فصلنامه حکمت و فلسفه
سال شانزدهم شماره 4 (پیاپی 64، زمستان 1399)

Herbert Marcuse, a Frankfurt philosopher, has tried to redefine the concept of reason from Hegel's point of view. In his different view, he tries to show that the category of cognition and self-consciousness is not possible without addressing the hidden parts of the reason by adding psychoanalysis. He argues that it is an important part of recognizing desire and has been suppressed by the system of dictatorship in history. For Marcuse, the field of aesthetics and art are the parts in which the psyche is manifested, through which one can recognize the neglected parts and the position of individual desire and approach freedom. A case study of Kamal al-Molk of Iranian culture is a very good example, given all the angles that Marcuse describes. An artist who does not change when he sees change and, on the contrary, resists it and does not happen to achieve the self-consciousness that Marcuse wants. This poses a new complexity to Marcuse's position. This article tries to explore the inadequacy of each of the philosophical and psychoanalytic views according to the given example to say that the desire of the subject involved in the individual subconscious is confiscated long before puberty in childhood. He is barren and incapable of any movement. In this new narrative, it becomes clear that the concept of reason has a recovery beyond the mere realization of Marcuse's intended aesthetics, and that its implications are more serious and profound than what Hegel, Marcuse, and Freud thought.

The term life-world, which is introduced in parallel with topics such as the “natural concept of the world” and the “environment world”, is of great importance in Husserl’s later philosophy. It is a very complex and multi-meaningful concept that has led to different and often contradictory interpretations. Husserl examined this concept in the book Crisis from three aspects: worldly (mundan), ontological and transcendental, and in this way, it takes on different meanings, which are summarized as follows: the life-world is 1) the world of natural position; 2) the intersubjective world of action, which includes all the things that man deals with in everyday action; 3) a world given to perception; 4) the spiritual and historical world of culture; 5) the world precedes science (pre-science), which is in opposition to objectivism, especially modern objectivism, which is associated with the development of the natural sciences; 6) one of the ways to enter the transcendental realm. This article deals with the relations of the life-world with science, culture, and the transcendental realm.

The issue of cognition is one of the important issues that philosophers attempted to find out its process of identifying and interacting with the mind or subject of thought by facing the outside world. In this process, what precede cognition are the ontological problem of the existing reality and the interaction of the thinking subject with the outside world. Since philosophers have distanced between cognition and reality and considered minds as tools and media for the attainment of truth and reality, Hegel has been critical of these attitudes in order to redefine cognition as science. Therefore, he should be considered the pioneer of the phenomenological project in the field of philosophical thought. In his phenomenology, the question of the process of human cognition is simulated with the whole of philosophical thought throughout history. In this essay, the authors attempt to show how Hegel enables the transition from the stage of natural consciousness to the attainment of absolute cognition by rejecting Kant's existing reality into two areas of phenomenal and invariant.

Heidegger believed that the essence of Art is the manifestation of unconcealment and he believed that what makes possible Art as Genuine Art is the essence of Art. He believed that Art in ancient Greece was linked to the realization of unconcealment and possessed by the possibility of existence, but with the onset of the metaphysical age and over several stages, its connection with its essence has been disrupted and strayed from the possibility of existence. In other words, Heidegger considers the separation of Art from its essence, not suddenly, but slowly and gradually. This process began from Mimesis in Plato’s and Aristotelian ideas and continued to the concept of Aesthetics Experience in the early modern era. But he attributes the complete separation of Art from its essence to the later era of the modern age, a period when art has diminished to Artistic Occupations and has found itself as Technic. In his view, driving art into the realm of Technic has caused that genuine art departs from the possibility of existence.

The present paper aims to show that Heidegger’s concept of “facticity” is the primary form of his Dasein concept. Firstly, it explicates the three components of facticity meaning: 1. the concretion and reality; 2. the human individual characteristics; 3. the historicality which is based on the "averageness" and "everydayness" of Dasein or facticity. The textual bases of the paper are Heidegger’s writings known as Report to Natorp (the beginning of autumn 1922) and his lecture Ontology (The Hermeneutics of Facticity) (summer 1923). Based on these two texts, the paper, secondly, argues that facticity and Dasein are identical, due to their shared characteristics: anxiety, everydayness, death, care, Being-in-the-world, language, temporality, and finally existence. The paper tries to distance methodologically from the current Heidegger’s studies, which are extremely founded on Being and Time.

In various works of Ibn Sina, there are a number of scattered topics about the subject of pleasure. One of those topics is the definition of pleasure that needs to be thoroughly reviewed in order to achieve a coherent vision. In this paper, we will explore two ways to investigate pleasure quiddity. One way is through the classification of the six definitions based on the discussion of which each definition is expressed under it, and the other one is by examining the terms used in the definitions. These two methods bring us closer to a better understanding of Avicenna's vision. The first way leads us to the conclusion that the structure of definitions differs according to its subject. With regard to various structures, Ibn Sina has introduced various definitions for various purposes. However, the investigation through the second method shows that Ibn Sina’s view of pleasure is a unitary and coherent viewpoint because, with the use of components such as "perception" and "proper" that constitute the core of all definitions, they have a lexical and conceptual harmony.

"Indeterminacy begins at home" is the most important result of Quine's arguments in defense of "translation indeterminacy". This conclusion, which is also supported by Davidson, and hence we will call it the Quinnie-Davidson thesis, indicates a lack of definition of meaning in the mother tongue. Hans Gluck, who likens this thesis to the "inevitability of translation" thesis in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, criticizes Quine-Davidson's thesis and does not consider it defensible. Here, first, by reviewing Quinnie-Davidson's thesis as well as Gadamer, I will confirm Glock's alleged similarity, and secondly, in refuting Glock's criticisms, I will try to defend the Quine-Davidson thesis by reviewing the similarity and balance between the position of Quinn's root translator from one hand, and Quine's account of the situation of the child on the verge of learning the mother tongue, on the other hand.

Le Corbusier and Bataille -who was against architecture- seem to be two opposing figures. But there is a relation between the two. Building Ronchamp, le Corbusier was reading The Accursed Share of Bataille. ‘Le jeu or play’ is one of the common concepts in the theoretical framework of these two, which can be slightly different. In this paper we will look for this relation considering le Corbusier’s Ronchamp chapel. In Ronchamp le Corbusier brings the contrast-based play to the beginning of architecture: What is architecture and not architecture at the same time. In Ronchamp Le Corbusier continued with the process of rotating axes which he had started in 1920s; the same measure which Bataille takes in ‘Acéphale’. The play in Ronchamp is ‘changing Thing into no-thing’ and ‘sacrificing’ architecture; concepts which are found in general economy and Bataille’s works. Ultimately Ronchamp plays with the common organization of architecture, both in reference and form. This is just what Bataille admires in works he considers as the cathedrals of the time or beyond: Manet’s works and Lascaux Cave Hall. In Le Corbusier’s not-well-understood concept of ‘machine of life’ the process of architecture is very close to the ‘formless’ process of Bataille: Playing of intensities that reaches to its acme in Ronchamp. By sacrificing what he loves, Le Corbusier, as he imagines, sits on the place of ‘Sovereign’ of Bataille.