نشریه جاویدان خرد
سال هجدهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 39، بهار و تابستان 1400)

We are aiming to show why human beings are accustomed to ask metaphysical questions. However, we will ask this question as a metametaphysical question. We show that a mature metaphysics will never be able to explain ever raising metaphysical questions nor to determine its metaphysical questions unless it extendedly discusses the questionability of metaphysics. To this aim we first set a framework for possible alternative theories about the questionability of metaphysics and then, as a case study, based on Maecus Willaschek interpretation of Kant first critique will show how two-layer critique of Kant has cleverly set forth this framework and gives his own answer. We hope this attempt shows how questionability of metaphysics depends on explaining the origin of metaphysics. This also hinders some misunderstanding of Kant in contemporary philosophers as well as some mistreating with Metaphysics as a worthful enterprise. It is unavoidable at least for Kant and and some famous figures.

The Famous thinkers, explains Īji's view of ethics, like other Ash'arites, as one of divine command theory, But he does not consider moral good and evil to be limited to the meaning of the merit of praising the Shari'a and blame, sometimes also means perfection and imperfection or expediency and corruption. According to Īji's moral ontology, it can be attributed to him that he is realist based on the promise to reason good and evil and he is subjectivist based on the promise to religious good and evil. Although he does not make a logical connection between good and evil moral meanings, he accepts Argument ability for meaning of reason good and evil. his reason for not communicating logically between these meanings, which is God's compulsion, seems invalid because, if explained logically, God's legislative will is based on God's creative will, and it will not be forced by a non-god.

In confirming the theory that the fanā or Waḥdat al-wujūd in Islamic mysticism is due to the entry of Vedanta's teachings into the Islamic world,Zaehner paid attention to some of Bayazid's statements and tried hard to reconcile some of his statements with the words of the Upanishads. In describing his ascension (miraj),Bayazid called what he saw in this journey a khudā (deception) and This prompted Zaehner to introduce "deception" as the equivalent of "Maya" in the Shvetashvatara Upanishad.In order to strengthen his theory, he also tried to find a suitable equivalent in the Upanishads and the Bhagavadgītā among some of the other titles that Bayazid mentioned in his Ascension.In this writing,by proving the Islamic origin of the interpretation of "deception" and also by arguing the semantic difference between "deception" and "Maya",the inaccuracy of Zaehner's claim is revealed and his theory about the influence of Vedanta on Islamic mysticism is challenged.

Closed-mindedness is an intellectual vice that that degrades people intellectually and practically. Academic practice, in particular, requires an open mind which is susceptible of critical dialogue, that is, the same virtues and skills that are at the opposite end of the spectrum. Thus, if we take closed-mindedness as a vice that should be avoided by the general public, it is a devastating flaw for academics in particular that undermines the different functions of their activities. In this paper, after outlining a framework that provides an opportunity to discuss the importance and impact of moral and intellectual virtues and vices on academic activity, we turn to the main features of closed-mindedness and what makes it an intellectual vice. Then, we show how this vice misleads the three functions of academic practice and degrades them, while open-mindedness enriches these functions and helps them to be realized in the best possible way.

The present paper is initially intended to provide an introduction to the literature on the metaphysics and semantics of dispositions in analytic philosophy. To this end, I characterize five semantic approaches to disposition ascriptions (the simple conditional analysis, the modified conditional analyses, the unanalyzable approach, the generic account, and the graded models) and show what kind of metaphysic is consistent with each of them. With this survey on the table, I am inclined to say that the arguments against the simple and modified conditional analyses are sufficiently good to refute these analyses. In addition to that, I put forward several arguments against the generic account and the graded model, arguing that the unanalyzable approach is preferable to its opponents. Finally, given this analyzability and the possibility of unmanifesting dispositions, I side with the kind of dispositionalism suggested by Martin and Heil

This paper attempts to pursue the critique of Platonic Chorismos relating to Heidegger’s later thought and thereby to reveal what kind of necessity is involved in the difference, priority and transcendence of ‘the clearing’ (Lichtung) or the Being as such, as the origin of the ontological difference, with regard to the Being of beings and the understanding of Being according to the problem of Phenomenology, i.e. the possibility of appearance and phenomenality. This necessity will be first considered by interpretation of the difference and priority of ‘the clearing’ with regard to the status of phenomenological Apriori in Heidegger’s earlier and later thought by his referring to Plato’s Doctrine of Recollection; then, Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato’s Doctrine of Ideas, especially the Idea of the Good, will be pursued too in three periods in Heidegger’s thought in order to disclose the transcendence and separation of ‘the clearing’ from Being and appearance, and consequently, the concealment and unavailability of ‘the clearing’ at least in a deep nexus with Plato’s Allegories of Sun and Cave; a connection that has to be emphasized in contrast to Heidegger’s own position against Plato’s Doctrine of Truth.

The present paper gives an overview of Heidegger's way of thinking, but against the main stream of his studies, that divides his thinking in two steps: before the so called "the turn" and after it. Thus it has been talked about Heidegger I and II too. This paper but presents his thinking as a way with some turns, that can be summarized into four main steps. Heidegger himself talks about three formulations and three steps of his question of being: “the question of the meaning of being”, the “question concerning the truth of being” and finally the “question concerning the location of being” or "topology of Being". This article recognizes the time before summer 1923 as the fourth step, in which Heidegger’s thinking belong to Philosophy of life. So the task of this paper is the explication of these steps, their spans and their relations to each other.

We narrate humans as we see and feel them, and we do this by drawing upon terms that are understandable by others as well. A Sufi or a mystic, however, is like a dream-stricken mute who has an experience which cannot be expressed by words. In order to communicate the experience, he or she has to deploy linguistic expressions. Thus, he or she makes a recourse to words, and in order to avoid misunderstandings, he elucidates what he or she means by these words. In this article, we have critically edited the Persian treatise Sharḥ-i Muṣṭalaḥāt-i Ṣūfiyya. In the preface of the article, we are concerned with the history of the origin of Sufi terms and their expositions among Sufis, as we have introduced instances of Sufi work in which these terms are elucidated. What is critical about Sufi terms is whether they are grounded in the Qur’an and ḥadīths or are just coined by Sufis. Although Sufism has obviously been influenced by non-Islamic schools of thought, the theory that Sufi terms are rooted in the Qur’an is very popular among Sufis, historians of Sufism, and contemporary scholars of Sufism. There is no doubt that without drawing upon the texts of the Qur’an and ḥadīths, it would be impossible for an intellectual system like Sufism to be constituted from merely non-Islamic elements. Later, in addition to terms borrowed from the Qur’an, ḥadīths, and Islamic disciplines, Sufis deployed two classes of particular terms which brought about a dramatic change in their language: “love”-related terms and “wine”-related terms. These two classes of terms describe states that go beyond the limits of human reason. It is very difficult to describe either love or wine-drinking in terms of the ordinary language, as the difficulty was experienced by Sufis. The terms “love” and “drunkenness” with which Sufis characterized themselves led to strong protests by the pious, who accused the former of disbelief. In particular, the use of “love” to describe the relation between humans and God angered the pious, because they believed that “love” signifies the sexual relation between men and women, and it cannot be used to characterize the human-God relation. The uses began, however, to be admitted by the pious and they gave up criticizing the Sufis because of such uses. Having to interpret away these terms, Sufis used them as indicators of their intuitions and elaborated their uses of these terms; for example, they explained that “hair” (zulf) symbolized the plurality of the material world and “spot” (khāl) symbolized unity in order to rescue themselves from accusations. Exposition of Sufi terms was first presented as part or a chapter of a book and was later presented in the form of monographs. Such essays or treatises include two sections or two types of terms: (1) a lexicology of non-metaphorical terms (nonsymbolic), and (2) a lexicology of metaphorical terms (symbolic). It is hard to determine the exact date when metaphorical terms appeared among Sufis, although we know that such terms were mature and known enough in the late sixth or the early seventh centuries AH (twelfth or thirteenth centuries CE), because the book Awrād al-aḥbāb by Abu-l-Mafākhir Yaḥyā Bākharzī (d. 736/1336) points to certain metaphorical Sufi terms in its section on Samā‘ dance, such as “wine,” “monastery,” “Zunnar,” “tarsā” (Christian or Nazarene), and “kharābāt” (literally: ruins), and the terms continued to be used after that. Another significant treatise concerning metaphorical Sufi terms is Rashf al-Alḥāẓ fī Kashf al-Alfāẓ attributed to Sharaf al-Dīn Ḥusayn ibn Ulfatī Tabrīzī in the eighth century AH (fourteenth century CE). The treatise Sharḥ-i Muṣṭalaḥāt-i Ṣūfiyya whose full text we have critically edited at the end of this article is another link of the chain of such works, which bears strong similarity to Rashf al-Alḥāẓ in its content. In this article, we begin by an introduction of the treatise and its similarities to and differences from Rashf al-Alḥāẓ. With this study, we show that the two treatises are, despite their strong similarities, two wholly independent treatises. There is an old and valuable manuscript available for the treatise Sharḥ-i Muṣṭalaḥāt-i Ṣūfiyya. It is the 17th treatise in a collection of manuscripts held in Abū Rayḥān Bīrūnī Foundation of Oriental Studies in Tashkent (Uzbekistan), number 3100, in 211 folios. Sayyid ‘Alī Moujānī, who has provided an image of the collection, has called it the “Song of Bukhara.” Early in this collection, after Sayyid ‘Alī Moujānī’s brief introduction, ‘Alī Bahrāmiyān provides a list of the treatises in this collection (18 treatises). Since the Bukhara collection has not been introduced elsewhere and because of certain mistakes in the list of the contents of the collection, some of which we were able to correct, we provide the list in this article as well. Most of the treatises in this collected are in the handwriting of Muḥammad Bāqir ibn Fakhr al-Dīn Rūmī. The critical edition of Sharḥ-i Muṣṭalaḥāt-i Ṣūfiyya was done based only on this available manuscript. In order to be able to read certain difficult words, we consulted other extant works in the exposition of Sufi terms, such as part of Hujwīrī’s Kashf al-Maḥjūb, Fakhr al-Dīn ‘Irāqī’s Iṣṭilāḥāt, and Rashf al-Alḥāẓ fī Kashf al-Alfāẓ attributed to Ulfatī. Sharḥ-i Muṣṭalaḥāt-i Ṣūfiyya has an introduction and three chapters. In the introduction, the author talks about the garment of form with which Sufis cover the world of meanings, as well as the coinage of mystical terminologies. In the three following chapters, the author provides short explanations of 255 metaphorical terms used by Sufis. Here are the titles of the three chapters of the book: “names of love and the lover and the loved,” “names of merrymaking instruments,” and “names of the states of the lover and the loved.” Some of the most significant differences between this treatise and Rashf al-Alḥāẓ lies in its introduction, the titles of the three chapters, the number and order of the terms, and explanations provided for some of the terms

Based on Dasātir’s approach, world history is divided into some basic periods (Mehīn Charkh) and each of these main periods is divided into some shorter periods (Kehīn Charkh). The big period which we are in it has begun with “Ābād”, the prophet who all of the people in the current world are of his generation. After Ābād’s period, three short periods have been passed until fifth-period “Golshāhīān”. Studying Dasātirian criteria for the beginning and end of the one period, it is shown “Kay khōsrow” is the final prophet of Golshāhīān and Zoroaster is the first prophet of the consequent period. Concerning this fact that “Fifth Sāsān” is the final prophet of the Zoroastrian period and “Parvīz” is the last divine king in Dasātir, it is demonstrated that Dasātir should be considered as the enunciation of Āzarkeyvān who will be the first prophet of the seventh short period.

The connection between Plato’s philosophy and theIlluminationist Wisdom can be seen through the analysis of the agreements between these two philosophers in their treatment of key ideas which are rooted in “the eternal substance of wisdom”.In this analysis the works of the two philosophers are compared with one another in terms of their spiritual character. The goal of true philosophy, as conceived by Plato and Suhrawardi, is happiness which ultimately coincides with theGodlikeness.Therefore, the most fundamental theme in thisphilosophy is the identity of the essence of man with the divine truths, which man has forgotten as a consequence of his corporeality.Thefirst principle of philosophy as a spiritual path is thus the remembrance of the deiform nature of the self. In addition to reasoning about this theme, Suhrawardi and Plato deal with it in a symbolical-allegorical way.The symbols concerning this theme can be found in Suhrawardi’s mystical treatises and in Plato’s dialogues such as Republic and Phaedrus.These symbols are representative of the twofold nature of man, celestial and terrestrial—symbols such as hedgehog, dewdrop, bird, heart, the world-reflecting cup, the winged chariot, the eye of the soul, and their correlated symbols such as entombment and ensnarement in leather, cave or well.

There are some evidences in Suhrawardi’s works about the preference of the practice compared with theoretical research that it can direct us to the preference of practical thosophy towards theoretical wisdom with giving some reasons. Theoretical wisdom was prioritized compared with practical theosophy before Suhrawardi, especially in Peripatetic school, but Suhrawardi established a wisdom by using illuminative way with the discussing way and by prioritizing this way compared with the discussing way by criticizing Peripatetics in which practical wisdom is prioritized,the priority in terms of essence not time. Mystical journey and aceticism is a impartible part of Suhrawardi’s practical theosophy. His wisdom is an intuitive and mystical wisdom in which Hakim experience the realities objectively not subjectively. Hence we can called Suhrawardi an empiricist philosopher, an intuitive and mystical experiment. The priority of practical wisdom over theoretical wisdom is investigable in his written thought and also in his practical life.

Among the conceptual ingredients of natural kinds, concerning living creatures specially, has been the idea of essentialism. This idea however was challenged by the evolutionary theory in biological world which provided a new view of biological species. In order to analyze the relation between natural kinds and essentialism, I focus on reasons motivated philosophers to invoke the idea of natural kinds and show that this motivation was principally epistemological, i.e. to solve inductive problems. In this view, essentialism, in its strong from, is considered to be a redundant condition for natural kinds,. Essentialism,, in its weaker sense,, is however required, meaning that properties underlying induction must be shared by every individual of a kind, in order to warrant the inductive inference. A consequence of weakening essentialism in natural kinds is the possibility to suggest a unified concept of natural kinds for various sciences, biological and physical.