فصلنامه حکمت و فلسفه
سال شانزدهم شماره 2 (پیاپی 62، تابستان 1399)

In early 20th century, a widespread tendency toward a philosophical anthropology was dominant over the intellectual space in Germany, and it was so deep and extensive in its influence that phenomenology had to react and take a stance against it. This initial stance appeared be an essential conflict of a sort, so that Blumenberg coined the term “anthropological ban” regarding Husserl’s and Heidegger’s Phenomenologies. In this paper, we have tried to illustrate that such a confliction is neither essential nor absolute, meaning that it is quite legitimate to talk about a philosophical anthropology of a sort based on Husserl’s and Heidegger’s Phenomenologies. Thus, the plot and general characteristics of such a phenomenological anthropology, in terms of Heidegger's existential analysis of Dasein as a Fundamental ontology in his Sein und Zeit, has been depicted, and its fundamentally different anthropological pattern comparing with that of a traditional anthropology has also been demonstrated.

Hegel believed the Antigone tragedy not only revealed the national spirit of ancient Greece but was indeed the greatest artwork of all time. displaying the “Logic of History”, was the critical role Antigone tragedy played in the phenomenology of spirit from the standpoint of Hegel. This article will attempt to answer how Hegel reads Antigone's tragedy and how he observes the “Logic of History” in it. Ancient Greek society, In Hegel’s point of view, has constantly been the symbol of “unity of life”. however, Hegel believes that at certain times in history, this unity of ethical life and its state of joy in Greece has been destroyed. Since Hegel believes literary works have historical-cultural implications and considers art and literature as the first medium by which the spirit becomes self-conscious, in the section “True Spirit, ethical Life” from the book Phenomenology of Spirit, he describes the fall of the ethical life of Greek society by reading of the Antigone tragedy. What Hegel understood from the Antigone tragedy was a series of painful conflicts that ensued as a consequence of a contradiction between ethical powers within Greek society. powers that had heretofore been in unreflected unity, but now that their contradictions revealed, the ethical life of society collapsed and the spirit moved to a more rational and liberated stage. These stages are in fact very much the irreversible final course of history toward achieving freedom.

Since Wittgenstein is known for his two philosophies, one of the concerns of interpreters of his thoughts is to understand the relation between his two philosophies. Hutto is one of the interpreters who have endeavored to identify a reliable relation between Wittgenstein’s philosophies in order to present a coherent and consistent interpretation of these philosophies. In his view, this approach results in resolving superficial and profound conflicts in Wittgenstein’s philosophies. In Hutto’s words, an integrated basis that relates Wittgenstein’s two philosophies is Wittgenstein’s “end of philosophy”, and his attitude towards “nature and meaning of language”. Based on Hutto’s interpretation, in two of Wittgenstein’s intellectual periods, the end of philosophy was ‘description’, but Wittgenstein’s philosophical attitude towards the nature of language was evolved: an evolution from logical form to form of life. Hutto attempts to show that this evolution was not Wittgenstein’s main intention and it emerged through the method he applied for offering his thoughts. In Hutto’s view, Wittgenstein’s attitude in his second philosophy is correct, based on the ‘functional attitude’ and his attitude in his first philosophy is faulty, based on the ‘picture theory’, and this fault results from Wittgenstein’s confusion. He intends to extend the second philosophy method to the first philosophy in order to interpret the whole philosophy by one end and attitude. Although his conclusion is exquisite, it results in the conclusion that in Tractatus, there is no substantial point worth keeping.

In this paper, by reviewing the main components of Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy it will become evident that he is a critic on the distinction between the context of discovery/justification in the methodology of science. His reasoning consists of: 1. his proponents have merely dealt with the context of discovery/justification in the educational realm, according to which only the evidence regarding the justification of a hypothesis is considered effective, and the other aspects of justification are ignored. 2. the distinction of two contents is based on oversimplification in process of producing science, which merely refers to the strong point of the theories, not the weakness. 3. there exists no empirical determination in the context of justification. 4. in the process of producing science the descriptive and prescriptive aspects, of the hypotheses, are inseparable and intertwined. 5. unlike the proponents of this distinction the structured lexicon in the context of justification has no fixed and definite consequences but is subject to Kant’s relativized a priori principles facing constant change, modification, and reparation. After pronouncing these problems, Kuhn was criticized by his proponents of distinction of discovery/justification in a few contexts: 1. adopting intention on ambiguous writing style in his works, 2. applying the cyclic approach in providing an epistemic-realistic criteria list and retrieval to the non-epistemic criteria, 3. confusion between the context of decision and context of justification and concerning cause instead of reason. To escape from these criticisms, he points to the following two issues: 1. misunderstanding of his views by sympathizers of the distinction and 2. providing criteria as to preserve the objectivity of science different from the proponents of the distinction. The objective of this paper is to analyze, complete, and criticize Kuhn’s thoughts regarding the distinction of discovery/justification.

The present article studies Rorty’s pragmatic attitude to the mind-body problem. This project expresses itself along two axes: his critical attitude to the Cartesian conception of the mind as mirror of nature, and his pragmatic idea of the man named non-reductive physicalism. Based on historicism, he shows that there is an epistemic gap between philosophical paradigms, and each of them and the problems arising from them depend on the historical conditions and are optional. In addition, he makes it clear that the problem of mind is the result of presupposing the assumptions of historical origin, which have been chosen for non-epistemic causes in the same particular historic period. Therefore, the traditional conception of knowledge and mind may be replaced by a pragmatic conception of knowledge, which is a matter of conversation, of social practice, and a pragmatic idea of the man, that is, materialism without mind and body identity.

The Priority of the practical approach toward the world to theoretical approach is one of the most fundamental components of Heidegger’s “Being and Time”. In fact, Heidegger believes that the first disclosure of Dasein to the world is based on practice rather than speculation and even Dasein is the same practice. Thus, according to Heidegger, the theory is only a derivative form of Praxis. Heidegger doesn’t refer to “Aristotle’s Phronesis” explicitly in “BT”. However, we can find the implicit presence of this concept all over the book to the extent that researchers like Volpi consider “BT” as a translation of Aristotle’s “Nichomachean Ethics”. I Will try, in this article, to present four tacit presences of Phronesis in “Being and Time” and to show that these four presences have founded on KAIROS that Heidegger emphasizes on it especially in the “Phenomenology of Religious Life” Lecture course.

The concept of freedom is one of the most central concepts in Kant’s Philosophy which has a critical role in both theoretical and practical reason. Some interpreters believe that agency and spontaneity of reason in theoretical knowledge is another expression of autonomy and freedom. In another hand, freedom plays a central part in practical reason too. In fact, practical reason as a will that determines itself abstracted from the casual system of nature is nothing but freedom. But there is a challenge that this fundamental concept in Kant’s philosophy encounter. This challenge in Hegelian terms is that this freedom is just “Transcendental”; it means this freedom is abstracted and cut of reality and Kant never succeed in proving this fundamental concept of his philosophy and just supposed it Transcendentally, as something needed for establishing his philosophy. In this article, we first try to explain the challenge and then critique the possibility of solving it by focusing on Kant’s writings on History. So, in the introduction part, we explain the critique of Transcendentalism in the concept of freedom. Then, we try to show how Kant in the philosophy of history tried to find a way out of the Transcendental grasp of freedom and shows that freedom is an actuality that appears in history. In conclusion, we critique the sufficiency of our reading and this suggested solution.