نشریه مطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی
پیاپی 28 (بهار و تابستان 1400)

The strategic area of Central Eurasia is one of the most important regions in the post-Soviet space, accepting the rivalry between the Russian Federation and the United States, and has introduced itself as a mirror of international politics. Regarding the strategic culture of Moscow’s foreign policy, it can be said that since the Russian Federation does not want to fully maintain the basic rules of the international system, nor does it seek to make extensive changes to the rules of this order, hence the idea of “reformist” activism Comes to mind. Reform activists are actors who pursue different motives and methods than other actors in international politics. The Russian Federation, as a reformist power, has on its agenda the two principles of peaceful coexistence and the creation of a multipolar world in its new foreign policy. In this context, the Russian Federation, on the one hand, does not reject any change in the status quo and intervention abroad (Central Asia, South Caucasus, Black Sea, and Baltic), and on the other, is dissatisfied with the current state of the international system and wants a complete transformation. It is not in the rules that govern it either.As for the United States’ movements in the geographical territory of Central Eurasia, it can be said that Washington generally seeks to sign bilateral and multilateral military agreements with Georgia, Ukraine, Romania, and the Czech Republic, following political intervention and attempts to bring the republics of the region under its security umbrella. In this regard, Poland is trying to move forward and most importantly, is building several anti-missile defense systems in the frame of NATO expansion. Although the White House has claimed that the purpose of the missile defense shield is to protect the United States and NATO members from North Korea’s threats and the Islamic Republic of Iran’s ballistic missiles, nevertheless the Kremlin sees it as a serious threat to its national security. Moscow is very serious and determined in its position and constantly declares that the justification of the United States for the establishment of a missile defense shield is a mere excuse for the blockade of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation considers the United States moves in this regard an attempt to achieve “strategic superiority” and to play with the result of a zero-sum game, which is targeted at the same time as weakening strategic depth, geopolitical contraction, and Moscow’s exclusion from European arrangements. From the above-mentioned points, it can be concluded that the main issues affecting the political-security relations between the Russian Federation and the United States are mutual threats and suspicions, successive and endless cycles of de-escalation, and involvement of various internal and external variables in the current process between the two countries which shows the complexity and multi-layered nature of this conflict.The Main Question is: what impact has the strategic culture and its components had on the actions of the Russian Federation and the United States in the Central Eurasian region in the last two decades?The Hypothesis posed by the above-mentioned question is that strategic culture serves as a driving force behind Moscow’s post-Soviet actions, including components such as strategic expansionism, the spread of Orthodox identity and the Russian nationalist discourse, and the consolidation of national power in the environment. In contrast, the United States has developed a special strategic culture to promote a culture of liberal democracy, establish a superpower position and create regional balance.The method used in this research is explanatory-prescriptive and the type of the research is fundamental. The nature of this writing is also qualitative. The data collection has been through the library method, the use of internet resources, articles, and documents.Analyzing the strategic behaviors of political units through the components of strategic culture has advantages the most important of which is the possibility of understanding the actions of the actor in question and predicting the behaviors arising from it. The theory makes it possible for researchers to understand how countries view strategic issues and what reactions they emit in a variety of situations, even in emergencies. Regarding strategic culture, it should be noted that this component is the product of the historical experience of countries. On the other hand, because experiences are different among governments, different actors have different strategic cultures. In this way, it can be said that the strategic culture acts as a magnifying glass through which the type of relationship between the international goals, motives, and actions of the Russian Federation and the United States can be evaluated and examined in the management of international crises.As mentioned at the beginning of the research, the most important components of the Russian Federation’s strategic culture include geopolitical features and a development view, the idea of great power and regional hegemony, dominant authoritarianism, Russian nationalist discourse, and Slavic-Orthodox identity, and the notion of threat. They have left a deep impression on the strategic decision-making and foreign policy of the Russian Federation. In other words, it can be said that Moscow, in articulating its foreign policy discourse and strategic decision-making, has relied on the above-mentioned components. Accordingly, the Russian Federation in the field of foreign policy has strategies such as selective interaction, soft balance and an emphasis on multilateralism, the great normative modern strategy, eastward policy, confrontation with fundamentalism and terrorism, and Russian-oriented political and security institutionalism in the region which has made the headline of its work. Regarding the strategic culture of the United States, it must be acknowledged that to achieve the goals that have been formed under the influence of its strategic culture, it seeks hegemony and consolidation of its power in the world. In this regard, the United States has a mission to lead the world and is committed to global governance. In the meantime, if the country resorts to military force, it will inevitably use it. As a result, it can be said that the components that shape the strategic culture of the United States are aggressive, which is effective in pursuing its aggressive foreign policy in the strategic context of Central Eurasia.

According to most international relations scholars, the role of geopolitical rivalries and political-security issues at the regional and global political levels, as well as Russia’s domestic policy issues in recent years, have been key elements in Russia’s relations with the United States in the last decades. While accepting the dominant views, this article points to another influential element in shaping the relationship between Russia and the United States, especially in the last decade. In this regard, the authors try to expand the existing literature in this field as much as possible. Thus, the author’s concern is expressed in this question; what role does the United States play in the position of the “other”, the formation of national identity, and the conduct of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy in the transitional international system. According to this question, this article’s main argument is that; Russia has been redefining its position as a “great power” in the transitional international system to confront the United States as its specific “other”. This seems to be rooted in Russia’s aggressive foreign policy approach, especially under Putin’s leadership. According to this article, the United States, as a historical “other”, misinterpreted Russia’s interests and historical role as a key player in the international system, with a misunderstanding of the collapse of the Soviet Union while recognizing that Russia’s great power status has an important role for its national identity. Russia’s perception of itself is the image of great power. This vision includes Russia’s willingness to participate in the decision-making process on global issues and to have a sphere of influence. Since the mid-1990s, Russia has gradually regained its lost confidence and power and has emerged as a claimant state in the international system. From the time Vladimir Putin came into office, Russia has been seeking to regain its status as a great power in the international multipolar system by adopting more pragmatic policies. Russia’s foreign policy approach under Putin has sparked serious debates about the reasons for Russia’s aggressive actions during this period. Most Western scholars and politicians often find Russia’s post-Cold War behavior unpredictable, irrational, anti-western, aggressive, and expansionist. Examples of such behaviors include Moscow’s rapid response to NATO’s intervention in the 1999 Kosovo crisis, the invasion of South Ossetia in Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea, and finally Russia’s military intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015. Some IR scholars began to argue that the key external factors, geopolitical rivalry, and Russia’s political-security conflict with the west are playing a critical role in shaping Russia’s foreign policy behavior. In contrast, some observers emphasize domestic factors as the main reason behind the Kremlin’s policies in recent years, such as state stability, fear of color revolutions, and attempt to divert people’s attention away from domestic problems. Although all the abovementioned factors play a critical role in Russia’s strategic assessments, these factors have not considered psychological, social and emotional motivations. Those mainstream analysts who rely on positivism in approaching Russian foreign policy have not considered other factors such as positive social identity, national self-esteem, and concerns about its status in the international system. The main goal of Russia’s foreign policy, especially under Putin’s presidency, is to achieve the position of great power in a multipolar system in which Russia is considered as one of the main poles. Over the years, the content of Russia’s foreign policy has not changed fundamentally, but influential domestic and international variables such as rising global oil and gas prices, which are Russia’s main exports and declining US commitments, especially in the Middle East, have been changed. These factors have given Kremlin more leeway in choosing its political options. Based on the above considerations, this article seeks to find an appropriate answer to the question of what role does the United States plays in the position of the “other” information of Russia’s national identity and aggressive foreign policy behavior in the transitional international system. The main hypothesis of this article is that Russia’s aggressive policies such as military intervention in Syria and the annexation of Crimea, show the revival of traditional values as key elements of the country’s foreign policy strategy. According to the authors, Russia, especially after the ascension of Putin to power, has been seeking to counter certain “other” actions, namely the United States, by redefining its great power status. This hypothesis seems to provide a much better understanding of Russia’s aggressive behavior in the international system, such as its dealings with the crises like Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria.

Valery Gerasimov introduced his Hybrid Warfare Doctrine in 2013. In his doctrine, Gerasimov emphasized a combined use of hard and soft power elements (components) because he believed that Russia needs a new approach to counter new threats effectively. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Hybrid Warfare Doctrine is based on foresight and is formulated to prepare Russia to have a strong presence in modern battles. In addition to emphasizing a combination of hard and soft power, this doctrine attaches greater importance to the soft power and a redesigning of Russia’s defensive policies and troops; it also underscores deep concentration on military and defensive research projects. Thus, Gerasimov challenged the mainstream Russian approaches to the military and asserted that political leaders required innovative ideas and initiative to deal with future security/safety challenges. This doctrine gained popularity for the first time during the 2014 Russo-Ukrainian War, catching the attention of political, military, and security analysts. Russians applied Gerasimov Doctrine on a large scale in Ukraine for the first time and succeeded in annexing the Crimean Peninsula to their federation using an effective combination of soft and hard power. This was a great achievement for Russians because the Crimean Peninsula had a special strategic place on the Black Sea and could give Russians easy, rapid access to the eastern parts of the Mediterranean Sea, the Balkans, West Asia, and North Africa. As a result, Russians could gain numerous military, economic, and commercial advantages. Afterward, Russians started to get the most and realize their goals in West Asia and North Africa by applying Gerasimov Doctrine principles widely. Kremlin has always had eyes on this region since the USSR; however, when the USSR dissolved, Moscow focused more on problems caused by the dissolution. Consequently, the US seized the moment (used Moscow’s passive policy in its favor) and expanded its sway over this strategically important region. Russia rekindled its interest in West Asia and North Africa when Vladimir Putin took office. Russians believed they could achieve their goals and protect their interests only if they had a stronger presence in the region. They saw this region as promising in terms of economy, military, politics, and security. But Moscow faced a major challenge on this path: the US, a formidable rival. Looking back to their success concerning Ukraine, Russians believed that Gerasimov Hybrid Warfare Doctrine was the best tool to achieve their goals. Therefore, when they decided to intervene in the Syrian Crisis on the pretext of inhibiting terrorist activities, not only did they employ hard power, but they also used hybrid warfare elements extensively. Their success in Ukraine and events such as the Islamic Awakening made them fully aware of the importance and efficacy of soft war. Russians seemed to aim for more than a war on terrorism; they also harbored the thought of impeding the US increasing influence in Syria and the entire region. Applying Gerasimov Hybrid Warfare Doctrine in Syria, Russians gained remarkable achievements; as a result, by applying hybrid warfare elements in Libya, they resolved to challenge the US unrivaled position in the region and restore Moscow to its former glory in this oil-rich country in North Africa. In line with this, the current study addressed how Russia has used Gerasimov Hybrid Warfare principles to confront the US in this region. The data were collected through desk research and then described and explained within the research conceptual framework; the results showed that following Gerasimov Doctrine, Russia is combining the elements of hard and soft power to limit the expansion of the US influence in Western Asia and North Africa and widen its sphere of influence in the region. Russians concluded that non-linear warfare elements can enable them to pursue their ambitious geopolitical and geo-strategic policies without confrontation with the US. Even though Russia is a military superpower and its nuclear arsenal can pre-empt and minimize armed conflicts with the US, Russians regard Gerasimov Doctrine as a safer and more cost-effective path to their goals. In sum, considering the achievements Russia gained by applying Gerasimov Doctrine in Ukraine, Syria, and Libya, it appears that it is expanding its capabilities in hybrid, non-linear warfare and intends to promote this type of warfare in other parts of the globe.

China is one of the main players in Central Asia, which pursues its economic and security goals and interests in that region. China’s energy demand has grown by 500 percent since 1980, with rapid economic growth; As China is now the largest consumer of energy and the largest importer of oil in the world, therefore, Central Asia is one of the priorities of China’s foreign policy, considering its energy resources and the possibility of meeting the needs of China’s growing industries. Given the growing competition between regional and trans-regional actors for greater benefits in Central Asia, China is making a concerted effort to expand, given its industrial energy needs and Xinjiang security concerns. Influencing Central Asia is on the agenda; therefore, the Silk Road initiative, with its large volume of investment and its vision, is an important step towards achieving China’s strategic goals in the international arena. Given the importance and scope of the Silk Road initiative for China and its political, economic, and security implications for Central Asia, this study seeks to answer the question that: How does the Silk Road Initiative help shape China’s hegemony in Central Asia? The hypothesis is that the Silk Road initiative, as China’s most important strategy in the new big game with the United States and Russia, contributes to China’s hegemony in the Central Asian region through economic domination and the expansion of political and security influence. The present article is explanatory in nature and method. The results of the studies are as follows:To meet the needs of growing industries, China has adopted a development-oriented foreign policy approach to reach global consumer markets. China needs the energy to continue economic development and attract foreign investment and therefore energy security and ensuring the continuation of energy flows and reducing vulnerability in this area is one of its foreign policy priorities. On the other hand, ensuring the stability and security of Xinjiang is one of the main security concerns of Chinese leaders which can lead to unrest and create danger for other parts of China. Therefore, to advance its macro foreign policy goals and ambitious regional and international intentions, China introduced the Silk Road Initiative in 2013 as the main axis of its foreign and domestic policy. In this regard, Central Asia has been considered as a strategic hub and one of the regions with rich hydrocarbon resources and territorial proximity to pursue national interests in the Silk Road economic belt strategy.As one of the most important measures to reduce their strategic vulnerability, the Chinese leaders have established closer ties with energy-rich countries, including Central Asian countries, through the Silk Road Initiative. On the other hand, due to the proximity of Xinjiang Autonomous Province to Central Asia and China’s security problems and challenges in this province, Central Asia has played a significant role in China’s security strategy. Therefore, given these considerations, China’s growing presence and influence in the Central Asian geo-economy will gradually translate into geopolitical influence. In Central Asia, China seeks to increase its regional influence by increasing its lasting influence and by launching the Silk Road Initiative, with an emphasis on economic exchanges as the fulcrum of the project, with a view to peaceful development and non-alignment. The stimulation of the powers present in the region has put the achievement of regional hegemony on the agenda.Given the undeniable impact of economic growth and development as a bedrock of national stability and security, strengthening the economic strength and stability of Central Asia is closely linked to addressing China’s security problems and this issue is one of the main axes of the Silk Road initiative. The purpose of this plan is to help develop the countries of Central Asia and the western regions of China to ensure security and political stability in China. Therefore, China’s approach in Central Asia is economic and trade dominance as an important prerequisite for ensuring stability and security in western China. However, China’s emergence as a major power in Central Asia has become an undeniable fact due to its economic dominance, energy interests, and political influence. However, it should be emphasized that increasing China’s influence by using strategies such as the Silk Road Initiative, despite its declared policy, is not merely economic, but pursuing political and security interests and providing necessary grounds for expanding China’s influence and hegemony in the periphery. At the heart of the plan, of course, is China’s denial of this approach in the international arena, given the considerations of peaceful development.To further its interests in the region, China has put on the agenda a comprehensive effort to expand its hegemony in Central Asia; the Silk Road Initiative, with its large investment volume. Its vision is taking important steps toward achieving its strategic goals internationally. Based on the results of the study, China, relies on economic growth and development, to counter the US unilateralism in the international system, to establish regional influence and hegemony by using the capacities of the Silk Road initiative. In this regard, in order not to arouse the sensitivity of the United States and preventing it from taking precautionary measures and interventionist steps in this field, it has pursued a cautious foreign policy and has focused its activities on economic relations with the countries of Central Asia.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which was accompanied by the inefficiency and the end of communism on December 26, 1991, the emergence of political behavior in Central Asia was a question for politicians and scholars. The rise of authoritarian political behavior to the accompaniment of active clan networks and clan politics in post-Soviet Central Asia that has been ruled by communism for nearly a century was not the behavior that was predicted by them. Subsequently, the communist ideology was laid down and it was succeeded with the ideology of ethnic nationalism and ethnonational statehood building.With the independence of Central Asia’s states, except the first years of Askar Akayev in Kyrgyzstan, who tried to establish a democratic regime, the rest chose an authoritarian regime. In Central Asia, excluding Akayev, the leaders are the nomenclatures and the former communist members of the Soviet Union who concentrated their power in the form of authoritarianism, which is growing up and strongly institutionalizing, and hyper-presidential a lifetime leader. The neo-traditional structure of Central Asia did not fundamentally change with independence, as the nomenclatures managed to preserve their positions. Furthermore, the political instability of the years of independence, the low level of economic development, low political interest, efficacy among the citizens, and fear of inter-ethnic conflicts, brought authoritarianism as an indispensable system of Central Asia’s units. In addition to authoritarianism, informal agreements in the form of clan pacts between regimes and the existent clan systems and networks, which are inherently an informal system and one of the dominant power of each unit, are the main stabilizing factors in the new Central Asia established republics. Furthermore, the leaders are inclined towards ethnic nationalism, because to them the dominance of their nationality seemed to be the best safeguard and an improvement of their position in society.This article, which is based on the descriptive-analytical method, by considering the concept of authoritarianism, focuses on the Central Asian republics and tries to analyze the roots of the growth and consolidation of authoritarianism in the Central Asian countries. Thus, the main question of the article is, “what are the factors of the emergence and consolidation of authoritarianism in post-Soviet Central Asia?” The article argues that factors of authoritarianism in Central Asia are derived from two general categories of internal and external factors, which are in a mutual relationship.The internal factors are divided into three subcategories: Political, economic, and cultural. Central Asia lacked any experience of Western-style democracy and statehood before its creation in the 1920s. One of the dominant keys in internal factors is the political socializing of Central Asia’s leaders and citizens who lived under the Soviet Union’s authoritarian sovereignty and are the heirs of the Soviet Union’s legacy, especially in the way of governance. In addition, the article focuses on the political culture of the region, which is based on the utmost impact of political construction of power from the social construction of power through the reciprocal relationship between clans and government elites. Finally, the article has argued the impact of the economical factor with three aspects of the rate of government revenue, the independence of government revenue from society, and foreign trade partners in which the EU and China have a tangible and influential role.The external factors are divided into two subcategories: First, the level of foreign affairs, which means the extent of foreign relationships and international interactions. In Central Asia, as the extent of foreign affairs, especially with the EU and the west increases, it causes less authoritarianism and the promotion of democratic characteristics such as the issue of human rights. Conversely, as the extent decreases and delimits to Russia and China, it promotes authoritarianism and the less manifestation of democratic characteristics.Second, the nature of foreign affairs, which means who the main partners of Central Asia’s foreign affairs are? What type are their governments’? What are their value systems? In the arrangement of choosing partners, the factor of the economy due to the issue of having hydrocarbon supplies or other valuable supplies, which rise the GDP and economic prosperity, has a tangible role. In this aspect, Central Asia’s units can have two kinds of partners: the EU and the west with their terms and strictness on human rights and democracy, or China, which does not care about democracy or authoritarianism in its bilateral relationship.   The factor of China has three outcomes for the authoritarian Central Asian leaders: first, they ought not to have reforms in their policies on human rights and democracy as the EU and the west mentioned as their preconditions of the bilateral relationship. Second, due to China’s presence as an alternative, the EU and the west will not have their former leverage; since economic benefits and Central Asia’s hydrocarbon supplies as the Russian alternative are the priority for them, maintaining the relationship seems inevitable. Because of the two outcomes, the pressures of human rights and democratic reforms gradually recedes, therefore, Central Asian leaders can work on their personality cult and traditional foundation of legitimacy in tranquility, which are the main factors of consolidation of authoritarianism.The consequence of internal and external factors indicates that the authoritarianism with variable intensities is the political nature of this region and with close similarities in terms of internal factors that prompted the Central Asian governments called as authoritarian. This is an external factor particularly the nature of foreign affairs differentiates the intensity of authoritarianism in these units. Eventually, the presentation of these factors and their impacts on the emergence and consolidation of authoritarianism in post-Soviet Central-Asia is for propounding a holistic view and avoiding mono-factor analysis on this subject. Nonetheless, not all of the mentioned factors can be simultaneously applied in one unit of the region, but by putting them together, we can comprehend the reason for the existence and variation in authoritarianism intensity.

Energy resources, especially oil and gas, have always been one of the most important elements of reliance for exporters as well as importing countries to strengthen their economies. On this basis, countries with energy resources have been given special attention by importing countries. In this way, they have sought to dominate these resources and countries in various ways. Central Asian countries have also become a battleground for regional and global powers for access and control of their energy resources.Those global and regional powers that have tried to keep their presence in this competition are the United States, Russia, and China. Meanwhile, China is paying more attention to these countries due to its border proximity and the need for their resources for its industry and maintaining economic growth while Russia is trying to strengthen its economy, which relies on the export of energy resources. Russia is also very sensitive to the presence of other powers in the region and has tried to keep them in orbit through various means, including dominating energy transmission lines and buying shares in the oil and gas companies of these countries. On the other hand, the countries of this region have always tried to diversify their energy transmission lines and share different countries in the field of oil and gas resources by using their investments in their energy sector. Therefore, China’s presence in the region in the form of the New Silk Road initiative and its investment in various sectors, especially the energy industries of these countries has been welcomed.The new Silk Road, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative, was first proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping during a visit to Central Asia in 2013. This project is an important idea of China’s economic connection with Central Asia and works to meet China’s economic needs and access to energy resources in Central Asia. However, China’s efforts to its presence are in direct contrast with Russia’s efforts, as Central Asia has traditionally been Russia’s sphere of influence. Since 2000, Russia has stepped up its activities in Central Asia intending to play a leading role in the region. China’s massive economic presence in Central Asia runs counter to Russia's goals and initiatives, including the Eurasian Economic Union initiative to restore its regional prominence.The Belt and Road Initiative is China’s most important and largest project for developing the export of goods and gaining access to markets and energy resources for energy-rich countries. The project has designed various routes to achieve China’s energy needs, the most important of which is the Central Asian route to China, through which China has been able to enter the region in the framework of bilateral plans and agreements. In addition, by investing in the energy sector of these countries and buying their share of oil fields, they will be able to have an access to energy resources more securely than any other routes through which China supplies its energy demands.According to the above-mentioned facts, China needs energy for reasons including its economic growth, economic security, and energy security with the support of major energy companies. For this reason, the country aims to control oil and gas production and supply chains with special attention to reliable energy-producing countries. Central Asian countries need foreign capital for investments and diversify their export routes. Russia is sensitive to its near abroad and needs energy resources to fulfill export commitments to other countries and strengthen its economic growth. In this present study, the author has used analytical methods to examine the impact of the Silk Road Initiative on Sino-Russian relations in Central Asia in the field of energy from 2014 to 2019. According to this study, the expansion of China’s cooperation with Central Asian countries, especially Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in the framework of the Silk Road Initiative from 2014 to 2019, has praised Russia’s competitive concerns. As a result, Chinese officials have simultaneously implemented plans to expand energy exchanges and cooperation with Russia in the form of this plan. As a result, it can be said that the China Silk Road initiative has simultaneously strengthened the competitive and cooperative nature of Beijing-Moscow energy relations.Many observers see Central Asia as the most likely source of tensions and rivalries between China and Russia over issues like political, military, and economic influence. However, what has mostly affected relations between the two countries in recent years is the issue of energy. Therefore, it can be said that in the future, the issue of energy and the Central Asian region will be one of the important factors affecting the cooperation between China and Russia.In general, it can be concluded that China’s presence in various projects, especially the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as concluding bilateral agreements with Central Asian countries, especially Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which have a higher capacity, especially in the field of energy, to enter the Belt and Road Initiative, has aroused Russia’s sensitivity. The region has been the traditional sphere of influence of Russia and in many cases, it has tried to create obstacles and prevent the presence of other countries in its near abroad. An example of this has been the increase in purchasing prices from these countries and the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union in the region in competition with the Belt and Road initiative. On the other hand, China by realizing these sensitivities has refrained from participating in security issues in the region and has handed them over to Russia to reduce Russia’s sensitivities. Therefore, due to Russia’s economic difficulties since 2014 and the sanctions imposed on the country by the West, the country has welcomed China’s presence and its investments in the energy sectors of Central Asia and even Russia. With all these interpretations, although Russia and China have become strategically closer in recent years, several strategic partnership factors limit them globally. Similarly, their interests in Central Asia combine a combination of elements of cooperation and competition and reduce the likelihood of a Russian-Chinese condominium in the region.

The Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea was signed between all the littoral states of the Caspian Sea and put an end to more than three decades of debate and ambiguity in this regard. This convention defined the status of several issues including demarcation of each country’s territorial waters, banning the presence of the foreign military forces in the sea, cooperation to manage the Caspian’s environment, and most importantly, construction of energy pipelines based on an agreement between involved states. The latter has great potential for influencing regional energy dynamics, even in the South Caucasus, and an opportunity for Iran to receive a fair share of the scene. Though Iran looks like an equal country with others in this regard, due to severe US sanctions in the years following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran's energy and geopolitical benefits have been circumvented and ignored. Today, countries like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have greater weight than Iran in determining the fate of the energy in the region. Russia and Iran are on the same side of the story. They both do not want to be cut off from energy transmission lines and allow small countries to make decisions. In theory, the convention is just a paper for Iran which only creates obligations, and unlike other states, doesn’t bring golden achievements for Tehran. For this reason, Iran is the only country that has not yet ratified this convention in its national parliament. In practice, but the convention moved forward Iran one step more and gave it more capacity to request its share from the Caspian energy market. The Islamic Republic now could say all obligations and achievements must be equal and be divided properly. In Geopolitics school, the liberals believe that states must take Geopolitics as a platform for competition and cooperation and pursue their absolute interests. Despite realists who believe that the interests of one state are relative and that the interests of one state mean the deprivation of another state, the liberal program can make progress in Iran's interactions with the dynamics of the Caspian energy. On the one hand, sanctions still exist, and Iran is like radioactive particles that no one wants to touch. On the other hand, it has gathered untapped energy potentials that they want to release. According to the liberal geopolitical version, this must be formulated in a precise strategy and the achievable steps must be determined. In other words, Iran cannot use an aggressive and subversive approach to other coastal countries, simply because it enjoys vast energy resources, a geopolitical position, or the signing of a convention in its hands. This article articulates that the Iranian foreign policy should be optimistic to other players of the Caspian Sea and tries to persuade them to consider Iran as a great player with legitimate interests in Caspian energy extraction, pipelines, and other issues. Tehran must remind that the basic principle of the 2018 Convention was cooperation which applies to all objective areas of the Sea, not just signing a deal. The first practical step under the aforementioned limits of Iran could be the allocation of a reasonable part of the Caspian pipeline's capacity to transfer Iranian oil and gas. This article has the necessary legal basis in the Convention, and in addition, Russia has stated that all decisions related to energy in the Caspian Sea must take into account the consent of all parties. So, if Iran couldn’t sell and transit some of its energy sources, it could easily spoil the Convention and other collective decisions.  Almost all Caspian countries are major energy producers with huge untouched reserves which make them unavoidable competitors for exporting energy to East Asia and Europe. Supplying Europe with its natural gas is a long-standing goal for Iran since the 1990s, but sanctions prevented the development of its energy infrastructure such as the study of new fields, building pipelines, and installing modern extraction equipment. While during the last decades, Tehran witnessed Europe’s efforts to diversify its energy imports via building new pipelines in the Caspian region and South Caucasus, today Russia tries hard to prevent these programs and even circumvent hotspots like Ukraine by launching the Nord Stream 2 project. Furthermore, the instability of the South Caucasus continues, as Russia and Turkey are pursuing divergent security and economic interests. The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, like a frozen conflict, has an unknown fate which at any moment could lead to an unexpected disruption of energy flows. In addition, to deepen synergy with the Caspian littoral states, Iran now could engage with Europe and the US to get waivers in energy export sanctions. At this point, diplomacy matters most. Iran needs to assure Russia that a limited energy export to Europe by Iran would not weaken its predominance in regional energy dynamics. The use of the Russian-dominated pipeline network and the acquisition of a limited market share from Europe should be considered as initial steps that are not intended to generate revenue. It uses the provisions of the Caspian Legal Convention to enter the world of northern energy.

Undoubtedly, in the new century, energy is a vital element for the survival of all countries and its stable and cheap supply has become one of the most important concerns of countries and global economies. Russia is the largest gas and the third-largest oil producer in the world. The European Union is the largest consumer of energy in the world because of limited energy resources. Complementary economies between Europe and Russia, their geopolitical location and geographical proximity, have made symmetrical interdependence between them.Energy and its security have been one of the most key and sensitive areas of cooperation between Russia and the European Union. The EU’s concern is to “ensure the security of fossil fuels supply” and Russia’s response to this concern is to “guarantee the demand for gas” in the long run. Russia’s main goal is to achieve sustainable gas exports at the highest possible prices, and in this regard, the dominant energy companies, including Gazprom, have been most effective in pursuing Russia’s national interests and Moscow’s foreign policy.Russia seeks to make Europe more and more dependent on it and has pursued various policies to this end. One of these policies is the policy of “discrimination between customers”. Accordingly, Gazprom prefers to deal with EU members individually rather than as a group. For example, lower-priced sales to countries with access to alternative energy sources (northwestern Europe) and higher-priced sales to countries that do not have enough alternatives (Central and Eastern Europe). The second policy is to “conclude long-term contracts with customers”. The third policy is to “monopolize gas reserves by consolidating its control over strategic energy infrastructure”, especially pipelines in Europe and Eurasia, by purchasing and acquiring refineries, pipelines and transmission networks. The fourth policy is to “establish a natural gas price control cartel”. This will be a strong lever for Russia to advance its political and economic interests.The European Union is also one of the world's largest consumers of natural gas and is interested in low prices and secure energy supply and has pursued several key policies to this end: The EU’s first policy is to “integrate member states into a European energy market”. Its second policy is to “encourage a reduction in dependence on Russian gas imports while diversifying its gas exports”. The third policy is to “diversify the energy basket”. The EU supports all alternatives to replace Russian gas imports from reducing energy consumption to the use of alternative fuels such as renewable energy and alternative gas sources such as liquefied natural gas namely Nabco and shale gas. Despite all initiatives put forward by Russia and the European Union to reduce their dependence on each other and their strong emphasis on the need for diversification and finding safe alternatives, these policies do not seem to be feasible in practice. In the current context, the EU seems to have limited alternatives to Russian energy. It is difficult to increase imports from North Africa; because the capacity of Italian pipelines is fully utilized. Increasing exports to Spain will not help either, as no more gas can be sent to Europe from the Iberian Peninsula. Relying on oil in the Middle East, the current crisis zone, is also unwise, as there is always the concern that terrorist groups will target pipelines and production facilities throughout the region, closing energy routes such as the Strait of Hormuz and leaving Iran in a state of disarray. The existence of huge energy reserves and special geopolitical and geostrategic position, due to US opposition and competition from countries such as Russia and Turkey, cannot be a good market for the union.Energy and its unparalleled role in geopolitical competition have shaped some sort of global division between countries: 1. Energy exporting countries, 2. Energy importing countries, 3. Energy transit countries. All of their actions and behaviors to reach further benefits make geopolitical interests of global energy. This article seeks to examine Russia’s actions, reactions, and behaviors as an exporter of energy, the EU as an importer of energy after the Ukraine crisis. The article seeks to answer the question “what role has energy played in Russia-EU relations since Ukraine crisis?”The developments in Ukraine caused a lot of fluctuations in the political, security, and economic relations between Russia and the European Union. Following the Ukraine crisis, a new Cold War has broken out between Russia and the West. The adoption of a resolution against Russia on the illegal act of annexing Crimea to its territory, the removal of Russia from the G8 summit, the suspension of the new visa agreement, economic sanctions, and especially sanctions on those involved in the crisis, sharp decline in exports and imports, are examples of suspension of relations between Russia and the European Union after the Ukrainian crisis. Nevertheless, energy relations between Russia and the European Union have so far not been affected by political interests and have continued as before. Russia, which has always used its energy as a tool to advance its political goals, has not only used its energy against the bloc since the Ukraine crisis and strained its relations with the European Union, but it has also come up with some plans. It has sought to consolidate its trade with the union by removing Ukraine from the energy transit route to Europe, replacing new pipelines, including North Stream 2 and using Turkey’s territory, and reducing Kyiv’s influence on the energy transit route. Despite the political, security, and economic ties between Russia and the European Union, it seems that the energy variable has prevented spilling over their problems to other areas and helped maintain two players’ relationships.The results of the analysis of the conditions indicate that an increasing interdependence between them for at least the next decade especially in the gas sector will have remained. This is mainly related to Gazprom’s dependence on the European market, the technical problem of replacing Russian gas imports in the European Union, and long-term contracts by 2030, which could result in heavy fines for parties seeking to terminate the contract.

The evolution of human rights standards in today’s globalized world has given rise to the issue of women’s rights and gender equality. In today’s world where the role of women in social and economic life is increasing, the issue of gender equality is becoming increasingly important. One of the most important steps taken by the Soviet government was to carry out fundamental reforms to improve the social status of women. An action that began in 1918 but in practice failed to improve the situation of women. The revolutionary government succeeded in increasing women’s employment and participation in the national economy but failed to achieve women’s equality. In the post-Soviet period, the situation of women, in general, did not change. In this article, we discuss the socio-political empowerment of women in the South Caucasus. After reviewing the status of women in the Soviet Union, we will look at the post-Soviet period and the position of women in the region in the political, cultural, economic, educational, and health dimensions within the conceptual framework of empowerment of women. The main question is what is the situation of women in the South Caucasus today? The findings of this study show that the situation of women in this region in terms of political, social, cultural, educational, and health rights is close to international standards but has not been fully realized.In the post-Soviet period, in most of the newly independent states in the Caucasus, there is little evidence of an improvement in the status of women, but in some areas, the status of women has deteriorated since the Soviet era. In this article, we examine the situation of women in the Soviet Union in 1917-1991 and the post-Soviet period in 1991-1999 in Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. We first look at the situation of women in the Soviet Union in general and then at the situation of women in the three newly independent countries in terms of political, cultural, economic, educational, and health criteria. The question of this research is what is the situation of women in the South Caucasus today? One of the theoretical topics that are widely considered and used today is the issue of women’s empowerment. The situation of women in the South Caucasus is examined in this article in the context of this discussion. Empowering women strengthens their social, economic, cultural, and political status. When women have income and financial security, they gain power and self-confidence. They create accessible economic growth by creating new jobs as well as expanding the talents and human resources available in a country. Employed women are the new drivers of sustainable growth in developing countries. The most important challenges for women’s empowerment are; Increasing access and control of resources, equal property rights, increasing political participation. This concept of women’s empowerment is rooted in the human empowerment approach, where individuals can make decisions about their area of function, where they can feel like a valuable part. We now turn to the situation of women in the South Caucasus, taking into account the various aspects of empowerment mentioned above.In sum, the measures taken by the Soviet government were to ensure the real equality of women with men in society, in cultural life, and production. Social development in the Soviet Union aimed at building a classless society by increasing interest in the needs of every human being was concerned with the problems of personal well-being and cultural development. The protection of women, as a prominent factor in the Soviet government’s general social policy, was designed to integrate them into the socialist system, but that government failed to ensure gender equality. What happened in practice was the emphasis on using the productive labor force of women and raising the birth rate in the service of the increasing population for industrial development and strengthening the Soviet military. Gender equality and the promotion of a decent attitude towards women were not among the priorities of the Soviet political elite, as other goals such as political survival and rapid industrialization took precedence. Eventually, Gorbachev’s reform plans - the last attempt at the relative success of the Soviet system - failed. Women faced structural discrimination during the Soviet era. In the post-Soviet period, the transition from a totalitarian government to a democratic and free-market government worsened the situation of women in the South Caucasus. Today, there is no national policy to address the situation of women. The government has not attempted to change this situation because it sees gender equality as an issue that was addressed during the Soviet era. Lack of effective mechanisms to ensure the proper implementation of laws leads to discrimination against women in all areas. Although men and women are equal in the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, there are no strong mechanisms for achieving this in the daily life of Armenian society. Women in the South Caucasus have little activity in the economy or politics. Women’s participation in politics is limited due to social and economic pressures including childcare, lack of financial resources, opportunities, and capacities. Traditionally, women have preferred social work to politics. In both countries there is a traditional view of the presence of women in society; A view that wants more women at home and away from social, cultural, and political activities. In general, in the post-Soviet period in the countries of the South Caucasus, to date, there is little evidence of the development of democracy and the improvement of the status of women, but in some areas, such as employment, the situation of women has worsened since the Soviet era. Improving the status of women requires political will, financial resources, a change in attitudes toward the status of women in society, a strong civil society, active political parties, and public awareness. This path has not yet been implemented in the south Caucasus, despite minor constitutional changes.

In the anarchic situation of the international system, where countries still have to rely on themselves for security and survival, the alliance approach is a desirable way to balance and neutralize threats. The Islamic Republic of Iran, due to its particular geopolitical position in Western Asia and confrontation with the ruling order after the end of the imposed war, has shifted towards a coalition-building approach. In addition, the structural pressure of the international system after the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially in recent years, has inevitably created a coalition to counter these threats. The Islamic Republic of Iran has in recent years been able to form its most successful coalition with Russia and Turkey in the Syrian crisis. However, the main question now is whether the Russian-Iranian coalition in the Syrian crisis can necessarily lead to a strategic alliance between these two countries at the regional and other levels. Examining the foreign policy goals of the two countries in the current situation shows that there is a need for a higher level of integration between the two countries to achieve such a goal.With the end of the bipolar system and the collapse of the communist states headed by the former Soviet Union, international relations entered a new era that differed in all aspects in form and content from the previous systems. Under these circumstances, relations among countries are very different and debatable in terms of complexity and multiplicity. Now, almost three decades after the collapse of the bipolar system, although a wide range of models was designed to explain the status of the international system such as unipolar, multipolar, multipolar and hegemony, etc. these models can be boldly proposed. Experts believe that we have no definite order in the post-Cold War international relations. For this reason, many theorists of the current international system emphasize that we are in the period of transition into the multipolar order. Thus, international relations after the Cold War has been complex and ambiguous, at least in terms of structure and form, and have not yet defined precise and efficient substantive rules. What is certain, however, is that international politics is still anarchic and that governments operate in a self-sufficient environment. Under these circumstances, and due to changes in the geometry of power, including the decline of the United States and the growing power of countries such as China and Russia, coalitions in the coming world will be very important. The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a regional power in West Asia, which faces many security challenges, should take advantage of this approach. Despite the importance of this approach, the question that every concerned international relations researcher must answer is whether the Iran-Russia alliance in the Syrian crisis can be repeated at other levels.The principles of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran can lead to alliances with other major powers that challenge the United States, but at the same time have different aspects that sometimes make these countries align their interests with Iran card to play against the United States.Therefore; it is believed that cooperation of countries such as Russia and China with the Islamic Republic of Iran is limited to a certain range and these countries sometimes use Iran as a card in their relations with the West especially the United States. Russia, as a world power, has diplomatic relations with the United States and is currently in competition rather than hostility with it. So, naturally, Moskow should have more room to maneuver, but the Islamic Republic of Iran has many conflicts at all levels with the United States.In addition; regarding Iran’s opposition against Israel, it should be said that there is no similarity between the positions of the Islamic Republic and any country in the world. Perhaps the main reason for the Islamic Republic of Iran’s reliance on militant groups such as Hezbollah and the popular uprising is that we have not been able to form a strategic alliance to secure our interest due to the low level of common interests with some countries such as Russia. Therefore, defensive realism is being penetrated to the region through cooperation with such groups. Iran’s strategic alliance is not with countries but with non-governmental organizations.So, in general, according to the definitions of coalition and alliance, the cooperation between Iran and Russia is a coalition, not an alliance, which, by its very nature, ends with the achievement of the two countries’ initial goals, such as stabilization in Syria. A strategic alliance can be reached with this country because the level of common interests of the two countries is not so high yet. Some Russian experts have called Tehran-Moscow relations fragile and believe that Iran cannot be a reliable partner for Russia. At the same time, there are many opponents in Iran about closer proximity to Russia and mistakenly consider this proximity to be contrary to the principle of neither East nor West policy. Thus, it is safe to say that we have not been able to reach a consensus on our national interests and priorities during the past four decades due to a variety of reasons, and until we resolve this internal problem, the prospect of forming a strategic coalition at the regional level, even with Russia does not seem very clear. The Syrian crisis and common threats felt both by Iran and Russia have shown that the principle of alliance building is not an unattainable goal and can be achieved if the convergence of interests is felt with a country like Russia.

Forty years of Chinese reforms which started in the globalization process and were the results of trade liberalization, foreign direct investments, made China the world’s top exporter and the second global economy after the United States. Beijing adopted an aggressive realistic foreign policy to obtain the political weight equivalent to its economic presence in the international order. The Neighborhood Policy prioritized East Asia and Central Asia, to manage security and religious challenges and to optimize energy resources, transit routes to Europe, and take advantage of the infrastructure weaknesses. The objective of this research is to analyze Chinese relations with Central Asian countries by responding to this question “How China follows and secures its foreign policy objectives and national interests in Central Asia?” The hypothesis of the research consists that “China seeks its national interests in bilateral agreements and economic relations with Central Asian countries, while at the same time use regional arrangements and initiatives to encourage Central Asian governments to participate and cooperate in regional political and security arrangements. A descriptive-analytical methodology has been employed to respond to this question and prove the hypothesis.The Chinese reform process was a unique experience that could strike a balance between communist ideological values and new liberal economic and trade policies. China’s accession to the World Trade Organization caused a trade revolution in the country and cash financial resources enabled Beijing to assist other countries. The gradually increasing attractiveness for Chinese investments encouraged Central Asian countries to consider a more receptive approach towards cooperation with Beijing, despite their political-security concerns.China also started to reconsider its relations with neighbors located on its western borders by signing economic agreements in their infrastructure projects. Multiple reasons influenced this trend. Firstly, the vicinity of Central Asia with the Muslim province of Xingjian poses a potential security challenge, since those republics could destabilize any country with their fundamentalism, human and drug trafficking, weak political structure, and corrupt politicians. For example, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan host the Taliban, Al-Qaida, and Daesh in their southern frontiers. The participation of 4000 Central Asians and 1000 Xingjian residents in Daesh operations and their return to their motherlands pose a serious regional threat. China has signed security agreements with all Central Asian countries in the 21st century and its proposal to form a quadrilateral military alliance between Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and Tajikistan among others are measures to have a secure environment in Central Asia.Secondly, the Caspian Sea-rich energy resources could respond to the big Chinese thirst for oil and gas. In Xi Jinping’s trip to four Central Asian countries in 2013, different agreements in the fields of oil, gas, coal, water, and electricity were signed and Chinese firms have invested an average of 10 B/USD$ per year in oil projects in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and hydroelectricity in Tajikistan ever since.Thirdly, the huge demands of investments and trades encouraged Central Asian countries to balance the Russian dominance through making partnerships with companies of other regions. Tajikistan and Kirghizstan could have access to the huge Chinese market because of their proximity to Western China. Beijing soon became Kirghiz’s first trade partner and the landlocked undeveloped country got access to free see-through Karakoram expressway and Pakistan. Kazakhstan is China’s biggest trade partner and has received a considerable amount of investments. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are far from Chinese borders and have their eyes on American and European companies. However, they have never rejected a Chinese proposal for the sake of economic security. Water distribution, electrification, energy, and health projects have a stabilizing effect on the regional economy.At the same time, regional frameworks were used to create a suitable network for defense and security cooperation. Regional frameworks like the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) were either initiated or promoted by Beijing to secure its regional supremacy. Proposals and plans like “Procurement of Asian Security by Asians” in CICA are clear evidence of Beijing’s intention to advocate an Asian framework on security with no accountability to Washington. The idea of an Asian defense and security identity has been presented by other leaders. Xi’s desire for the establishment of an “Asian Security Operative Structure”, Putin’s quest for an “Increased Economic Integration”, Rowhani request to “Adopt common position against unilateral and illegal acts of other countries” and Erdogan recommendation for a “More proactive ownership of CICA by member countries” show the determination of Asian leaders for a more independent approach in international arena and enhancement of regional cooperation. This trend strengthens even more Beijing’s position to fight against extremism, separatism, and terrorism in Central Asia, making in this way its western borders safer and controlling Xingjian ethnic and religious unrest.Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is another security mechanism with a strong presence in China. With more than 45% of the world population, 23% of world territory, 25% of world GDP, two permanent UN Security Council members, two energy suppliers, and three energy consumers, it could be considered as the most important Chinese-led international organizations. Established in 2001 and expanded in 2017 with the entry of two Asian nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, the SCO is distinguished from other security arrangements for its fight against extremism, separatism, and terrorism; whose only permanent body is the Anti-Terrorism Structure. Other subjects of importance are arms business; drug trafficking, immigration, and organized crime. The SCO doesn’t intend to become a military block or even a security union, but rather an organization to contribute to regional peace and stability. The 2nd priority of SCO is socio-economic development which is being pursued by China through big investments, infrastructure projects, and transport corridors. During the international financial crisis, SCO poorer countries received up to 10 B/USD$ Chinese soft loans to finalize Russia, the Kazakhstan-Kirghizstan expressway, and the China-Kirghizstan-Uzbekistan railroad. The traditional ideological rivalry between Russia and China has been faded and both sides signed a 400 B/USD$ contract of oil and gas supply by Russia to China for 30 years, enabling Moscow to breach American and European sanctions. It could be mentioned that the SCO is a division of labor between Beijing and Moscow, the first taking care of the economic and financial needs of members, while the second will be in charge of the security interests of member states. The recent accession of India puts it in a balancing position in SCO between China and Russia, taking part in events based on national interests.In the economic field, the Belt and Road Initiative, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Silk Road Fund (SRF) are regional arrangements to persuade Central Asian countries to benefit from Chinese financial resources and know-how to respond to their development needs. The Belt and Road Initiative could not be realized without transit through historical routes of Central Asia towards Europe. The 6500 Km Caspian Transport Corridor, from China, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to Europe reduced the 60 days maritime travel to only 14 days land transport. Kazakhstan Strategy for 2050, Almati-Urumchi railroad and Kazakhstan access to the Chinese port of Lianyungang are projects of interest to Chinese companies. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is an effort to expand Chinese relations with its eastern neighbors, while Belt and Road Initiative is allocated to Central and West Asian partners. This is the way Chinese Guanxi helps the government to strike a balance between its bilateral and regional relations in Central Asia and how former foes could become friends, to jointly fight third adversaries.

The objective of research: The present research puts forward designing and assessing the optimal model of strategies with security threats of extremist Islamism in Central Asia with the emphasis on the role of Iran with the objective of presentation of suitable strategies for confronting extremist Islamism in countries of Central Asia.Theoretical framework: For a theoretical explanation of the Etiology of extremist Islamism threats in Central Asia, a compound approach includes the theory of Huntington Political Development and theories of social pressure such as the theory of Robert Agnive General pressure, Robert Morton and Peter and Judit feel of relative deprivation have not been applicable. Therefore, for theoretical explanation of strategies to control extremist Islamism in Central Asia, the Convergence theory, cultural diplomacy, soft power, and social development have been applied.Method of research: Having used qualitative research approach and content analysis, the data, relative to coping strategies with security threats of extremist Islamism in Central Asia with the emphasis on the role of Iran were collected through a semi-structured interview (standard) with 12 persons (among them are university professors and experts in political science and regional studies), done as theoretical sampling method and theoretical saturation. For analysis of qualitative data, the contents analysis and contents network based on theoretical coding process in 3 stages “open coding, axial coding and, selected coding” has been used in line with the finding of basic themes, organized themes and comprehensive themes and finally, a conceptual model of confronting strategies against security threats of extremist Islamism in Central Asia have been formed with emphasis on the role of Iran. To validate the issues and structural model, the evaluation method was used as a communication method (by referring to the interviewers) and the audit method (by referring to professors and experts). For reliability testing, two reproducibility methods (by accessing the internal agreement coefficient between the two transition codes and eliminating existing deficiencies), as well as transferability or generalizability (by performing theoretical and comprehensive sampling), were used.Research Qualitative research findings showed that optimal model of confronting strategies against security threats of extremist Islamism in Central Asia with emphasis on the role of Iran with nine comprehensive themes have been reached to theoretical saturation (including themes: 1. compassionate and moral recitation promotion of moderate Islam; 2. effort for cultural convergence; 3. using scientific and university capacities; 4. Taking into consideration economic development; 5. strengthening sustainable security; 6. strengthening Islamic unity discourse and convergence in coping with extremism; 7. considering political development; 8. considering social development in Central Asia; 9. considering sustainable development in Iran, 10. 20 organized themes that finally lead to 120 basic themes bring about theoretical saturation. This research indicates that using strategies and developmental strategies and special convergence diplomacy of the soft and cultural power of the most appropriate coping strategies with security threats of extremist Islamism in Central Asia has been with emphasis on the role of Iran. Finally, the presentation of proposals in the frame of suitable strategies for coping with security threats of extremist Islamism in Central Asia with consideration to the role of Iran are as follow:Using all capacities for introducing and informing, regards moderate Islam and its distinction with radical Islam.Laying the groundwork for strengthening cultural and historical aspects, which Iran shares with Central Asia.Using all capacities in line with strengthening literal and art capacities, which Iran shares with central Asia.Laying the groundwork and using all scientific and faculty capacities for strengthening relations and scientific, educational, and research exchange in Central Asia.Laying the groundwork and using all capacities for strengthening economic relations with Central Asia.Laying the groundwork for economic development in Central Asia.Laying the groundwork and using all external and internal organizational capacities for the realization of sustainable security in the region.Strengthening convergence and laying the groundwork for disputes settlement in the region.Laying the groundwork for synergistic interaction in dealing with extremism in the region.Laying the groundwork for support and assistant to political development in Central Asia.Laying the groundwork for promotion of welfare and quality of social life and satisfaction of citizens in Central Asia.Using all external and internal organizational capacities for economic qualitative and quantitative development.Laying the groundwork for the development of public scope and civil society in the states of Central Asia.Holding synergistic interaction between political players for détente in internal areas and foreign relations.Laying the groundwork for promotion of welfare and social life quality and satisfaction of citizens in Iran.

After the collapse of the Tsarist Empire following the 1917 revolution, non-Russian political activists in different parts of the empire, including the Caucasus and Central Asia, sought autonomy and then independence for their communities. Thus, the three republics of the South Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia) gained their independence one after another in 1918; but the Red Army occupied the republics and forced their leaders to emigrate in the early 1920s. To continue their struggle against the Soviet Union, the Caucasian émigrés, including the Georgian Social Democrats and the Azerbaijani Musavatists, sought the support of anti-Bolshevic states. They found Poland as an enthusiastic supporter. The Prometheus movement was a Polish-backed political organization that weakened the Bolshevik regime by supporting nationalist movements among non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union. . The task of fighting the Bolsheviks on the southern front fell to the Caucasian activists.The French-language journal Prométhée, published in Paris between 1926 and 1938, was the main tool of the movement's propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union. The journal, edited by the Georgian Georges Gvazava, was introduced as the National Defense Organization of the People of the Caucasus and Ukraine, which was renamed the National Defense Organization of the People of the Caucasus, Ukraine, and Turkestan from issue 8 onwards (June-July 1927). It was succeeded by Revue de Prométhée, edited by the Ukrainian Alexander Shulgin, during 1938-1940. Many prominent Caucasian politicians, from the former republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the North Caucasus along with their Turkestani and Ukrainian counterparts, contributed to the journal Prométhée. One of the notable contributors was Mehmed Emin Resulzade (1884-1955), an influential figure in the Iranian constitutional revolution (1905-1911) and the founding father of the Republic of Azerbaijan (1918-1920), who later organized Azerbaijani émigrés in Turkey and Europe.In this study, we have focused on Resulzade's articles in Prométhée. Accordingly, the main themes of Resulzade's articles were the historical and cultural identity of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the defense of the idea of ​ Pan-Turkism against the propaganda of the Soviet Union, as well as the circles of white Russians and Armenians, the disclosure of Moscow's expansionist policies against the neighboring countries and the attempt to gather the Caucasians around the idea of a confederation. The national history of the Republic of Azerbaijan was the most important subject of Resulzade's articles. He presented a selection of important stages in the history of Azerbaijan. He sought to define an independent and respectable identity for this country and emphasize the importance of the Republic of Azerbaijan for the Western world. Resulzade's goal was to prove the claim that the people of the Republic of Azerbaijan had all the elements of national identity. By stating that the majority of the inhabitants of Azerbaijan are Turkic peoples, he sought to provide historical evidence of the presence of Turks in the southeastern part of the Caucasus.Resulzade was a supporter of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and defended him and the Kemalist regime, even when the policies of Turkey were against the Azerbaijani struggle against Moscow. Pan-Turanism / Pan-Turkism was a major charge promoted by the Soviet Union, according to Rasoulzadeh. Armenians and white Russians also provoked it. Against the allegations about the political allegiance of the Azerbaijani activists to Turkey, Resulzade distinguished between cultural pan-Turkism and political pan-Turkism. He asserted that political pan-Turkism is doomed to failure because it wants to unite all Turkic peoples under one flag, but cultural pan-Turkism seeks to liberate Turkish culture from foreign domination. According to Resulzade, cultural pan-Turkism was able to create a revolutionary movement among Turkic masses and attract them to the struggle for national autonomy and independence against Russian imperialism. He also strongly criticized the White Russians' approach to the rights of ethnic minorities and their emphasis on Russian unity.Resulzade was also trying to show the imperialist attitude of the Soviet Union toward the eastern countries. The Bolsheviks claimed the abolition of the privileges imposed by Tsarist Russia; but, according to Resulzade, this claim was nothing but political propaganda. He referred to Persia, which the Soviet Union mistreated. Referring to Bukharin's remarks at the 15th Congress of the Communist Party on the events of China, Resulzade mentioned it as the real approach of the Bolsheviks to the eastern countries. Bukharin reiterated Lenin's position in support of the independence and nationalist movements as long as they did not become a threat against the Soviet ambitions. He did not expect the collapse of the Soviet Union to be far from expected. Resulzade viewed the Swiss political system as an appropriate model for the Caucasus. He considered the realization of Caucasian unity in full connection with the acceptance of the idea of the Caucasus Confederation by all people of the region and the two key neighboring countries, i.e. Persia and Turkey.

Since Putin’s presidency in 2000, efforts have been made to rebuild Russia’s position. The Russian state has taken various steps to maintain its military power in a state of “strategic parity” with the United States and “maintain global stability”, which has always been emphasized by Moscow’s official policies and strategic documents. Even in the last two decades, it has conducted several military operations outside Russia. One of the most important areas that were the laboratory of this claim was in the Middle East, especially in the Syrian crisis. Of course, Russia has tried to continue this role by strengthening relations with the countries of the region and has entered into other crises such as Yemen and Libya. This behavior of Russia has led it to be considered as an attempt to revive the position of the Soviet era. Therefore, understanding the nature of Russian policy and its dimensions whether it is passive and tactical, or using an opportunity to project issues related to the Ukraine crisis, are some of the questions that need to be answered here. Therefore, the main questions in this article are: has the Russian government rebuilt its regional standing? If so, how and with what strategy has it been done? In answer to the above-mentioned questions, the author has tried to put forward one main hypothesis and two complementary hypotheses. The purpose of this article is to show the progress of Russia’s efforts in the Middle East especially in Syria, to increase its regional and international position through a set of political and military ideas, initiatives, and actions. The first hypothesis is that “much of Russia’s standings have been due to the weakening position and confusion of the United States in the region and its policy of Pivot to Asia. But air operations, initiatives such as the chemical disarmament plan, de-escalation zones, the threshold process “Role-playing in the negotiations, communication with all parties to the crisis, the policy of regional balance and comprehensive regional engagement have revived Russia’s regional and international position.” The second hypothesis is that “despite this relatively successful policy and the promotion of Russia’s position in Western Asia, we must always keep in mind the obstacles, problems and even contradictions of Russia’s policy in the region, which can strengthen this position in the long run.” Thus, although the developments in the region have created conditions for the reconstruction of Russia’s position, this does not mean that this trend will play a decisive role in the overall state of Russian power. Therefore, the third hypothesis is expressed in such a way that “the power of any state must first be due to their internal situation, and as long as the process of internal development and modernization, and in the absence of this situation, external events, only act as a factor to prevent internal crises.” Given the fact that the current Russian state is very careful about increasing its foreign troop’s presence and spending and entering into a comprehensive international competition to avoid repeating the experience of the Soviet Union. Although the main focus of this article is on Russia’s actions in the 2015-2020 Syrian crisis, it is inevitably necessary for some topics to consider more periods. Therefore, it is not possible to talk about reviving the power of this country without the main roots of this issue in previous decades and also analyze its policy in the Syrian crisis without considering regional and even international contexts of its rivalry with the United States. Of course, the dispersion and decentralization of topics should not be considered as a need for a more comprehensive analysis. To examine the ideas of this article, an attempt has been made to first present a theoretical discussion and analytical model to better understand the angles of this issue. Then, the issue of the global recovery of Russian power will be considered from different perspectives, and in the next topic, the redefinition of its regional policy in the new era will be examined. Demonstrating power in the Syrian crisis and its actions and efforts is the focus of further discussions, and in the end, by analyzing its considerations and limitations and its future perspective, the conclusions will be presented. Based on the above mentioned arguments, it can be concluded that the Russian government, even though in recent decades has faced three issues in the areas of official ideology, the position of empire and the status of international power (superpower position), but still has tried to maintain its global military position in Maintaining the framework of the principles of “strategic alignment” and “global strategic stability”. It has politically acknowledged that it is only one of the world’s five great powers and in the sphere of global influence, it is reducing its global obligations. But in response to international humiliation, by imposing pressure on the regional environment and preventing western interference in its internal affairs (in the context of NATO enlargement, EU enlargement, missile shield deployment, color revolutions, and interference in human and ethnic rights within the federation), has turned to an independent foreign policy by increasing its regional role and military engagement. At the same time, Moscow has sought to justify these actions within the framework of the existing international system and the Westphalian order. Russia has been able to solve its domestic problems since 2000 by managing domestic policy and increasing oil and gas revenues, it has restored internal stability and security and has improved its economic conditions. It also maintains relative regional hegemony at the regional level by maintaining institutions such as the Commonwealth of the Independent States and the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the establishment and expansion of the Eurasian Economic Union, as well as the use of military force. Regarding the reconstruction of Russia’s power in the Middle East, we should also pay attention to a set of possibilities and limitations of this country. As noted above, Russia has been rebuilding its regional position through a series of measures, the most important of which are: Establishing and expanding relations with different countries in the region based on the logic of realism and pragmatism and away from any ideological considerations concerning its relations with countries like Iran and Turkey to Saudi Arabia and Israel; Paying attention to the relative regional balance between important governments of the region; Aerial operations against terrorist groups. Since 2015 by taking some political initiatives such as chemical disarmament in Syria, the establishment of de-escalation zones to ensure the security of the people and transfer of humanitarian aid, and most importantly serious participation in peace initiatives and dialogue with various parties to the crisis, as well as holding tripartite meetings especially the Astana process, it has tried to consolidate its standing in the Syrian crisis in the face of some western powers especially the United States. The combination of these measures has made this country along with the Islamic Republic of Iran, win this crisis. But it is still uncertain whether Russia will pursue a broad Middle East policy in the long run.

Over the past decades, Turkish-Russian relations have been increasingly characterized by a wide range of cooperation and rapprochement. Beyond strong economic bonds, the main reason behind the recent rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow is the general deterioration of Turkey’s relations with its Western allies which is highly interlinked to the outcomes of changing global order. As American hegemony has been declining, two rising Eurasian powers, Russia and Turkey, have started to challenge Western order and supremacy in the shifting international system. This dynamic context has paved the way for the strategic partnership of revisionist powers. Many scholars even began to argue that Turkey-Russia relations could turn into a strategic alliance in the future if Ankara’s relations with Western allies strain further. However, contrary to what many believe, a persistent strategic alliance between Russia and Turkey is rather unlikely due to serious differences in the two countries’ stances on certain major issues in the changing regional and global politics. This article aims to study the changing nature of Turkey-Russia’s strategic rapprochement systematically. The current literature on Turkish-Russian relations suggests that Turkey is strategically reorienting away from the West towards Eurasia, Russia in Particular. Instead, this article seeks to explain the multi-dimensional nature of Turkey’s strategic rapprochement with Russia in a changing international system. It argues that Turkey’s growing interest in closer cooperation with Russia is taking place amidst a transforming global order, shifting regional geopolitics and domestic political dynamics. In this context, Turkey’s rising partnership with Russia does not necessarily mean an axis shift at the expense of its traditional Western orientation. Rather, this growing strategic rapprochement is the outcome of a dynamic reaction to the ongoing power transition in the international system, a rising rift in transatlantic alliances, the crisis in Turkish domestic politics, and the geopolitical developments surrounding the two emerging Eurasian powers. Although the transforming global structures have paved the way for Turkey-Russia strategic partnership, bilateral relations continue to be characterized by significant elements of conflict and geopolitical rivalry and also are highly affected by their relations with the West. Among other factors, the role of asymmetric economic interdependence, divergent energy strategies, authoritarian leadership agency, as well as geopolitical rivalries in the changing geopolitics of the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East are highlighted. In the charter of IR theories, the Neorealist school in particular and also in the changing global world order, being Multipolar seems to have facilitated the efforts of rising powers to forge a strategic partnership with each other as well as pursuing Multi-directional and Multi-dimensional foreign policies. For rising non-Western powers, being Multipolar seems to have paved the way for the formation of pragmatic and flexible strategic cooperation while viewing each other as potential rivals on some critical issues. In this theoretical context, despite historical roots of animosity and geopolitical rivalry between Turkey and Russia, as two rising Eurasian powers, Ankara and Moscow have succeeded in compartmentalizing their relations in the changing global order. However, this does not necessarily mean that Turkish leaders are keen to make a strong strategic alliance with Russia. Ankara’s gradual shift away from Western allies in recent years does not demonstrate a strong Turkish commitment to end its strategic and institutional partnership with the transatlantic alliance but it is reconsidering its international standing in more Eastern ways. On the contrary, Turkey’s strategic rapprochement with Russia should be seen as a realist adjustment to the realities of the emerging post-Western multilateral world order. This article concludes by stating that Turkey-Russia emerging strategic partnership in the changing global order faces various structural and normative constraints. The article offers four notable points in this regard: first, Turkey’s strategic relations with Russia is to a very high degree determined by the development of its relations with traditional western allies as Ankara still has a structural security-economic dependency on the West and has important disagreements with Moscow regarding the changing geopolitical issues in the Middle East, Black Sea, East Mediterranean, and South Caucasus. Second, it is worth noting that the intense personal relations between Erdogan and Putin, the two authoritarian leaders, itself is an unstable element in shaping an institutionalized strategic partnership as the two ambitious leaders have an uncompromising distrust of each other. Third, although the high volume of trade has become a key element in improving Turkish-Russian relations, the trade imbalance and asymmetric economic interdependence between the two countries, especially Turkey’s dependence on energy imports from Russia, is an obstacle to drawing the prospect of strategic cooperation between Ankara and Moscow. Over the past decade, various geopolitical developments in their immediate neighborhood with a security dimension interfere with the trade interdependence between the countries. In other words, the fluctuations in Turkish-Russian trade relations also demonstrate the primacy of politics and security for sustained economic interdependence in the longer term. Finally, with all the disagreements in Turkey’s relations with Western allies, the scale and intensity of potential threats to Turkey’s national security and interests emanating from Russia are too high as the two Eurasian powers present competitive perception and intention towards the post-Western order in the making. Although Ankara treats the US and EU differently, Turkey is increasingly instrumentalizing its growing relations with Eastern powers to gain greater diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis Western powers. Therefore, it seems that the contributions over the rising of a strategic partnership between Turkey and Russia are overstated, at least in the foreseeable future, and the recent moves in improving the strategic cooperation of the two countries should be seen as a pragmatic response to sets of common challenges and opportunities in changing regional and global context. All in all, the dynamics of strategic ties between Ankara and Moscow can rarely be stabilized.

Regionalism is the expression of a common sense of identity and purpose combined with the creation and implementation of institutions that express a particular identity and shape collective action within a geographical region. Regionalism and regional convergence are one of the important mechanisms of countries for empowerment development in the new era. Russia is the largest and most powerful country which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This country has made many efforts in the last couple of decades to establish regionalism and regional arrangements in former Soviet republics, the results of which have been the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) which consists of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. It is the most important and active union created after the dissolution of the former Soviet Union to foster closer economic cooperation among member states for the well-being of the people of the region. The Islamic Republic of Iran, which has always been excluded or has not entered into the regionalization processes in the peripheral areas of the East and West, has in recent years put cooperation and convergence with the Eurasian Economic Union on its agenda. The signing of the agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Zone between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union in May 2018 was an important step for Iran to enter into regional arrangements. The present study seeks to investigate the regionalism policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation. What are the goals of the two countries in converging and cooperating in the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union? Methods and Material: The field study of the research is the core of Eurasia. The Eurasian Economic Union is located at the eastern end of Europe, bounded by the Arctic in the north, the Pacific Ocean to the east and Eastern Asia, the Middle East, and parts of Central Asia to the south. The Eurasian Economic Union accounts for about 15 percent of the world's landmass, 2.4 percent of the world’s population, and 2.2 percent of the world’s gross domestic product or (GDP). The Islamic Republic of Iran is adjacent to the south of the Eurasian Economic Union. Iran shares borders with three of five countries of the Eurasian Economic Union. The research and data collection was done by descriptive and analytical methods. Results and Discussion The process of Eurasian integration began immediately after the break-up of the Soviet Union. When the USSR began to fell in 1991, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was created from the ruins of the former USSR. The idea of Eurasian regionalism dates back to 1994. In 1994, during a speech at Moscow State University, the first President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, suggested the idea of creating a “Eurasian Union”. The idea was pursued by Russia and Kazakhstan. With the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s era as a prime minister, Eurasianism politics and regionalism in Eurasia were followed by Kremlin. In 2000, five states of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan established the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). In October 2007, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed an agreement to create a common customs territory and formed the Customs Union (CU). In December 2009, the leaders of the three countries in the city of Almaty signed the structure and framework of the Customs Union action plan for implementation from June 2010. The Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union was signed on 29 May 2014 by the leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, and came into force on January first, 2015. Finally, on January first, 2015, the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union took effect. The treaty codified and expanded all prior agreements regarding both the work of the Customs Union and the development of additional areas of integration. Armenia joined the integration union on January 2nd, 2015, and Kyrgyzstan joined on May 8th, 2015. The Member states established the EAEU based on a certain understanding of their long-term economic objectives. Establishing a single market for trading goods, services, capital deployment of labor forces among member states and has the specific and highly ambitious goals of creating a customs union.  The Interim Agreement enabling the formation of a free trade area between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Islamic Republic of Iran was signed in May 2018 within the framework of the Astana Economic Forum. The objectives of the Agreement are to liberalize and facilitate the trade of goods between the parties through, inter alia, reduction or elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers concerning the originating goods included in Annex 1 of the Agreement; to create a base for formation of a free trade area in which following international rules, standards and practices, duties and other restrictive regulations on commerce will be eliminated between the Parties and the necessary support for economic and trade cooperation between them will be provided. From the date of the entry into force of this Agreement, the parties will reduce and/or eliminate customs duties on goods listed in Annex 1 of this Agreement. According to Annex 1, in the Agreement, the list of 502 goods and services by the Eurasian Economic Union and 360 items in similar cases by Iran are included. With the policy of Eurasianism, Russia seeks to expand its sphere of influence and rebuild its status as one of the world powers. The Islamic Republic of Iran has realized the importance of regionalism, but it has been left out or not included in almost all processes of regionalism in the East and the West. Iran sees the Eurasian Economic Union as an opportunity to expand its international relations and strengthen its economy during the sanctions period. Conclusion The US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the extensive US sanctions against Iran and also Russia’s geopolitical straits and the challenge to the West, have led Russia and Iran to cooperate within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union. The results show that despite the economic nature of the agreement, its political and geopolitical goals are of high importance for both Russia and Iran.