نشریه پژوهش های برنامه و توسعه
پیاپی 3 (پاییز 1399)

Being on the development path is not a predetermined goal and isdifferent in various countries due to their different historical and socialbackgrounds. Elinor Ostrom is one of the Institutional economistswhose achievement can be a development planning guide. Thequestion of this research is that what are Ostrom's institutional attitudeand its application in development planning? Polycentric attitude,Bounded rationality, and Self-organizing ability that form Ostrom'sphilosophical foundations would lead to a structure of governancewhich is necessarily a democratic collective action, bottom-up,decentralized, and socially constructed that a systematic process of theability to solve social problems, learning, and creativity form itscontent and indeed, it is social interaction and the expansion of socialcapital. Therefore, according to Ostrom’s view of planning, itsframework relies on the governance of local and decentralizedcommunities which are derived from social interactions in the contextof a social learning process that replaces absolute bottom-up analysis.

One of the most challenging issues related to the monetary policy is the causes and origins of inflationary shocks and biases. There are two approaches to the monetary policy in general: first, monetary policy based on discretion, and second, monetary policy based on a specific rule. Economists of New Classical School believe that monetary policy should be based on a monetary rule. Accordingly, the cause of inflationary shocks and biases can be considered as a violation of the monetary rule. They believe that economic agents make their expectations rationally. Therefore, an announced monetary policy will not have a real impact and will only cause inflation. As a result, an economists' effort could be to explain the government's motives for violating the monetary rule and to make policy recommendations based on it. This article tries to provide a new solution to the problem of violation of the monetary rule by using a special type of mechanism so called "Clark mechanism" (pivotal or person-centered mechanism) as well as designing micro-bases for the government behavior and rational agents and relying on the issue of government reputation.

Iran’s Public-Private Dialogue Council was established in 2011 according to article (75) of the Law for theFifth Development Plan. According to the law for the Continuous Improvement of Business Environment (Article 11 (a)) the Council was obliged to propose modification, abolishment or regulation or applying procedure to related officials in order to improve the business environment in Iran. According to the available content in the Council's website, the definite achievement of this council during 8 and a half years of activity on the grounds remarked was just modifying a procedure as a result of issuing a directive, modifying a directive and a regulation. Configuring agendas and enactments (of the Council), indicates that it has not been successful in regulation and deregulation. The council has not taken any action to get into modifying rules and the fact that it has not got much success in the cases contributed in regulation and deregulationreveals that there are many obstacles in performing this task which is the topic of this article. The main question of the present text is that, what are the reasons for the Council's failure in not getting any achievements in the functions of purpose, modification, abolishing or setting rules? This paper aims to answer this question without getting into the theoric analyse level and solely by functional analyses of the Council. The research method is based on the case study and a combination of documentary, normative and content analysis.

Water as a vital element has been a rout of political, national and international challenges for years due to its unequal supply and geographical distribution. A practical approach for optimal allocation of water resources in game theory through explanation and interpretation of current situation in a cooperative game framework and building up an efficient solution could be helpful. Since in the cooperative game, players can be aware of other players’ decisions and strategies clearly, game will be performed based on the profit sharing between players’ coalition and controversially there will be a competitive decision-making situation due to various coalitions between players. In this study, Atrak river drainage basin has been investigated. A cooperative game between beneficiaries has been introduced, their strategies have been explained and finally “Shapley Value” has been evaluated for each player and efficient scenario is assessed. Based on optimal allocation of water resources scenario in north east provinces, environmental improvement and national income increase will be expected.

The literature review of economic growth shows that the factors which are known as the growth engine do not have the same impact on countries with different socioeconomic structures. In this way, the different levels of institutional quality can be considered as the main determinants of exploiting of economic growth factors such as foreign direct investment (FDI). In order to evaluate the performance of institutions, there are several indicators. One of them is “good governance”. A good governance is known as an effective factor to develop the economic growth, improve the work environment and absorb domestic and foreign investment. “Good governance” indicator comprises six components: Voice & Accountability, Political stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, and Rule of Law & Control of corruption. Our main purpose in this study is to evaluate the effect of regulatory quality indictor as a representative of good governance on FDI in four different country groups classified by income Levels. Therefore, in this paper, the effect of the regulatory quality indictor on the relationship between foreign direct investment and economic growth in four different country groups classified by income level is investigated. The panel smooth transition method over the period of 2002-2016 is applied. The result shows that: 1- There is a positive and significant relation between regulatory quality and economic growth. 2- The main hypothesis is confirmed in the Lower Middle income countries and Upper Middle income countries

One of the important developments in the payment system is the emergence of new payment tools known as electronic payment instruments. With the help of electronic payment tools, the possibility of earning money by stealing is reduced; Thus reducing the amount of theft is a predicted resultof increased access to electronic payment instruments. In this research, this hypothesis has been investigated for the period between 1386- 1394 using data from Iran's provinces.

Panel GMM method is used to estimate the regression equation.

The results show that the expansion of electronic payment tools in Iranian provinces has had a negative effect on theft. Also, the rate of urbanization, the misery index (sum of the unemployment rate and inflation rate), industrialization and income inequality have had a positive impact on theft. Accordingly, some policy suggestions have been offered to extend the use of these tools.