نشریه اندیشه فلسفی
پیاپی 1 (زمستان 1399)

According to Avicenna’s theory of knowledge, intellectual knowledge in the case of human beings is explained via the inherence of intelligible forms in the soul. In this paper, I will show that the inherence of intelligible forms in the soul is at odds with the immateriality of the soul.

Athir al-Din al-Abhari is the only Avicennan logician who denies conditional syllogism. He also the first who doubted in conversion and contraposition of conditionals and dispensed with them. After 1968, some consequence systems under the title ‘Conditional Logic’ have evolved that reject the same rules. A similarity between Abhari and these contemporary systems is their commitment to Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens. Analyzing the reasons that the two groups provide for denying conditional syllogism reveals that their rejections is rooted in their novel interpretations of strict conditional. On Abjari’s view, the strict conditional ‘whenever A then B’ means ‘in all assumptions that the implication between A and B is possible, A implies B.’ On the contemporary conditional logicians’ view, the conditional proposition ‘if A then B’ in natural languages means that ‘other things being equal, A implies B’. The two interpretations are common in that in addition to the assumption of the premise, they both assume things that are somehow related to the premise, and this is the common root in the denial of conditional syllogism for both groups.

In his classic paper on the philosophy of religion entitled ‘The Presumption of Atheism’, Antony Flew, relying on a traditional law rule, extracts a methodological rule according to which the burden of proof in the problem of God’s existence is non-restrictedly on the theist. Here we argue that from another law rule in Islamic jurisprudence, we can extract another methodological rule that, in contrast to Flew’s rule, is context-dependent; so, applying this new rule, we can imagine that in some situations, the burden of proof would be on atheist. Since there are some historical evidence for the relationship or even identification of that traditional rule and this Islamic rule, it could be concluded that Flew’s rules too should be context-dependence. Hence, his non-restricted claim about the burden of proof in the problem of God’s existence will be rejected.

In this paper, we will try to reconstruct Hegel’s logic and metaphysics through the modern logic. Graham Priest has claimed that we can read Hegel’s logic with the paraconsistent approach to logic, specially Dialetheism; he calls Hegel a Dialetheist. At first, we report Priest’s account on Hegel’s dialectic and his notion of dialectical contradiction; also, we try to analyze Priest’s argument for calling Hegel a Dialetheist. To achieve the proper comparison between Hegel’s logic and Dialetic one, we explain, non-technically, the simple semantics of a Dialetic logic. And finally, we establish a criticism of Priest’s account in order to reopening the question about Hegel’s being Dialetheist.

In order for a crime to be realized, the defendant to be judged as criminal with moral and legal liability, deserving to be punished properly, Anglo-American legal theory appeals to the Requirement of Voluntary Act (RVA) as a necessary and comprehensive requisite. According to this requisite the criminal act is consisted of mens rea and actus reus, with voluntary act as the actus reus in its restricted conception. Moral and legal philosophers have attempted to provide various moral explanations for the RVA, particularly utilizing theories in philosophy of action. In this paper, firstly I introduce the RVA as it is articulated in Anglo-American legal theory (in first two parts) and then illustrate and review five different possible moral rationales which could be deduced. Finally, I will conclude my paper with some hints about my preferable view and set forth questions concerning the very validity of such attempts at philosophically moral justification.

This article is up to raise a claim different from the common attitude toward the relationship between the absurdity of life and suicide. In a common attitude, one believes that “one commits suicide if and only if his life becomes absurd”. This can be objected in two ways: a priori and posterior. In the first path, in order to analyze this proposition, we should obtain a proper notion about the concepts of “absurdity of life” and “suicide”. After this clarification, we can reflect on the relation between these two concepts. In the second path, we should find two kinds of cases: (1) mentioning suicides that are committed by ones with meaningful lives, (2) considering some absurd lives which didn’t end up committing suicide. Thus, rejecting the aforementioned proposition a priori and posterior, we can mention new relations between the absurdity of life and suicide. The aim of this article is first scrutinizing accounts around death, and second justifying lives worth living different from common attitudes around the meaningfulness of lives. In this article, we will only evaluate this contradiction by referring to western-christen thinkers and we will show that unlike the common attitudes, suicide is not necessarily based on deep thoughts about life.