فصلنامه بازی جنگ
پیاپی 6 (بهار و تابستان 1399)

Effective allocation of the defense budget is one of the important duties of governments in the fight against terrorism. In this paper, using the bi-level optimization and the sequential-move game, we introduce a new multi-target attacker-defender game with budget constraints to model the strategic interactions between attacker (terrorists) and defender (governments). We focus on the different types of attacks adopted by the attacker. Using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions, the proposed bi-level programming problem is reduced to a one-level mathematical program with complementarity constraints. We then design a capable neural network to solve this one-level mathematical programming problem by using the perturbed Fischer-Burmeister function, optimization theory, and some concepts of ordinary differential equations. It is shown that the proposed neural network is asymptotic stable and convergent to the optimal solution of the bi-level programming problem. Finally, we show the performance and validity of the proposed method by using two scenarios.

The purpose of this paper is to mathematically model the problem of interdiction the maximum movement of enemy forces in ground defense. Solving the proposed model gives the best strategy to help army ground commanders for preventing the maximum transfer of enemy forces and equipment. This can be regarded as a significant matter of the wargame involving two players. The first player tries to move his maximum forces whereas the second player tries to damage or limit the enemy's movement routes with the least cost and equipment in order to prevent the transfer of enemy forces as much as possible. Different models for this problem are presented based on real-world assumptions. Finally, the performance of the final model is evaluated using the simulation of the war between Iraq and Kuwait. The results show that the use of the mathematical approach has a good performance to stop and to weaken the enemy.

With the advancement of technologies related to cyber domains, the threats related to intrusion, disruption and sabotage in these domains have also increased and the decision makers of stakeholder organizations in these domains should be able to In the event of any threat, appropriate decisions should be made and the relevant users should be able to implement these decisions correctly. One of the things that builds and strengthens this ability in decision makers and users is the game of cyber wargaming.In the present article, with the aim of explaining the technologies and technologies of cyber wargaming after collecting information Libraries and mentions of cyber wargame technologies explain them and explain the frameworks and models of cyber wargame explanation, cyber wargame platforms, training space and cyber wargame tools, similar to Applicable constructions for cyber warfare game, representations and deceptions of the enemy in cyber war game, existing exercises and scenarios in cyber wargame have been performed and finally the relevant results have been presented as a content analysis.

One of the methods used to prepare and increase the capability of military commanders in the field of decision-making, decision-making and feedback from decisions in universities, research institutes or military training centers, is the method of war game or situation simulation. War game is divided into different categories, each of which has its own characteristics and features. In this research, we have used the library approach to collect literature in the field of war games and by classifying them, the present study has become an applied research whose achievements can be used in future planning and planning in war game design, implementation and training centers. In this research, data collection has been done by field and library methods. The result of the research identifies the types of decision-making patterns and models in war games and helps planners to design, execute and train war games in order to improve the ability of commanders to provide appropriate solutions by recognizing decision-making patterns.

Increasing confidence in information and communication technology has dramatically changed the definition of security and the nature of war. Many important infrastructures, such as banks, airports, information systems, research centers, power plants, hospitals, telecommunication centers, oil pipelines, etc., are potentially vulnerable to cyberattacks. Game theory has provided a rich set of mathematical tools for modeling and analyzing strategic interactions between attackers and defenders in cyber warfare, which can be used as a fundamental and accurate theoretical basis for deciding in the most challenging war situations to select the optimal strategy. In this paper, the challenging propblem of optimal resource allocation in cyber warfare with uncertain information in cyber warfare is formulated by game theory as a uncertain mixed-integer quadratic programming model and it is investigated with limited belief degree and conditional value at risk criterions.

In this paper, a two-player Stackelberg game between the defender (leader) and attacker (follower) is considered , when the attacker tries to attack a strategic site and damage to communication paths , the defender aims to reduce the damage caused by the goal of locating the optimal number and the best type of military equipment due to resource constraints. This research attempts to present a bi-level mathematical model to optimize the location of military equipment, which aims to increase the distance between the attacker and the strategic site. Considering the bi-level model and because the military equipment location problem is in a class of NP-hard problems, a metaheuristic hybrid approach based on teaching-learning based optimization and dijkstra method is used. At the end of the research, with the help of large-scale numerical examples of the problem, the full description of the model and the proposed solution algorithm has been discussed.