مجله فلسفه و کلام اسلامی
سال پنجاه و چهارم شماره 1 (بهار و تابستان 1400)

Vision of God, especially on the resurrection day, is one of the theological problems upon which Imamites and Asharites have different opinions. Imamites believe in the impossibility of the vision of God while Asharites believe in its possibility on the resurrection day. These two schools refer to some Qur'anic verses to confirm their ideas: e.g. “You will not see Me, but look at the mountain; if it should remain in its place, then you will see Me. 7:143”. “Some faces will be radiant on that day, looking at their Lord. 75:23”. In this article, we critically study the Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's theological view and study the extent of the influence of the former philosophers and theologians on his view. Finally, we will show that his view, which is heart felted discovery, does not differ much from the Imamites view.

Mullā Ṣadrā has used the same terminology and style of the earlier logicians in many of his discussions on logical belief (Taṣdīq); while his two theories, “principality of existence” and “union of the knower and the known”, require that he address the issue to present the problem of “conception and belief” in a philosophical system different from the philosophical system of the sages. According to the theory of principality of existence and using the method of textual analysis, this article has re-read Mullā Ṣadrā’s view in explaining the truth of logical belief and has analyzed his approach in the face of the view of previous logicians. In this regard, it was concluded that Mullā Ṣadrā has expressed his view with two different approaches and on two levels: One approach is based on the principles of earlier logicians (essential approach) and the other approach is based on the theory of the principality of existence (existential approach). It was also argued that Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of the truth of logical belief was the same as Fārābī’s view, emphasizing that such a view was based solely on Mullā Ṣadrā’s existential approach and backed by theories of the principality of existence, the gradation of existence, the substantial motion and the union of the knower and the known.

Intuition is a philosophical judgment tool. Some accept it as a method in philosophy and others deny it. On the deniers' side, some philosophers, based on the diversity of responses to intuition pumps, consider it as an uncertain or invalid method. By contrast, the others claim that the incidental factors because distorted responses and there is not any wrong in intuitive method by itself. Here the level of expertise considered as one of the external factors that causes the accuracy or inaccuracy of intuitions. An accurate intuitive response can be found by questioning experts, not lay people. Avicenna’s view is compatible with the expertise-based view. In his rejoinder to a critic, he mentioned the intuitive arguments are not proper for all, but for those who possess perspicuity and subtle intelligence and his reply implies that he trusted the responses of meticulous philosophers more than others. This comparative work suggests a novel reading of Avicenna’s reply to his critic and reconsiders the interpretation that charges him with engaging in an ad hominem argument.

Regarding the classical theory, metaphors have been regarded as decorative things, belonging to the literary language and distinctive from philosophical and scientific language. Besides, according to this theory, the basis of the forming of metaphors is the similarity between two phenomena. However, considering the contemporary theory, not only the literary language but also the scientific and philosophical ones are metaphorical. Moreover, the basis of the forming of metaphors is not only the objective similarities, but also the non-objective ones and experiential co-occurrences. In the contemporary theory, a metaphor is the transition of the source domain structure to the target domain. According to this theory, philosophical concepts are conceptualized through metaphors. Lakoff and Johnson believe that mind is conceptualized through metaphors. The present article shows that Shaykh al-Isḥāq (Suhrawardī) would also structure the mind through metaphors. In Suhrawardī's Epistemology, different aspects of perception are formulated through concepts such as seeing, illumination, manipulating objects, Constructions, mathematical calculations, and motion.

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In addition to a study of the major interpretations of the "principality of existence", (ʾIṣāla al-wujūd) this article studies Mullā Ṣadrā's view through the third person narration method. According to this method, the main point in "principality of existence" is the distinction, the rules and the relation of existence and quiddity. Mullā Ṣadrā describes his view in the form of the proposition, "Existence exists", and he claims that this proposition is a "common technical Predication." This proposition can be interpreted as follows: 1. Quiddity has instantiations in the external world. 2. Quiddity does not have any instantiation in the external world. 3. Quiddity, primarily, does not have any instantiation in the external world, but it has instantiations through existence. There are many explanations for each of the three interpretations. The major point of this article is that it is not possible for quiddity in-itself to exist in the external world.

Some philosophers consider human and its mind purely material. In contrast, another group believes in an immaterial substance interacting with the body. Mullā Ṣadrā and John Foster, the British philosopher who was his contemporary, are among those who have independently argued for the immateriality of the soul. In this paper, we look at some of their arguments on the immateriality of the soul which are introspective; i.e., the arguments which emphasize direct attention to the soul or the inner and non-material consciousness of man. The methods of the two philosophers in reasoning are different. Foster focuses directly on man's inner awareness of his mental states, and Mullā Ṣadrā bases his arguments on comparing the properties of the soul with the body. Introspective arguments are effective in that they can, easily and without numerous premises, refer any human being to his or her inner self and make him believe in the immateriality of the soul. Of course, Mullā Ṣadrā and Foster did not pay any attention to the problems of introspection. Before putting forward this type of argument, the infallibility of access to mental states and the correctness of initial intuitions must be proven.

The “linguistic denotation” scheme in this paper, vs. the “logical denotation”, represents the relationship between “words” and “meanings” in “natural languages”. In this scheme, the process of “denotation” is dependent on “application” and is performed by “interpretation”, but in logical denotation, it is only a function of contract. However, the Holy Quran and Traditions have been issued in the atmosphere of natural language. Therefore, the meaning of the Kitāb and Sunnah must be explained in the structure of linguistic not logical denotation. So, the meaning of words, in addition to the “co-text”, also depends on the “context or application”, and interpretation activity plays a great role in it. Accordingly, “application” in the literature of interpretation of the Quran is: the occasions and addresses of revelation, and in Tradition is: the conditions and situations of the Hadīth issuance. Details and applications of this approach in Quranic and Hadīth sciences require further researches.

A cluster of arguments for the existence ʿaql-i Mufāriq (Separated intellect) are based on epistemological approach, which we, in this inquiry, will analyze three of them critically. In this study, we indicate that these arguments are more similar to “explanations” rather than reasoning for the existence of separated intellect, I mean that they are more similar to illustrative hypotheses which, in addition to establishing compatibility in a system, give us an understanding of how one thing is possible. In this case, firstly, they will accept competitors; i.e., we can offer other hypotheses and explanations. Secondly, because it seems that all these problems are multiple-origins, in different disciplines, other explanations could be presented, each of which illuminates a portion of reality. Thirdly, as for the criteria of precedence of explanation, maybe these explanations do not succeed today. Nevertheless, if we regard these arguments as a proof and justification for the existence of separated intellect, they will have many defects and will not reach the goal.

The present research seeks to answer the two questions from “What does the impossibility of knowledge of the divine essence mean?” and “What are the reasons for this impossibility?” The following conclusions have been obtained in this research: the nonidentity of essence and attributes, and the nonidentity of existence and quiddity in God cannot be accepted; the inconceivability of God essence is true, but there may be other ways of knowing Him. Furthermore, some of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s reasons are similar to like examples than independent reasons. Therefore, the data and results seem to show that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī does not have a consistent manner on the issue and in some cases believes in the knowability of the divine essence. The authors will address the possibility of the knowability of the divine essence from the perspective of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in another independent study.

Mullā Ṣadrā, being influenced by Islamic traditions and his preceding mystics, is the first Islamic philosopher who has discussed about the "death of angels" in his philosophy. However, without a precise perception of the Major Resurrection, it would be impossible to analyze the death of angels in Ṣadrā's philosophical system. He analyzes the nature of the Major Resurrection through mystical fundamentals, on the basis of which he considers the angels' death to be justifiable. He has elaborated the angels' death from two perspectives: first, nominal annihilation through the manifestation of God's essence in the Major Resurrection. In this analysis, which has been broached earlier by Davoud Gheisari, the angels annihilate with the manifestation of God's essence in the Major Resurrection Day. Second, swooning death (i.e. death by swooning), which represents returning back to the non-existence in the divine essence. This type of death occurs on the Day of Major Resurrection .Ṣadrā, in various instances, has considered the latter type of death as being true for the angels.

The present paper is in the field of philosophical counseling. It aims to introduce and explain the metaphysical foundations of logic-based therapy (LBT). This therapy is one of the approaches in philosophical counseling and Elliott Cohen's invention. This method assumes that the actions and emotions of human beings are the results of practical and logical deductions, and containing some fallacies, these deductions cause irrational feelings and self-defeating behaviors in humans. The present paper first introduces the six steps of logic-based therapy. These steps help clients discover fallacies such as absolutism and perfectionism in their practical deductions. Cohen's treatment is not just a negative one because after identifying each fallacy it introduces the opposite virtues as antidotes to the clients. Finally, the paper examines the metaphysical foundations of logic-based therapy from Elliott Cohen's perspective and analyzes the four fundamental philosophical principles of LBT.

In Aristotle and Fārābī's philosophy, knowledge begins with sense perceptions. This approach to the acquisition of knowledge faces two challenges posed by Sufism, “illusion” and the “the conflicting interpretations of sense perceptions”. Aristotle tries to answer these two questions by dividing sense perceptions into “specific” and “common” ones and proposing the concept of “balanced conditions”, and the duality of “appearance” and “perception”. Fārābī has not taken a position on the second challenge, but he draws a different approach to the first challenge by dividing the certainty into “complete certainty” and “incomplete certainty”. In his view, certainty arising from “sense perceptions” is an incomplete one, and by adhering to the three conditions, one can adhere to the certainties of sense intuition. It seems that neither of the two solutions of these two thinkers is complete in solving the problem; but Aristotle's solution to the problem of “illusion” is more defensible than Fārābī’s.