مجله الهیات تطبیقی
پیاپی 24 (پاییز و زمستان 1399)

 Sheikh Mofid (deceased 413 AH/1022) is a representative of Imami theology from the Theological School of Baghdad II with a rational approach. Khajeh Nasir Toosi (597-672 AH) is a representative of Imami theology from the theological school of ‘Holleh’ with a philosophical approach and has its own independent method compared to the Imami theologians of its predecessors. In Islamic philosophy and theology, God is called by various names and the concepts used in philosophy for God's specific name are different from the word. Sheikh Mofid was a theologian who used the Mu'tazilites, and his view of God is rational in the religious concept. He calls God ‘Allah’. However, Nasir al-Din al-Toosi is among philosophers and theologians with the view that God is a benefit to both. He has used the term ‘Maker’ (Saane), ‘Creator’, ‘Bari’, ‘God’ (Allah) as well as the ‘Necessary Being’ for God, which are conceptually different. The aim of this study is to determine the place of philosophy and theology in the conceptualization of God in two Imami theologians in two centuries and different methods and how they are influenced by theology and philosophy and religion to conceptualize God. The question is: To what extent is the concept of God in Sheikh Mofid and Nasir al-Din al-Toosi theological and philosophical? According to Sheikh Mofid, in the content structure, the discussion of ontology and its importance for theology in explaining the conceptualization of God has been very low and the name used is ‘God’. In Al-Nakt al-I'tiqadiyah, which is suspected of being attributed to him, the author uses the concept of ‘obligatory existence’ in combining the theological approach. In Avaeil al-maghlat, the author speaks of ‘the creator’ (Mojid) and ‘maker’ (Mohdis). But the author delivers the creator (Mojid) to Allah. Because of his belief in Togifi of names, it has limited himself to the religious and theological use of conceptualization for God. Khajeh Nasir, based on ontology to talk about God, considers the absolute name of God to be ‘Allah’, which is a Qur'anic, theological, religious, and Islamic name. But in the conceptualization of God, he is strongly influenced by philosophy, and the name he chooses for God with a decisive influence on philosophy, which he explains in his numerous sources, is ‘Necessity’ (Vojoob). Based on the philosophical foundations of "existence, bound existence and absolute existence, Necessity and Possibility, and the intrinsic and non-essential necessity”, the issue of obligatory existence is discussed.  In Sheikh Mofid's methodology, the rational method and listening are used. In proving the existence of God, he uses theological rational arguments in the argument of occurrence and uses the possibility in the argument that does not make Him needless of the philosophical method. In discussing attributes, he pays attention to both intellect/hearing (Samaa) and revelation. In attributes that he cannot use reason to analyze, he uses hearing and narration, but with the help of interpretation, he explains their attributes not by returning to the true meaning of the attributes, but by interpreting the meanings of the attributes. Khajeh Nasir also uses the argument of ‘Necessity and Possibility’ in philosophical and theological discourse to prove the existence of God. In the theological discourse, it is based on the criterion of genesis (Hodous), and in the philosophical approach, it is based on the criterion of ‘possibility’ and especially ‘the existence of possibility’ for the need for cause and existence. In explaining the proof of necessity and possibility, he also uses Quranic verses. In Tajrid ol-eiteqad and Fosoul in explaining attributes and returning attributes to the necessity of existence, there is a philosophical approach because it uses Necessary of Being to explain attributes. But in the attributes he uses for God, he obtains permission from the Shari'a with a Toghifi approach. He has considered the application of attributes to God to be conditional on the permission of Sharia and his method is negative and positive, which is used in philosophy and theology to speak of God. According to all that has been said, Sheikh Mofid is a theologian who rationalizes the word and his method is rational but he accepts reason in interaction with revelation and does not believe in the independence of reason. Khajeh is a theologian-philosopher who uses philosophy to explain God and to conceptualize God. The diversity of specific names of philosophy for the conceptualization of God is less common in Khajeh to discuss God and he is confronted with the text of philosophy and theology before him and the religious text (the Qur'an) and ignores the Greek philosophy. Although he is familiar with the philosophical concepts of ‘cause and effect’ as well as ‘power and action’, he does not use cause to conceptualize God. Khajeh emphasizes only the concept derived from Farabi and Avicenna. However, in the case of the to be Toghifi of names and attributes for God, he obtains his permission from the Shari'ah. The same is true of Sheikh Mofid. Therefore, Khajeh uses philosophy to explain theology and for him, philosophy is used to discuss God without contradicting the Shari'a and sharia is the basis that determines the limits of his philosophical explanation. According to Sheikh Mofid, the intellect has the same position. It can operate within the realm of religion and serve religion.

Throughout history, man has chosen various arguments to support his claims and his ideas. Now, it seems that inductive-statistical reasoning methods can bring new achievements to theology. The main purpose of the present study is to prove the legitimacy of the Shiite religion with an innovative approach. The study uses library resources with an analytical-exploratory method. Roy Bhaskar, the developer of the epistemological framework of critical realism, explains that the subject of scientific activity is not the study of events, rather, it is a study of the mechanisms that produce events. These mechanisms are real and independent of the existence of identifying the agent (researcher) in nature, but the result of the activity of a mechanism may not be realized or observed by the researcher. In the natural and social sciences, a randomization strategy is used to control such disturbing effects. In such a situation, the researcher tries to neutralize the effect of disturbing mechanisms by repeating the experiment or observing it in various contextual conditions repeatedly and then calculating the mean and performing statistical assumptions. Philosophers of science consider such explanations to be scientific issues and call them inductive-statistical explanations. The same process applies to historical analysis. When a theologian intends to judge the legitimacy of that religion by exploring the behavior and speech of the great men of the religion, he may encounter disturbing mechanisms. For example, the narrators may not have narrated the events accurately and completely due to carelessness, or they may have manipulated the hadith and the chain of documents due to bad motives. Due to Taqiya, Imams try to behave differently from normal conditions. In fact, these historical events took place a few hundred years ago in an open system, and it is not possible for the present-day researcher to recreate those experiences in the laboratory. But given that the behavior and traditions of 14 Shiite leaders (each of these Infallibles was the son of the previous Imam) have been reliably recorded and made available to us over 250 years, we can repeat a series of special virtues and characteristics in an immediate 14 generations.  Imams have been born continuously and one after the other for two hundred and fifty years, and all of them, according to the authentic and numerous historical sources, in terms of science, piety, observing the poor, self-sacrifice, moral virtues, not cooperating with oppressive rulers (even at the cost of losing their sweet lives) were the leaders of the people during their time and have constantly aroused the admiration of many people who did not believe in their Imamate. The authors do not deny that throughout history there have been virtuous people whose children and grandchildren have been the manifestation of the same virtues. But in history, there is no example of the continuation of these virtues in a fourteen-generation. However, this family has been under constant pressure from the rulers of all ages, and there is no specific worldly motive and desire to continue the path of the previous Imam by the new Imam (who was the son of the previous Imam). On the other hand, the most famous worthy book, in Arabic, has been published by a man from the same family throughout history. The literary beauties and scientific nuances of this book are so numerous that fair Orientalists and non-Muslim Arabic-speaking writers have praised it. In this regard, we should mention the news of the Holy Prophet (PBUH), which has been repeatedly mentioned in Sunni sources about the equal number of imams after the Prophet with the leaders of Israelites (twelve tribes). Sunni scholars have never been able to justify and accept it, and it is completely compatible with the glorious generation claimed by this research. Using the news and information obtained from Sunnis or non-Muslims, the present study examines the biological experience of the fourteen-immediate generation and explains that human perfections and virtues in this 250-year-old family have been iterated surprisingly one after another. The continuation of this situation for two and a half centuries, under the pressure and persecution of oppressive rulers, reinforces the proposition that power beyond human regulation has determined the density of virtues in this generation. After all, every human being can ultimately intervene at the level of their children and grandchildren, and not at the level of several generations after them. This research claims the mechanism that produced these virtues in this fourteen-generation family was divine will and miracle just as Moses (PBUH) and Jesus (PBUH) had miracles. At the same time, the many similarities between the teachings of the Quran and the teachings of the Torah and the Bible lead us to go beyond the fourteen-generation glorious family and join the family of the prophecy of Abraham's children.

The present study compares the concept of interpretation and interpretivism from the point of view of Hakim Naser Khosrow Ghobadiani (391-484 AH) and Allameh Tabatabai (1281-1381 AH) in the two books of Vajhe Din and Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Quran using a descriptive-analytical method. Naser Khosrow, as an Ismaili authority and theologian, is influenced by the Ismailis in his thoughts and ideas and has translated and explained the teachings of the Holy Qur'an, Sunnah, and other thoughts in the form of Ismaili views. He considers the Holy Qur'an to have an appearance and depth and believes that one who does not know the interpretation of the Holy Qur'an and the Shari'a will go astray. Naser Khosrow considers interpretation not only in similar verses but in all verses of the Holy Qur'an and even interprets the verses of the rulings, which are about the Shari'a and the divine rules and limits, contrary to the appearance of the verses. He has exaggerated in his interpretation and has unjustly used the incorrect interpretation in the verses of Al-Ahkam in the book Vajhe Din. He presents the depth as more honorable than the appearance and considers the book and the Shari'a worthless without interpretation. Explaining the importance of interpretation and the search for hidden meanings in his works, Naser Khosrow considers human grace and honor over other beings in knowing the ‘meaning covered by the appearance of things’- which is the same as interpretation. On the other hand, Allameh Tabatabai, who is a Shiite commentator of the Twelve Imams (AS), considers the interpretation to be correct based on the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah and believes that a correct interpretation does not contradict the appearance of the verses.  His interpretations are consistent with the meanings of the Holy Qur'an. He has never interpreted a verse contrary to its appearance. He argues for religious appearances and considers the method of correct interpretation to be the interpretation from the Holy Qur'an to the Holy Qur'an, which is the method of the Imams (AS). Allamah in Al-Mizan also considers interpretation in the whole of the Holy Qur'an. Despite this belief, he did not interpret the verses of Al-Ahkam (which are about 500 verses) at all in Al-Mizan and considers the place of discussion in the book of jurisprudence and not interpretation. According to Allameh, the interpretation is praiseworthy and permissible without any problems. He does not like and does not use the interpretation that is contrary to the appearance of the verses. But Naser Khosrow's Vajhe Din is full of misinterpretations and oppositions to the appearance because he sacrifices the appearance to the inside and considers only the inside. His interpretations are outside the rules of a correct interpretation since they are contrary to the appearance, which is not following Allameh's opinion.

 One of the important concerns of Islamic thinkers throughout history has been the correct knowledge of God Almighty. Mirza Mehdi Isfahani, by emphasizing verses and narrations, seeks to express a special method for knowing God Almighty, which is different from the method of philosophers and mystics. In the present study, the author evaluates Mirza Mehdi Isfahani's theory on the issue of knowing God Almighty. By referring to the works of Mirza Mehdi Isfahani and the commentators of his views, it becomes clear that according to Mirza Mehdi Isfahani, philosophical arguments not only do not lead us to God Almighty but are a veil for the knowledge of God Almighty and this knowledge stops us in recognizing mental concepts. According to Mirza Mehdi, the knowledge of the divine essence can be obtained only by God Almighty and with innate knowledge. Mirza Mehdi states that in the matter of knowing God, a distinction must be made between the two positions of proving God and knowing God. By referring to religious sources, which are important and emphasized sources of Mirza Mehdi Isfahani, it becomes clear that the distinction between the two positions of proof and knowledge of God is not correct and we have no choice but to use mental concepts to know God Almighty. Also, due to the simplicity of God Almighty, it becomes clear that the innate knowledge explained by Mirza Mahdi is impossible.

Despite being used in different branches of humanistic science such as literature, theology, and especially philosophy during the last two to three centuries, Hermeneutics has not yet been defined clearly. The literal meaning of hermeneutics in dictionaries has been affected by its traditional meaning as an interpretation of the holy book. Although hermeneutic roots can be found in ancient Greece, its serious presence is connected closely by understanding the holy books. Levels of meanings and metaphorical aspects alongside the absent author are of the characteristics of holy books which make their understanding with a problem. That was why a means for “understanding the primary meaning of holy text “was needed and hermeneutics proposed this means. Determining the meaning was, therefore, the assumption of classical hermeneutic, and “achieving the author’s intention” was the philosophy of hermeneutical science. During the different eras, hermeneutics has been defined differently from “achieving the author’s intention” to “creating meaning by interpreter” or even “the death of the author”. From Gadamer's point of view, hermeneutics tries to understand the text. He, however, emphasizes that assumptions have great dominance on the interpreter, and, therefore, discovering the intention of the author is not possible. Such an idea strengthens relativism in the field of epistemology and is criticized by some scholars like Hersch in the school of critical hermeneutics. Eric Hersch is one of the great theoreticians believing in the intention of the author. He is known for reviving the classical hermeneutics. Although his ideas are greatly following Schleiermacher and Dilthey (romantic hermeneutic), he gets distance from the romantic hermeneutics as well as philosophical hermeneutics by referring to the fundamentals of classical hermeneutics and restricting the meaning of intention of the author. By defending from the “intention of the author”, he tried to criticize philosophical hermeneutics so his hermeneutics is known as new hermeneutic. He believes that even though discovering the intention of the author is so difficult, the chief job of an interpreter is to reveal the interpreter’s logic, interests, intellectual input, and, generally, the word of the author. One of Hersch’s ways to revive the “intention of the author” is to classify between the types of interaction with any text. he believes that four-functions are possible for every text,” understanding”, “interpretation”, “judgment”, and  “criticism”. To distinguish between these functions, he proposes two fundamental separations as “separation between “Subtilitus Explicandi” and “Subtilitas Inteligendi”. Hersch believes that the main mistake of Gadamer and Heidegger was not paying attention to this big difference in understanding. Using a method like a reverse argument, Hersch proves the incorrect consequences of denying the author and dependence of meaning of the text which is doubtfulness and ignoring determine and demands incorrectness to any kind of reasoning of a theory of independence of meaning. Separation of text from the thought of the author, hence, causes the plurality of meaning rather than a single meaning; however, it extirpates not only the author’s thought but also the essence of the meaning. Emphasizing that there is a big difference between the validity of interpretation and creativity of interpretation, Hersch points out that creativity in interpretation does not lead to the validity of interpretation. He believes validity refers to an accommodation with the meaning of the text. In this way norms like “sensitivity”, “acceptability”, “power”, and “attractiveness” are not so important. Because what the text says maybe is none of them. The aim of interpretation, therefore, from the internationalists’ perspective is the validity of interpretation which its necessity is a limitation. Hersch, hence, emphasizes that the validity of interpretation which refers to the accommodation of a meaning that text presents is not necessarily creativity in interpretation. Opposed to all internationalists who believe in the theory of independence, Hersch considers meaning a sort of awareness, not words. This departure of words from meanings makes serious problems for him which made him present some rules named as the rules of confirming interpretation in four functions. By making use of these rules, it is more probable to achieve the intention of the author and reach a valid interpretation, especially in holy books in which the author is absent. These rules are “legitimacy”, “correspondence”, “gendered appropriateness” and “coherence”.

The ultimate goal of science is to predict the future and predicting is impossible without explanation. The scientific explanation is the expression of causes of a phenomenon in the light of a scientific law. Explanation in the humanities is a widespread and challenging issue and many theories have been put forward. The most prominent explanatory strategies in the humanities are naturalism and anti-naturalism, which have produced three causal, reasoning, and interpretative paradigms. The purpose of the present study is to criticize each of the models in religious studies and to design and redefine a new model for explication in religious studies. The basic strategy in explaining religious phenomena is methodological pluralism, which requires us to distinguish between the three concepts of paradigms, approaches, and methods in the study of religion. The relationship between the three is interactional. The explanation is a method used as a tool for measuring and evaluating hypotheses. The explanation of religious phenomena varies depending on the utilized approach. Our approach to the study of religion determines our model of explanation. Accordingly, the theological approaches are divided into the three categories of explanation-seeking, reason-seeking, and interpretation-seeking. The appropriate paradigm must be in synergy with the approach, and method, and state the cause. Religious issues are multidisciplinary and can be studied in different paradigms with many different approaches and methods. Thus, the three causal, discursive, and interpretive patterns in the religion do not have the same dignity and change depending on our approach. Our approaches to the study of religious phenomena determine the appropriate pattern of explanation. Religious research in the explanation-seeking approach seeks to explain the religious behavior causally and therefore the explanations are empirical. In the reason-seeking approach, an attempt is made to  seek to reason and understand religious behavior rather than to model religious beliefs and propositions. Finally, in the interpretation-seeking approach, theology seeks to interpret religious phenomena and to understand the behavior of the religion. A researcher needs all three models in religious studies and the use of all three is instructive and effective, provided they engage and cooperate with a pluralistic strategy. The pluralistic explanation is a better and more modeled approach to religious phenomena, which means accepting and benefiting from various approaches to understanding and articulating why religious phenomena occur.

 Classifying the interpretations of the Quran in a methodical and comprehensive model system is one of the most important areas of interpretive research. Some commentators have placed interpretive methods in two general categories: 1) The narrative method in which interpretive sources  include both Quranic and narrative pieces of evidence; and 2) The theoretical methodin which an opinion or ijtihad has a general meaning that includes any theoretical activity and scientific effort in understanding the verses. In general, the theoretical interpretive method is classified into several branches such as the Quranic theory (based on the method of interpreting the Quran into the Quran), the narrative theory (based on the method of interpreting the Quran into narrations), literary theory (based on literary analyses in the text of the Quran), the interpretive theory (based on Tawils, allusions, and mysteries of verses), and the comprehensive theory (based on theoretical analysis with a comprehensive view of interpretive sources including the Quran and authentic hadith, argumentative reasoning, and scientific experiences). According to this classification, philosophical interpretation is one of the interpretive trends based on the theoretical method that some commentators use it in explaining the verses of the Quran. In other words, philosophical interpretation as an interpretive tendency is usually used only in the interpretation of verses related to philosophical topics, not all verses. In this regard, relying on general philosophical principles and using rational arguments are the most important features of philosophical interpretations. Studying various philosophical thoughts reveals that Ibn Sina was the first philosopher who presented philosophical interpretations on a variety of verses and chapters of the Holy Quran in the true sense of the word. Then, Sohrewardi explained the verses of the Quran with a tasteful and enlightening approach in order to be flexible for the peripatetic philosophical reasons. Then, Mulla Sadra has taken the most important step towards designing and promoting philosophical interpretation. By separating the rules of the method of theoretical rational interpretation from the method of argumentative reasoning interpretation, a precise criterion can be provided in evaluating the interpretive works of Ibn Sina, Sohrewardi, and Mulla Sadra. In some cases, using general philosophical principles and definite and obvious arguments, they have explained the deep meanings of the verses and extracted the main purposes of the Quran. This kind of explanation of divine verses is considered as a kind of interpretation because it is based on correct rules and valid sources of interpretation and no philosophical views are imposed on the Quran. Among these, the literary theoretical method, narrative theory, empirical theory, and philosophical theory are the most important types of interpretive methods that Ibn Sina, Sohrewardi, and Mulla Sadra have used in explaining the verses. In these cases, the attention of these philosophers, after loyalty to the appearance of verses and interpretive criteria, is to elaborate and justify the meanings of the verse through philosophical concepts, principles, and rules. On the other hand, in explaining some verses of the Quran, regardless of the correct rules of interpretation, such as adhering to the appearance of verses, the discourse and context of the word, the principle of Mohkamat (indisputable verses) to clarify Motashabehat (similar verses) and other cases, they applied and imposed their philosophical principles and views on verses. Such interpretations, which are often of the Tawil type, are considered as opinions based on personal taste without paying attention to the correct rules of interpretations such as adhering to the appearance of verses and paying attention to the discourse and context.

 The binary opposition is a term to which structuralists have paid much attention. It means that there is a contradiction among many elements and phenomena. The human mind resorts to the phenomena by means of antithetical signs. The binary oppositioncan be effective in recognizing mystical and symbolic phenomena and myths. Artworks can be represented by signs and symbols and what is related to culture. In the present study, the artworks of ancient Lurestan, which are related to the Iron Age, are examined with a descriptive-analytical method from the perspective of binary opposition. The authors divided the images of artworks into small units and examined the relationships between them. Zurvanism is based on dualism. Zurvan is one of the great gods of Lurestan and one of the gods of the Zoroastrian faith. Zurvan is both male and female at the same time which might refer to anima and animus. Zurvan procreated both Ahuramazda and Ahriman. Zurvan's face looks like a man, but her hair is like a woman in a bronze headpin. Ahuramazda and his forces are symbolically positioned at the right side of Zurvan, but the Devil and his forces are at his (Zurvan's) left side. Ahura's images are young, in the forms of flower and fox, but the images of Demon (the alternative name for the devil) are old, or rather too young (i.e. infants), at the same time, and in the form of a serpent. Most of such conflicts have been used for religious purposes. Understanding the contrasts in a structure helps to understand its general meaning. Lévi Strauss believes that our ancestors have used binary opposition to better understand the world. Strauss first divides myths into smaller units , which he calls ‘myth im’. Then, he examines the metaphorical meaning of myth ims. Zurvan is the god of time who has an eternal and dual nature. He has twin brothers, Ormazd and Ahriman, for the followers of the Zurvanism religion. Zurvan is the name of a minor god in Avesta. However, in the Pahlavi texts, which represent the tradition of the Sassanid period, he has a prominent character. He is eternal like Ormazd and Ahriman in some texts because the god of time has no beginning of time and he is the beginning of everything himself. Zurvanism religion is a common form of Zoroastrianism during the Sassanid era. In the present study, two images attributed to ancient Lurestan were examined. In the first image, Zurvan has been depicted in the form of a man, with a majestic face, along with a beard on his upper body and the face of a beautiful woman on his chest. This image shows the confrontation between male and female types. To the right of Zurvan can be seen God bless (Ahuramazda), four standing young men, three sitting young men, and a flower. To the left of Zurvan are the Devil (Ahriman), four standing old men, and three infants on the ground. Ahuramazda’s forces can be Amshaspandan, who is seven persons, and the Devil’s forces can be Diwan, who is also seven persons; therefore, the forces of Ahuramazda and Ahriman are in opposition to each other. The second image is a headpin obtained from Sorkhdome Lori of Koohdasht. Zurvan's face has both the facial features of a man and a woman at the same time. Zurvan's thick eyebrows and rough face are signs of masculinity and his crown-like hairs refer to his femininity. On the right side of Zurvan, there is a flower that looks like a lotus or sunflower, which is a symbol of Ahuramazda. An animal has been engraved in this part of the image which looks like a fox or a jackal. This animal has worn clothes and a branch in its hand. In other countries, the symbols of the fox are interesting and associated with positive gods. In other countries, the symbols of the fox are and associated with positive gods. On the left side of Zurvan, the Devil is depicted as a hunchbacked infant. There is also a cobra snake which can be from the forces of the Devil on this side of Zurvan. This snake has hands and legs. It seems that it has had sacredness before the religion of Zoroaster and the Abrahamic religions. Snake is included as one of the Devil's creatures in Bundahishn’s book. The clothes are all over the top and cover them up to the toes. Only Zurvan has a belt on his waist, which is on his right side to the left, and this can be a sign of Ahuramazda's superiority over the Devil. The Zurvan in the middle of the page is the unifier of the world of light and darkness or the world of good and evil. The shape of the plate is a circle. As Jung puts it, the circle has been a symbol of both the male and female sexes at the same time. The height of Zurvan is so tall that covers the entire screen. It seems that his head is in the sky and his feet are on the earth. On this basis, Zurvan alone contains the sky and earth. The hairs of Zurvan are like a mountain. The mountain is also a symbol of the goddesses.

 One of the most important issues facing medieval philosophers and theologians, both Islamic and Christian, is the position of God in relation to the metaphysical subject raised by Aristotle. Aristotle considers the subject of metaphysics to be ‘being as being’, and most Greek philosophers believe that being as being is God. But Ibn Sina and Suarez provide a new interpretation of the subject of metaphysics and state that God can not be the subject of metaphysics, while at the same time, He is not separated from metaphysics. The main purpose of the present study is to compare the views of Suarez and Ibn Sina as two Christian and Islamic philosophers about the place of God in metaphysics. This research has been done by the analytical-library method. These two scholars have similarities and differences in this regard in several respects. The most important difference between them is that Suarez, given the topic of the Three Chronicles of Christianity or the Trinty that ruled him, could not have the same meaning of ‘being as being’ in his mind as Ibn Sina. Aristotle, on the one hand, believed that the validity of a science is to have a single subject buton the other hand, he introduced 3 or 4 subjects for metaphysicscausing confusion among philosophers and commentators after him. One of the issues that seriously added to the confusion of philosophers was the God's place in the subject of metaphysics. In general, different opinions and interpretations in this field can be expressed in two general perspectives: 1) For the Greek commentators of Aristotle, the subject of metaphysics is the special kind of being that is supersensible and immobile. For instance, Alexander Aphrodite, the first Greek commentator on Aristotle, considered metaphysics as a genus of which theology and divine sciences are of its types. 2) In the Middle Ages, according to the book of Exodus, the first Christian philosophers tried to equate the ‘being as being’ with the existence of the Bible. With Ibn Sina and Suarez’s entry into medieval Christian philosophy, the medieval metaphysical philosophers realized that the being expressed in the subject of the metaphysics could not be merely a specific being such as God. Rather, this being is generally the same as the absolute being, which includes tangible and intangible beings, and this is separate from the first being. Ibn Sina’s view is contrary to the view of Aphrodite and the Greek tradition which sought to prove that Aristotle's three definitions are different aspects of one thing and they have no inherent difference with each other. So, Ibn Sina at the beginning of his book Elahiyate Shefa says that “the subject of metaphysics is neither God nor the final four causes of things, but its subject is ‘being as being’ and God and the four causes are metaphysical issues”. Suarez also presents new ideas that set himself apart from Aristotle and the other medieval predecessors by presenting and explaining the real existence as the subject of metaphysics. In order to determine existence as a real existence, he provides a set of pairs of concepts such as the formal concept versus the mental concept, as well as the nominal existence versus the descriptive existence. Suarez distinguishes between the formal concept as a mental actuality and the concept in the mind as an act that is directly perceived by the mind, and here he approaches Ibn Sina.

 The Holy Qur'an, in addition to presenting the knowledge of the horizons for the knowledge of God Almighty, has also made a special invitation to the soul’s knowledge of God. Contrary to the knowledge of the horizon, which is expressed in various verses of its types and examples, the verses that have considered the soul’s knowledge have paid more attention to the essence of this issue and have discussed fewer examples or typologies. In transcendent wisdom, the soul’s knowledge of God and the attainment of the knowledge of God through the knowledge of the soul is one of the basic issues in theology and anthropology. Therefore, the analysis of the soul’s knowledge that is desirable in the Holy Qur'an on the one hand, and the explanation of its desired types in the Holy Qur'an on the other hand, seem necessary to present aspiring seekers the true way. To achieve this goal, with a descriptive-analytical method, after explaining the two general types of intuitive and acquired soul’s knowledge, we have reached four general categories of verses in this field and have measured the relationship of each of them. We  have come to the conclusion that the verses which have designed the knowledge of the presence and esoteric intuition for the knowledge of the Lord are also transferable to the acquired knowledge and proof of the soul. Knowing God through self-knowledge is an issue highly emphasized in Islamic teachings and has always been considered in mystical and philosophical teachings, especially the transcendent wisdom. This way of knowing God is introduced in the language of the Holy Qur'an as the way of the soul or soul’s knowledge, and in some verses of the Qur'an, God Almighty has demanded to reach oneself in this way. Anthropological knowledge is a way to know God in which the knowledge of the human soul becomes a means to ascend to the knowledge of God Almighty. The human soul is  created in such a way that by knowing its essence, attributes, and actions, one can attain knowledge of the divine essence, attributes, and actions Of course, depending on how much the seeker of this path has cultivated his soul or which dimensions of his existence belong to such knowledge, the limit of reaching the knowledge of God would be different. Sometimes he achieves only God's existence, sometimes he becomes aware of the perfect attributes of God, or learns how to attribute the essence to perfection and how he acts for his actions. Of course, attaining higher degrees of such knowledge are possible. In general, the soul’s knowledge can play a role in the path of knowing God the Blessed and Exalted in two ways: !) acquired knowledge and 2) intuitive knowledge of the soul. The intuitive knowledge of the soul is based on the intuition of the soul and esoteric revelation based on the relevance of the human soul. In this type, man's intuitive knowledge of his own truth receives its relevance in person and intuitions belonging to this relationship in proportion to its scope of existence.  The meaning of the acquired knowledge of the soul is achieved by using the argumentative and acquired knowledge to the human soul and his properties of the acquired knowledge of God. This study shows that the acquired soul’s knowledge becomes argumentative with deductions such as the movement from potential to actual in relation to the rationales and the occurrence of the soul and the end of the rational movement of the soul. These issues have been explicitly narrated by Mulla Sadra and his commentators and followers. According to the Holy Qur'an, there is a strong connection between the self-knowledge and the knowledge of God. The Holy Qur'an emphasizes the soul’s knowledge of God Almighty in four general categories: 1) commitment of soul (Maidah, 105), 2) the soul’s testimonial (Araf, 72), 3) reference  to the soul’s path versus the other two paths (Fusselat, 53), and 4) forgetting the soul (Hashr, 19). However, in Mulla Sadra's works, only the application of the soul’s knowledge to the last two cases can be seen. But the innovations of Sadra philosophers such as Allameh Tabatabai based on the principles of transcendent wisdom can also be applied to the first two cases of the soul’s knowledge of the transcendent wisdom. In Surah Al-Ma'idah, attention to the self and its knowledge is emphasized because it is a means to know God and should not be neglected under the pretext of engaging in the commandment of the good. Considering that the human soul is presented in this verse as a way and not just a walker and seeker, the emphasis on self-knowledge in this verse can be applied to the first and third interpretations of the self-knowledge argument as it can be applied to the intuitive knowledge of the soul. Since in Surah A'raf, after man bears witness to himself and the soul bears witness to him, man has testified to the existence of God and to the attribute of his Lordship. According to the evidence of the verse in this study, its explicitness in the intuitive soul’s knowledge is more than the acquired soul’s knowledge. In Surah Fussilat, which refers to all three categories of ways of knowing God, according to the context of horizons knowledge and truthful knowledge, the meaning of the soul’s knowledge can be considered as its acquired form. Based on the privilege of the intuitive soul’s knowledge over horizons knowledge, it can be considered as its presence. In Surah Al-Hashr, the issue of the soul’s knowledge is raised in a contraposition way, so that forgetting God is considered the cause of forgetting the soul. Hence, the suspension of the forgetfulness of the soul over the forgetfulness of God refers to the suspension of the remembrance of God on the remembrance of the soul and the dependence of the Lord's knowledge on the knowledge of the soul. According to this verse, the ignorance of the divine names and attributes causes the neglect of the attributes of poverty and dependence of man. In addition,  the human being, by considering himself independent, forgets his truth and seeks non-God in the worldly life. Finally, we can say explaining the desired soul’s knowledge of the Holy Quran from the perspective of transcendent wisdom and the application of intuitive and acquired soul’s knowledge mentioned by Mulla Sadra to some verses of the Holy Quran are based on the special view of transcendent wisdom on the human soul and its special existential position on the one hand, and the explanation of some principles and foundations of ontology on the other hand. In this view, according to Mulla Sadra, self-knowledge is the ladder of knowledge of the Lord, and knowing the essence, attributes, and actions of the human soul can be a window into knowing the essence, attributes, and actions of the Almighty God.

To explain the effects of tragedy on the audience, Aristotle refers to the fear and compassion conveyed to them following the protagonist’s unfortunate fate. Of course, the question of what factor has brought this misfortune to him is a question, to which Aristotle has given a short and unclear answer. From Aristotle's point of view, the fear and compassion that are occasionally deserved for the protagonist, who may be even sometimes blamed because of them in front of his audience, are caused by the mistakes that he has made. Of course, the famous word 'Hamartia' (ἁμαρτία), to which Aristotle refers, has not been explicitly interpreted and this ambiguity has stopped understanding of the cause of the failure of the hero of tragedy in an aura of the commentators’ multiple interpretations. With regard to the key word 'Hamartia' (ἁμαρτία) as a well-known term in Poetics that describes the protagonist's mistake, the present article tried to consider the unfortunate event of Corona as a confirmation of the specific interpretation of this term through a descriptive-analytic method after presenting the commentators’ multiple opinions in understanding what this Aristotelian term means. Therefore,  what is most evident in the face of the natural catastrophe caused by Corona is the surprise of modern Man as a result of this ruinous phenomenon. Thus, if we go back to the tragedy in Aristotle's view, the acceptance of this natural evil at a time when all scientific methods have been used to control the Nature means nothing but submission to the evil, lawless, and out-of-control feature of Nature. As far as it goes, if we relate Man as the hero of the tragedy with the laws of the outside world and go beyond the imposed rules of art, we can say that this hero has been fated to the mentioned misfortune not due to his mistakes, but by bad chance. Via this description, a hero, who is not captivated by luck, may be deemed to be a kind of ideal character that will not be objectively found if the tragedy analyst wants to interpret his actions completely as voluntary, highly, and moral. With this unacceptable assumption, the task of art will be limited to presenting a pure ideal, while the relationship between art and reality will be seriously damaged. As a result of this interpretation, a fate-based tendency will be required for understanding the tragic character in relation with the reality of human life. Hence, the hero of Aristotle's tragedy must be called a prisoner of fortune contrary to the attitude our rationalist philosophers have achieved. Such an understanding of the Naturalist and Rationalist Aristotle reflected by his own commitment to the observation of Nature would make us reach an Aristotle, who has become realistic by a Stoic reading, an idea that distinguishes between autonomous and out-of-control matters and considers acceptance of the latter as part of a wise and realistic human life. Thus, Hamartia has been the hero's delusional optimism about the power of his own intellect and discernment. Nonetheless, this illusion has forced him to be resigned to the Nature and the Environment as atonement. At the same time, it is necessary to pay attention to this fact that the interpreter must still remain committed to the rules of rationality for understanding the action of this tragic hero since he is still aware of human rational principle. The negation of free will requires that Man deprive himself of his human privilege. However, as evidenced by the historical relations that govern human destiny and in spite of the bitterness and malevolence of the Corona, it is still possible to stay away from excessive optimism about Nature while committing to Man’s intellectual and practical ability. Understanding tragedy as a tumult of natural outburst would be a kind of critical and realistic interpretation of life. This recent interpretation is not a belief in tragedy or interpretation of life as a tragic event, but it is acceptance of tragedy as part of the essential components of human life based on the inseparable connection of Man and Nature. This is the balance between rationality and critical (not transcendent) naturalism.

Kant contends that it is not principally possible to argue in favor of the existence of God through theoretical reasoning and attempts to consider the existence of God as the presupposition of necessity to attain the highest good through practical moral arguments, thereby proving God. The purpose of this article was to examine Ayatollah Javadi’s critiques on the moral argument from the perspective of Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi's philosophy of ethics. Javadi Amoli makes two criticisms of this argument. First, Kant's acknowledgment of the acceptance of God's existence has only moral and practical values and does not prove the "existence" of God as a fact per se. The other critique is the implication between "Ought" and "Is", while "Ought " always results from "Is" and not vice versa.When Kant awakes from his dogmatic sleep, he realizes that none of the arguments presented to prove the existence of God are correct. He goes beyond that by claiming that it is in principle impossible to argue in favor of the existence of God through theoretical reasoning because God is not temporal and spatial; as a result, the categories of comprehension cannot be carried over to Him. Theoretical reasoning is limited to experiences and phenomena and if it goes beyond sensory objects, it goes beyond its limits while it is possible to speak about that realm neither negatively nor positively (Kant, 1998: p.153). However, he understands that by rejecting God, everything would be permissible and maintaining morality and respect for others’ rights would be meaningless. As a result, he decides to prove God through practical reasoning and keep morality alive in the society. Therefore, from Kant's point of view, moral action is the source of happiness and requires belief in the existence of God; because if there is no God, the moral law cannot be the cause of eternal happiness. Then, practical reasoning must accept God as the presupposition; however, theoretical reasoning cannot prove it. In this article, we first described Kant's practical moral argument and then investigated Ayatollah Javadi Amoli’s criticisms. Afterwards, his critiques were examined based on the principles of Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi's philosophy of morality.According to Kant, his moral theory needs 3 presuppositions to be completed: Freedom: Freedom is the necessary condition for the possibility of commitment to the absolute moral norms since man cannot act with absolute morality unless he is free. Immortality of the Soul: No rational being can attain virtue in the sensible world; the soul must be eternal so that we can reach it after death. God: The third presupposition of Kant's moral theory is the existence of God.When Kant sees theoretical reason to be incapable of proving God, he tries to prove God through practical reasoning. He believes that virtue and happiness are the two elements of the highest good. The moral law considers the presumption of the existence of God as the necessary condition of the combined interest between virtue and happiness. In other words, happiness is the state of rational being so that everything is done according to man’s will and virtue is what man must do (Kant 1996: 5/124). Man must achieve the highest good, that is, union of what he wants with what he must do. This depends on the compatibility of material nature and human will, but man can never harmonize material nature with his own will because the ordinary being is not the creation of the universe and cannot establish the necessary relationship between happiness and virtue (Kant 1996, 5/113). The highest good in Kant's philosophy has a moral necessity and is attainable by every human being. The necessity of achieving the highest good indicates the possibility of achieving it (Kant 1996: 5/143). Thus, to harmonize between virtue and happiness, we must assume the existence of the cause of the world, which can establish harmony and unity between the virtue and happiness. Therefore, God, the Omnipotent and Omniscient, must exist to reconcile the moral virtue with a blissful result.Javadi Amoli presents two objections to Kant's argument:His first objection is that this argument is never an argument for the existence of God because, according to Kant, when rational concepts are not associated with sensory intuition, they have no anecdote about the outside world and do not tolerate any meaning concerning the reality; therefore, this argument has only a moral value and does not open the way to the real world. This argument does not convince the skepticism of the existence of God; rather, it only says that if one wants to think morally, he must accept the existence of God as the presupposition of moral rules. According to Kant, if one wants to acknowledge priori judgments of practical reason, which are the same as moral rules, he or she must also accept the presuppositions of these priori rules, which are the existence of the free will, eternal soul, and God. Nevertheless, from Kant's point of view, this acknowledgment of the existence of God has only moral and practical values and does not prove the "existence" of God (Javadi Amoli, 2007: pp. 284-285).Javadi Amoli's second objection is the implication of moral judgments on theoretical propositions, such as the existence of God and immortality of the soul. He says that moral judgments, which are related to practical reason, have special subjects and predicates. These propositions, as Kant acknowledges, contain some self-existent propositions that are inherently acceptable to practical reasoning. According to him, the propositions related to theoretical reasoning are never deduced from the propositions that are related to practical reasoning, but this implication is from the side of theoretical reasoning. He says that for man to reach a practical judgment, he always has to form some deductions, the minor and major of which are theoretical and practical verdicts, respectively. From the combination of these two propositions, a moral deduction is formed, the result of which is the quantity, quality, practicality, or theoreticality of the function of the lowest two propositions. Since one of the propositions is derived from practical wisdom, the result that is drawn will be always the result of practical wisdom and not the theoretical result (Javadi Amoli, 2007: pp. 285 and 286).Nonetheless, Mesbah Yazdi believes that philosophically, the “Ought” and “not-Ought” are deducted from the “Is” and “not-Is”, so there is nothing wrong with drawing an "Ought" conclusion from the premises, which are all about the “Is”. Therefore, it must be deliverable to the “Is” with no difference. As Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi considers moral propositions, both the informing and compositional propositions are deducted from the “Is”. As a result, Ayatollah Javadi's objections to Kant are not sound according to his views. Ayatollah Javadi Amoli believes that because moral sentences are compositional, they are the lowest compared to the informing sentences and combination of informing and compositional propositions. The result would be always compositional since the compositional proposition is the lowest and there is no possibility of deduction, one of the premises of which is a moral (compositional) proposition to give a conclusion that would contain the concept of "Is" and be thus informing. However, according to Ayatollah Mesbah, who maintains that moral propositions are also informing and can be delivered to the universe, moral propositions will no longer be the lowest; hence, it is possible to infer moral propositions from cosmological propositions and at least, there is no barrier to being compositional. In the end, we conclude that according to the principles of Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi's philosophy of ethics, Ayatollah Javadi Amoli’s objections do not apply to Kant's moral argument, while Ayatollah Mesbah's point of view seems more accurate.