فصلنامه پژوهش های فلسفی - کلامی
سال بیست و سوم شماره 2 (پیاپی 88، تابستان 1400)

The division of knowledge into “notion” and “assertion” is one of the foundational discussions. Knowledge, in its general sense, is divided into knowledge-by-presence and acquired knowledge. Acquired is either notional that is not judgment or notional accompanied by judgment. The former is “notion” while the latter is “assertion.” The two problems of this division are as follows: 1) “failure to comply with the criteria of rational division” which includes the instances of “unity of the divider and divided” and “lack of contrast between the types; 2) “the contrast of two categories in one quiddity.” Thinkers have replied to the first problem by considering the different validities in division, that is, the divider is unconditioned, notion is negativity conditioned, and assertion conditioned to something. In response to the second problem, they have said that judgment is necessary to assertion and is tantamount to the differentia, and the companionship of notion and judgment is mental. Apart from asserting the composition of assertion and explaining its parts, Fakhr Razi believes in the logical requisites of composition as well. According to him, assertion is the collection of notions of object and predicate and copula and judgment. Its problem is the acquirement of assertion from definition dues to the self-evidence of judgment; or it is from both definition and argument due to the acquiredness of judgment. As it were, the acceptance of the acquirement of judgment is incompatible with Fakhr Razi’s foundation in considering notions self-evidence. Another problem is the incompatibility with the unity and simplicity of knowledge. In his view, we cannot eliminate the first problem by considering the different validities in the divisions and divider because firstly, the type of these conditions is mentally-posited and they cannot be the differentia for real matters. Secondly, these validations explain the manner of presence of the divider in the divisions and their relationship to each other and is not specific to notion and assertion. Similarly, using judgment as the diffrentia of assertion cannot be a reply to the second problem because no differentia has been mentioned to conceive a part of assertion to make it acquired and distinct. Moreover, because Fakhr Razi’s basis has a problem in the composition of assertion, answers and requisites based on it will also be problematic. Therefore, his view does not appear to be successful in solving the problems. In the explanation of the views of the philosophers, Nasir al-Din Tusi considers assertion to be judgment. “Meaning” is the divider of notion and assertion. Notion is really knowledge and assertion is knowledge of it reverts to notion. In reality, assertion is judgment and judgment has two aspects: 1) it is an action of the soul; 2) conceptualization of this action of the soul by the soul. According to the second aspect, judgment is one of the instances of notion. The main point in this view is to consider notion as the basis; however, limiting knowledge to notions results in the denial of the share of argument in the two parts of logic. As it were, the division of knowledge into two parts makes the division figurative and indulgent. However, if one seeks the different in the philosophical and logical aspects in Khwaja Nasir’s view, then from a philosophical perspective, assertion is judgment and reverts to notion and this results in the exclusiveness of knowledge to notions. Therefore, there are essentially no divisions for knowledge. However, the concept of notion and assertion is one of the issues of logic. From this perspective, knowledge is figuratively divided and since it is in the beginning of logic and is in the position of education, such a matter is allowed. Therefore, by defining “meaning” as a divider, Khwaja could answer the first part of the first problem. As it were, considering assertion to be the same as judgment is both its second part and also the second problem which is an existential and ontological discussion would essentially not be applicable.

Without doubt, one of the important schools of thought in Islam is the Muʿtazilite rationalism school of thought and, in addition, one of the most challenging historical discussions also revolves around the decision of “determinism (jabr) and delegation (tafwīḍ).” Based on many accounts, the theory of “delegation” meaning human independent power in performing actions has been attributed to the Muʿtazilites as one of the important Islamic sects; a theory that, according to many of the Ashʿarite and Twelver Shiite thinkers without doubt belongs to them. However, nowadays, this attribution has been challenged by some researchers and, in contrast, some have risen in support of it. This article utilizes a library method and through investigation of the intellectual foundations of the Muʿtazilites in the discussion regarding the method of creation of human actions and on one hand, striving to understand their words and on the other, by relying on ancient historical records in the works of sect-researchers and rhetoric tactics in the typology of the terms “delegation (tafwīḍ) and destiny (qadar)” seeks to pass judgment and give fruit to logical contributions in response to the main question of “how the link between the Muʿtazilites and delegation can be evaluated?” Based on this, citing assemblage of that which has passed to understand the relationship between the “Muʿtazilites” and “tafwīḍ,” the following can be mentioned as the main points: 1. The word qadar can mean “ikhtiyār (free will)” and “tafwīḍ (delegation)” and is equivocal. By studying the works of the Muʿtazilites, we can see that the attribution of the qadar to them has mostly been line with the meaning of free will regarding this term. Therefore, it cannot simply be deduced from the attribution of this term that the Muʿtazilites believe in delegation because we would suffer from the fallacy of equivocality. 2. According to experts in the area of sects, and considering the different evidence in historical books, the “qadariyya” and “mufawwida” are different from the “Muʿtazilites” and for this reason they must not be considered as one group. According to some sources, these two even had disputes between themselves. For this reason, it is not right that we consider the Muʿtazilite scholars as “qadariyya and mufawwida.” 3. The philosophical system accepted by most of the Muʿtazilites is based on accepted the linear cause and effect system along with and aligned with the theory of “denial of delegation” and can be evidence of the Muʿtazilites not accepting delegation because the theory of delegation of free will results in the violation of the law of causality by a precise breach of it and this is a serious challenge for this philosophical system. 4. Shiite scholars such as Shaykh Mufid, Syed Murtada, and Shaykh Tusi who lived in the age of development of the Muʿtazilites did not only not approve of the attribution of the theory of delegation of free will to them; rather, in some instances, they considered the beliefs of the Muʿtazilites to be the same beliefs as that of the Twelver Shiites. 5. The evidence that some of the opponents of the attribution of the theory of delegation of free will to the Muʿtazilites have presented such as “denying fate and destiny by the Muʿtazilites” and “accepting the impossibility of the gathering of two powerfuls over a single object of power” are not acceptable because, firstly, the Muʿtazilites do not deny fate and destiny and believe in them and secondly, the aforementioned law is not correlated to the theory of delegation in a correct reading of it in the discussion of the creating actions.

Plato has identified Meno’s paradox as one of the most important theoretical challenges to learning. Meno’s paradox is that research and learning about what one does not know is impossible and about what one knows is useless. To solve this paradox, Plato proposed the Theory of Recollection. According to this theory, learning is the recollection of pre-existing knowledge that the human soul has forgotten in mixing with the body. Augustine does not find the Theory of Recollection convincing. Of course, the relationship between Augustine’s position and Plato’s view that knowledge is a recollection is very vague. According to Augustine, learning is not simply the mere receipt of information, but the ability to recall what we already know. Contrary to the early days of his intellectual life, Augustine believes that the example of Socrates’ question and answer with a slave cannot show the correctness of the Theory of Recollection. Augustine’s reflections on the book of The Confessions also show that remembrance involves the a priori existence of the soul. But in the second half of his intellectual life, Augustine believes that divine light brings rational things to the mind and causes them to be known without the need for innate knowledge or the pre-existence of the soul in another world. Some commentators believe that the main reason for this approach is the difficulty of accepting the past life of the soul as the main component of the Theory of Recollection. But there is no consensus among them on the timing and quality of Augustine’s change of approach. According to Gilson, Augustine never categorically disproved the notion that the soul existed before the body, and never explicitly referred to where the soul existed before the body. According to Teske, in the second period of his intellectual life, Augustine retreated from the Theory of Recollection as he had put it in his earlier writings. From O’Daly’s point of view, nowhere in Augustine’s writings can one find an explicit comment on the past life of the soul. The research question is whether the subject of the pre-existence of the soul is the only way to understand Augustine’s position on the Theory of Recollection? In other words, is the only way to get closer to an optimal understanding of Augustine’s change of epistemological approach, to take another ontological position among other opinions? The research claims that the reading of Augustine’s philosophy of language and semiotics opens a new entrance to the theory of divine enlightenment as a novel solution to the Meno paradox. In fact, instead of ontologically, the focus of Augustine’s discussion is on the discussion of language and its ability to convey meaning, real teaching, and learning. According to this linguistic approach, nothing can be learned through words and questions and answers. Therefore, unlike Plato, he concludes that learning is not the same as recollection, but the understanding of knowledge and realities of the outside world is done with the help of the light of the inner teacher, God. Augustine called this thesis divine enlightenment. The purpose of this study is to analyze and explain this claim by emphasizing the treatise on Augustine’s “The Teacher”. In this treatise, he talks about the nature of language and its role in teaching and learning. In this treatise, he emphasizes that words are insufficient to transmit our thoughts and ideas to another, and therefore, the mind reaches the level of enlightenment and understanding of the world with the knowledge it has received from its inner teacher. As a result, enlightenment of the mind by God provides the best explanation for the Theory of Recollection

The conflict between the impact of unscientific factors on science and its process, or in other words, “oriented science”, has a long history. But in recent decades, the issue has been reborn in more detail and with a focus on unscientific values as well as a focus on the natural sciences at the heart of the philosophy of science, with numerous proponents and opponents arguing for their claims. Opponents of influence, often influenced by the positivist discourse that governs science, considered the involvement of any unscientific factors, including contextual values, in conflict with the ideal of science (objectivity and accurate reporting of natural fact), and spoke of neutral or value-free science. Accordingly, to justify any hypothesis, theory or scientific explanation, only scientific criteria should be sufficient, including scientific values, scientific and logical rules and evidences. On the contrary, some introduced such an ideal as unattainable, undesirable, or based on incorrect principles, and considering the scientific and practical consequences of scientific theories and hypotheses, they argued in defense of the impact of unscientific values on the process of science, which is the most important; they are: “inaccuracy of distinction between scientific and non-scientific values”, “necessity of underdetermination of hypothesis or theory through empirical evidence”, and “avoidance of inductive risk”. Underdetermination is a common term in experimental science books as well as philosophy of science. From a descriptive view, since the predominant method in the processes of experimental sciences is induction, it often happens that the collection and analysis of certain data by induction does not lead to a single and unique result, and if we consider all scientific and epistemological factors and criteria, however, no definitive conclusion can be drawn, and although numerous cases have been excluded from the results and are not supported by evidence, there are still several hypotheses, theories, or explanations that are supported by scientific criteria in much the same way. So, often more than one theory, explanation, or law is consistent with a particular set of evidence. The question is what happens when researchers eventually choose one of these alternatives and reject the others? If, according to the assumption, all scientific and epistemic factors have not been able to present a definite final result, then a complete determination is born of the involvement of non-scientific factors. The most important challenge in advancing this argument is to defend the objectivity of science despite being influenced by non-scientific factors. This problem can be solved only by knowing the values objectively and believing that they are based on real things, and that such attitudes about the metaphysics of value is common and can be defended. Other problems such as confusion between scientific and practical fields and complete elimination of underdetermination through purely scientific components are not very serious and it seems that the elimination of transient underdetermination can be achieved only by the influence of non-scientific factors. Of course, unscientific factors include unscientific values, and in practice, this gap can be filled with non-valuable factors. In this case, the underdetermination is not a response to the ideal of "value-free science", but a trace of the ideal of "epistemic purity" in general (including purity of non-epistemic values and non-epistemic non-valuable factors).

Kant, in his pre-critical works like Reflections on Anthropology and Lectures on Metaphysics, considers some aspects of images that are not followed in the Critique of Pure Reason. Instead, in the first critique, he makes us face some new aspects act of the imagination. In this research, through the analytic-descriptive method, we study the relationship between time, image, synthesis, in Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics which can give imagination an ontological aspect. Heidegger also tries to show the coherence and continuity between these two periods, which are not apart from each other. Heidegger’s interpretation relies on syntheses and his references to pre-critical works show the imagination as a unifying faculty for sensibility and understanding and make new images that are related together. He shows in the first critique, that there is a correlation and continuity between the form of presentation, (Darstellung), and the perceptual representations, (Vorstellung). Different images are formed on the ground of the pure image of time and have a direct relation to the synthesis. In addition to this, schema-images are not like perceptual images, but as pure future, are the basis of thought-experience, precisely cognition-intuition. The transcendental schematism is the continuous basis of both experience and thought, which is indeed the common and unknown root between sensibility and understanding of knowledge. The transcendental schematism is the pure time that becomes the basis of our knowledge. It brings together two sources, sensibility and understanding, the two branches of human cognition that perhaps share a common, but to us unknown, root (B 29). Sensibility provides the mind with intuitions it receives from the senses, whereas understanding contains the concepts necessary to process this sensory information. Both forms of knowledge are necessary for all cognition. Now cognition (Erkenntnis) is quite distinct from thought in general. Although it is possible to think (Denken) without sensory information, our concepts remain empty and no cognition has occurred: we have only “played with representations (Vorstellungen)” (B 195). For cognition to occur, all thought must relate, directly or indirectly, to sensibility (B 33): our concepts must be made sensibly concrete. “If cognition is to have objective reality, that is, a connection to an object,” argues Kant, “then the object must be capable of being given in some manner” (B 194). “Being given,” is what Kant means by Darstellung: the horizon of time is representations of object = x. Conceptual representations of the object = x are necessary to cognition. Pure time is a horizon of time that forms different images as images of notions of concepts. By placing the subject and subjective knowledge with Dasein, Heidegger accentuates the horizon of time and holding open the horizon as dasein to others. Dasein creates an image for now and leaves behind the images of throwing possibilities. As a result, the point of intersection of all the discourses can be expressed in such a way that the three Kantian syntheses correspond to the three aspects of time, temporality related to the forms of existence. schema-image is the pure-image-of-time of ontological determinism in the forms of existence. Dasien acts as Kant’s imagination based on images and relations that seem visually pictorial, and performs these relations and creates images. For Heidegger, therefore, imagination means performing the visual-time-relations, which is related to the pure image of time. These pictorial or visual relations refer to seeing or throwing to the form of presenting if something, like x, appears; relationships that make the image of phenomena appear as something and something else. Based on the temporal aspect, we can say the function of imagination is forming to the present, past, and future dimension of time which is corresponded to the dasein’s forms of existence.

Human actions and behavior are formed based on their internal events. Among these behaviors, some arise specifically under the influence of one character and emotions instantly and without undergoing the stages of thought and reflection; even though they use a knowledgeable source of the category of imagination. Similarly, sometimes particular qualities affect human souls that are subject to passivity that is acquired for the benefit of beneficial and harmful affairs in some faculties. These states of the soul are called human emotions; happiness and joy, grief and sorrow, fear and hope, fervor and ecstacy, and wrath and anger are all of this class. Here, the question arises as to what the position of the character and emotions is in the human existence according to Mulla Sadra? What factors are influential in creating the states and emotions of the soul? In this study, employing the descriptive-analytic method and using sources of Sadrian philosophy, we conclude that the presence of the character necessitates that when the will to act is formed, action is produced without any difficulty, thought, and contemplation. In reality, the characteristics of the soul originate from human perception and manifest their influence in actions. The repetition and exercise of this perception and the actions related to them create the grounds for the formation of a habit in human beings that gives rise to vocation and industry. There is a strong relationship between the habits of the soul and human states and actions. Similarly, there is a special relationship between inner characteristics and emotion and the human physical condition. Based on this relationship, just as behavior is influenced by characteristics, characteristics are also affected by behavior; however, this influence is indirect. It is noteworthy that the attributes and characteristics that are activated in human beings from intellection and reasoning are never themselves the cause of the suspension of thought. On the contrary, with their activity the performance of the aforementioned faculties is elevated in terms of quality and speed. When weak souls are engaged in intellection, their emotions become chaotic or when their emotions are engaged, their mind is disturbed. However, strong souls combine the attributes of perceptions and stimulations and create a balance. The noble soul is similar to the incorporeal beings in terms of instincts and nature from a wisdom and freedom perspective. In reality, the evolution and perfection of the soul from the stage of potential to the stage of actualized intellect do not create any obstacles for the form and states of the soul. The different physical states and circumstances and their effect on the vaporous soul in terms of fineness and subtlety or roughness and density of the soul results in the intensification of the potential of emergence of different and proportional states of the soul. However, Mulla Sadra does not believe that physical states and attributes have an existential affect on the soul and spirit because such a thing is impossible and is similar to the effect of something lower on the higher. Rather, specific physical conditions create the grounds and help the emergence or intensify the potential of the manifestation of a specific state of the soul and characteristic. In all these instances, those that have a direct influence on creating the state of the soul are the human perceptive faculties including sense, imagination, and reasoning, that is, first thought and conception are formed in human beings and the states and feelings of the soul emerge after that. However, he does not believe in the direct effect of the emotions on the functioning of the reason and perceptive faculties; however, he does not deny the indirect and preparatory role of the states of the soul on human reasoning and thought. In this way, this situation itself provides the grounds for the creation of new thoughts and ideas.

The theistic argument for an intelligent and purposeful designer, in addition to receiving critiques from great philosophers such as Hume and Kant, was influenced by Darwin's theory that explains life based on a single cell, which itself is the product of explicit natural material processes. In response, theists point out the fact that the evolution of life was not inevitable, and that it was much more likely that the physical constants and initial conditions of the universe could be preventing life. Accordingly, one of the most important arguments for theism is formed, the Fine Tuning Argument (FTA). However, atheists make two basic criticisms of the theistic teleological explanation of the life-accepting universe. First, life is not, in principle, an “improbable” phenomenon that needs to be explained, and life can emerge and evolve in any other world with different laws, physical constants, or initial conditions. Second, life in our universe is a very “rare” phenomenon and has a very small scale in relation to the space-time dimensions of the universe and therefore, it cannot be considered as the ultimate goal of an intelligent designer. The present article discusses the second claim. The question is, if God is the Designer and the Creator of the universe and has considered life, and especially human life, as the goal and purpose of creation and its jewel, why did he create life (and human life) so late to the beginning of the universe, and in a very small part of it? This issue against theism, which is based on scientific evidence of the dimensions of life in the world, can be found in many atheistic writings; however, it was first formulated explicitly by the English atheist philosopher Nicholas Everitt and was titled "The Argument from Scale” (AS) in his book The Non-Existence of God. The present article, while describing the original argument and its variant narratives, focuses on a narrative rewritten by the Canadian theist philosopher Travis Dumsday, called the “Delayed Life Argument” (DLA). Dumsday himself thinks that the Delayed Life Rrgument is an independent argument from the Argument from Scale, a claim which I will reject. In this article, I defend two claims First, any atheistic argument based on the dimensions of life in the world can be considered as an argument against the Fine Tuning Argument (FTA), because the Fine Tuning Argument is, in principle, vulnerable to any evidence of the rarity of life in the world. Second, despite Dumsday’s claim, the Argument from Scale is not independent of the argument from the Delayed Life Argument and can be reduced to it. Thus the theists’ answers to the Delayed Life Argument can also be presented against the Argument from Scale. Meanwhile, I present an idea based on scientific evidence and theoretical reflections of modern cosmology, to question the underlying assumption of the Argument from Scale. It can be shown that we humans have a privileged position in the universe, both spatially and temporally according to some interpretation of the new cosmological evidence and theories.

The reduction of the field of science to the limits of experience from the eighteenth century and the monopoly of its methods and tools in quantification and material senses, as well as the use of reason as a concept, has limited the scope of human beings; in such a way that the attainment of indulgence was increasingly considered as his goal in the material world. The purpose of this article is to provide another definition of science by considering the courts of Ibn Sina’s (Avicenna) philosophy in the fields of ontology, anthropology, epistemology, and methodology; a definition that fits the principle of human end and happiness. Comparing the components of the above-mentioned vertices in Ibn Sina's philosophy, science finds an intensifying range from the second level (sensory cognition) to the highest level (Frost science) and each time in comparison to the levels of love. And happiness corresponds with this; in such a way that man becomes more in love and closer to ultimate happiness by intensifying his knowledge. Intensification science, with the permission of multiple understandings, closes the way to the monologue logic of dogmatism, and on the other hand, according to the monotheistic system in Ibn Sina's philosophy, it never leads to unbridled relativity and skepticism arising from the new hermeneutics. According to thinkers in this field, a definition of science that is appropriate to Muslim societies should have several characteristics and these characteristics are not discussed at all in experimental science: It should: Have a divine origin. Have a longitudinal, not transverse, view of the hierarchy of existence; because neglecting the longitudinal hierarchy leads to neglecting the fit between metaphysics and physics, in which case metaphysics is either marginalized or considered ineffective on physics. Be based on discovering the truth and not just material usefulness. Its language is sometimes cryptic and symbolic and is not limited to the dictionary of mathematics and statistics. Now that we see these characteristics clearly in the ontology, anthropology, and epistemology of Muslim philosophers, including Ibn Sina, we seek to answer the following question: How can Ibn Sina, as a Muslim philosopher, deduce another meaning of science? The findings of this study are summarized as follows: Love has many levels, and each of these levels corresponds to different levels of human happiness. On the other hand, the level of human happiness is completely in line with the level of human perception. This includes multiple levels, from the lowest to the highest. That is, sensory perception - which is the lowest kind of perception - corresponds perfectly to the lowest kind of love as well as the lowest kind of happiness. This type of science is called intensification science and unlike experimental science, it does not limit and confine science only in the field of experience. Thus, the science of intensification in the school of Ibn Sina has characteristics that are appropriate to the life of Muslim societies; because in the coordinates of this science, the system of existence has a longitudinal hierarchy and in this hierarchy, transcendence is the source of beings and true happiness is achieved by reaching and maximum likeness to it by passing the levels of sense and appearance. By discussing the true happiness of human beings in the science of intensity, unlike empirical science, the absurdity of life is reduced and its meaning is increased, and it is by the promotion of this science that true happiness is achieved; something that empirical science can never do.