the three states of south Caucasia. In gene-geopolitical attitude, it seems that Russia hasn’t irremovable hegemony in south Caucasia and its semi-hegemony is connected to rivalry space of Western states and Eurasianism. As a whole, Russia’s hard power in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia will be challenged in the future through reasonable assumptions. Problem: after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia applied the policy of non-interference in its external environment for about a decade. From the time when Vladimir Putin seized power, Russia’s geopolitical codes were strengthened and revived again in continuation of the Soviet Union foreign policy. The growing importance of the Caspian Sea, its geo-economics issues, the investment, and the unprecedented presence of western powers in the newly independent states, have convinced Russian authorities to begin their presence in the external environment. Therefore, Russian foreign policy was empowered based on Eurasianism and the country tried using both hard and software tools to influence its peripheral states. The Caucasus is one of Russia’s peripheral environments or the so-called “near-abroad”. Russia has sought intervention in this region, directly and indirectly, to solidify its influence in its rivalry with the West, particularly with those of the US policies. The growing need of the countries in this region for energy extraction and finding a suitable market, has provided suitable space for Russia’s presence. However, attractive investments by Russia’s rivals, such as the European Union and the United States as well as Russia’s dependence on the sale of its energy resources, are among challenges that have made its foreign policy vulnerable in the South Caucasus. On the other hand, the lack of iconographic and spiritual elements in the Soviet Union seems to be one of the main reasons for its dissolution. Accordingly, the Soviet Union failed to establish a national identity among its members. The lack of a common history, myth, and culture that are components of gene-geopolitics paved the way for its dissolution. Nowadays, in the critical geopolitical approach, the iconographic elements that play a spiritual and cultural role in building societies have regained importance. These elements act like cement on the side of the material and connect the components firmly and durable to each other. Thus, in some respects, the lack of iconographic elements in Russian foreign policy is one of the challenges that has prevented its deep penetration into its surroundings. The authors of this article try to examine Russia’s foreign policy in the South Caucasus from a gene-geopolitical point of view qualitatively based on description and analysis. This region is one of Russia’s buffer zones in competition with the West. According to the mentioned point, there is a strong hardware and software presence in these three countries. How successful Russia’s foreign policy has been in the South Caucasus is a question that will be examined from a gene-geopolitical point of view. Question: what is Russia’s foreign policy in the South Caucasus from a gene-geopolitical point of view? Hypothesis: it seems that Russia in the South Caucasus has no hegemony. Therefore, its presence in the South Caucasus is due to the competition with Western powers and the pursuing policies of Eurasianism. Thus, Russia’s hardware presence in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia is likely to be challenging. in this article, the authors have studied the issue and hypothesis of the article with a qualitative method based on description and analysis. Moscow’s policy in the Caucasus energy sector has focused on the Republic of Azerbaijan, in the military fields the focus is on Armenia and in controlling the West’s behavior in the region it has focused on strategic competition in Georgia. Russia’s foreign policy, despite its multiple layers and constant flexibility, has no hegemonic burden. It is due to the history, culture, and ideologies of the Caucasus region. Russia has always tried to suppress them by maintaining its superior military rite. Russia's geoeconomic policies in the region also face challenges. Because Russia’s economy relies on oil and gas, it is not an attractive customer for regional oil sellers. Russia’s military rhetoric seeks to hardware domination in the South Caucasus. Due to the structural constraints, all three countries in the region are pursuing an alignment in policy with Russia. Armenia relies militarily on Moscow due to its territorial enmity with the republic of Azerbaijan. Besides, Tbilisi’s policies in recent years have shown this country’s serious desire to join NATO. The Republic of Azerbaijan, with its nationalist policies, is a reliable partner for Turkey, Israel, and the United States. That is why Baku’s Western policy is more intense, but Russia has not given up on its energy presence. Russia’s military support for Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has complicated Russian-Azeri relations. Azerbaijan’s energy policy in recent years has shown that the presence of the European Union to invest in Azerbaijan’s energy sector has been a challenge to Russia’s policy in Baku. Georgia as an example of a complex hardware implementation of Russia’s foreign policy like Ukraine has experienced growing instability. Historical deterioration in Russia-Georgia relations, along with growing US efforts to narrow Russia’s geopolitical depth in the South Caucasus, has exacerbated Moscow’s challenge in Georgia. So the lack of gene-geopolitical structures in Russia has made it difficult for the country to operate in the South Caucasus.

The advent of photography and cinema, along with the development of technical tools for reproducing and disseminating images, has given many geographical spaces a great virtual appearance and confrontation with the public, a process that can be described as the “democratization” of space. In this process, the formation of a structure of all geographical spaces is represented. At least four factors must be used for parallelism: Duplication, Pluralization, Diversity, and Multiplicity. Matchmaking is an effort to produce and reproduce all features and characteristics of a space. Pluralism means the possibility of the presence of all opportunities in a space without a centrist force. Divergence also refers to centrifugal flow, based on which collectivism and pluralism are made and ultimately suffocation refers to a way in which there is no sign of separation, uniformity and assimilation. These four factors are an attempt to eliminate discrimination and inequality in the homogeneous distribution of space. This means that the four factors must be used to break the center-periphery relationship and centralize one space and marginalize other spaces. A central space tries to highlight its features and coordinates and turn it into an “audit center” and reduce spatial diversity. Cinema deals with both ways of parallelizing and distributing inequalities. In other words, on the one hand, cinema can give space to the marginal spaces of opportunity and create a democratic space and it can also move towards justifying and showing the superiority of the central space in opposition to the “other space”. How spatial representations are represented in cinema is a matter of linking cinema and geography. Slavoj Žižek, the Slovenian post-Marxist philosopher, transformed the Hollywood film industry and its political-spatial developments by categorizing the American theatrical process from 1990 to 2001 after being affected by the September 11 attacks. He divides it into “Truman’s” and “Matrix’s” plays and explores the ideological and dramatic coordination of Americans’ understanding of the world after 9/11. Truman is a 1998 comedy, sci-fi, and drama film directed by Peter Lindsay Weir and starring Jim Carrey. The film depicts the life of a man whose life is being broadcast on television 24 hours a day for millions of people around the world without his knowledge. The film’s plot revolves around a middle-class man who, after a while, realizes what he has in mind about his happy and promising life. It’s a TV show. The Matrix is ​​a 1999 science fiction film written and directed by the Wachowski Brothers. The film narrates the existence of human beings as fictional realities that are constructed by man-made machines and nourished by the human mind and energy. According to Žižek, both films represent the real-life credentials of everyday life in the United States and question “simulated reality” and represent “the Ultimate American Paranoid Fantasy”. Media is recognized as a powerful and influential tool in today’s world that directs the flow of power generation in space. Cinema and film have become an important tool for competing on a variety of national and transnational scales as one of the important pillars of the media which have the power to persuade, motivate and lead to uncertainty. Therefore, research on the relationship between geopolitics and cinema, which began with post-modern approaches and especially with the influence of the Frankfurt School, follows a study of how to represent the action and response of geopolitical foundations in film circles and its external effects are on the audience. The present study, by using discourse and narrative analyses of three selected films, Rambo 2 (1985), Unwanted Injury (2002), and Fall (2012), seeks to explore how Russian geopolitical foundations are represented in Hollywood cinema. The results of this study indicate that discourses such as the cold War, non-construction, unorganized space, Russia-China-Iran triangle, and tensions seem to be the most important elements of geopolitical representations of Russia in Hollywood cinema. In these films, the location of the film’s screenplays is the same locations proposed by classical geopolitical theorists such as Halford John Mackinder and Nicholas John Spykman; places such as Hartland and Rimland, or spaces where hostile geopolitics survived the cold War. It is reminiscent of Russia, Cuba, and Colombia. Hollywood also needs to represent these strategic locations as “geopolitical tensions”. From a geopolitical point of view, Hollywood cinema seems to have “hegemonic representations” that produce in the minds of the audience a “new consensus” and a ‘new interpretation” of the world map.

With the end of the Cold War, Europe has faced new geopolitical challenges and these challenges have increased the impact of the surrounding environment on European security. The independent Moldovan government was born in 1991 on a world political map. In 2004, Moldova entered the ENP and then the EaP. This policy is the most important tool of the EU to promote convergence in the Eastern Neighborhood and Moldova has made the best use of its facilities. The integration process led to DCFTA and a visa liberalization system was established for Moldova. Research question and hypothesis:  having said that, it begs the question of what impact has the implementation of the ENP and the EaP on the EU-Moldova integration process and to what extent has the EU been successful in implementing it? The article hypothesis is that improving relations in the framework of the EU-Moldova Free Trade and Cooperation Agreement has led to the expansion of integration from the economic to the political and cultivated spheres and deepening of bilateral relations; but in terms of depth, its impact is limited by several of internal and external factors on both sides. the data collection method in this study is qualitative and is based on the documentary method. This research is in line with the theoretical modeling method. In this regard, the theory of neo-functionalism has been applied. The emphasis of this paper is on the logic of spillover, which is emphasized in the theory of neo-functionalism. In terms of the level of analysis, this research is three-level and examines the issue in functional, political, and cultivated spillover. all things considered, in the field of functional spillover, the interactions made in the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement to improve the standards of good governance were examined. In this regard, cooperation on the issue of Transnistria has been carried out in the form of 5+2 negotiations. The EUBAM was developed in the same direction. Economically, relations were driven by a system of preferences. In the political spillover, the Cooperation Agreement was reviewed; which was best crystallized in the form of a DCFTA. This agreement had many achievements in the field of integration and led to visa liberalization for Moldova. Package 8 was also implemented in the Transnistrian conflict. In the field of functional extension, EU institutions such as the Parliament, the Commission, and the Council of Europe acted as political entrepreneurs and took great strides in various aspects of strategic coalition building, bargaining influence and community framing. In Moldova, the institutions in charge of these three indicators are CEFTA, National Action Plan for Implementation of the Association Agreement and the Moldovan National Platform of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum.  Studies have shown that in terms of level and scope, relations between the parties have had a favorable growth and convergence has occurred well at all three levels. But in terms of depth, some internal constraints at the interior level of Europe and Moldova on the one hand and the regional level on the other, have prevented full deepening of integration.