Investigating the essence and the attributes of the Necessary Being is among the main discussions of the ‘metaphysics in its particular sense’. Especially, in the Islamic world, due to the explicit statements in the religious texts as well as the dominant culture, the philosophers made the greatest effort to resolve the issues pertaining to this topic. The mode of relationship of the attributes with the essence and with one another is, as far as the concept and the instance are concerned, one of those issues. Avicenna, as one of the pillars of the Islamic philosophy, has put forward a theory on the discussion of the conceptual unity of the attributes of the Necessary Being with one another, which has not been accepted by other philosophers. After him, Mulla Sadra has attempted to deface Avicenna’s theory, and others, following him, have criticized Avicenna. In this article, we have tried to delineate Avicenna’s theory so that it is clarified whether Mulla Sadra’s critique on this theory is right or not.

The Philosophers’ opinions on the truth of the acquired knowledge can be divided into two types: some regard it to be the presence of the quiddity of ‘external known’ in the minds; and consequently, the acquired knowledge is reserved for the quiddities. This group has resolved the issue of correspondence of the knowledge with the known using this view. In contrast, other (earlier) philosophers consider the acquired knowledge as the instance and ghost of the external known. The issue of the ‘mode of the knowledge suggesting the known’ has produced these discussions. According to the former view, knowledge of the mental quiddity can be knowledge of the external quiddity; but the view related to the ghost considers suggestion of the suggested as an essential element of knowledge, and regards no need for a relationship and some sort of unity between the knowledge and the known. Here, the discussion of the relationship between the knowledge and the knower is posed, about which there are two basic views: some believe in the existential unity between the knower and the knowledge; and in contrast, the earlier philosophers have depicted a concrete relationship between the knower and the knowledge. In this article, the arguments presented by the adherents of the aforementioned views have been investigated; and finally the views of those who believe that the knowledge is a ghost and that there is a unity between the knowledge and the knower have been defended. According to that view, the acquired knowledge is the very existence of the knower, which is suggestive of the known.

The natural atheism is based on two items: “the concept of God” and “the explanatory realm of science and religion”. The concept of God in new atheism is different from that in Abrahamic religions, especially Islam. Besides, the science and religion are two different spheres and are, as far as explanation is concerned, essentially different. Since past, various methods have been used to prove the existence of the Necessary Being, one of which is founded on the very “concept of existence” itself; that is, the philosophical explanation of God’s existence a priori. Richard Dawkins maintains that the “ontological argument” is nothing except a word game, and Kant has rejected that argument. Descartes, however, presented a new exposition which was totally ignored by Dawkins. This article seeks to explain and review Dawkins’ statement in The God Delusion to show that Dawkins’ critique of Anselm’s ontological argument is by no means right and is a cheap reading of that argument.

‘Perception’ is among the basic and broad discussions in Islamic philosophy. The “rational intuition” is nothing except a rational and direct philosophical confrontation with the external things and realities. Inside the minute perceptions acquired after the direct rational confrontation, the soul prepares their generalities through a certain process; and in philosophy and the language of philosophy, it mainly speaks with general statements. With an explanation of the rational intuition stated in master Yazdan-Panah’s view, the drawbacks of Allama Tabatabaie’s theory of perception have been resolved, and it will have some functions in the discussion on initiation of philosophy and the philosophical secondary intelligibles as well.

The science of philosophy has many benefits and functions which will be dealt with in the present article from various viewpoints. In the starting section of the article, some benefits such as holism, perceptiveness, etc. have been mentioned, which are naturally the benefits of reason as well. In the middle point of the article, we have mentioned some important functions such as “knowing the Exalted God”, “knowing the realities and truths of the beings in the universe”, “finding out the needs of the beings and the needlessness of their creator and humbleness before the Exalted God’s grandeur”, “obtaining the right worldview”, “analysis, investigation and proving or rejecting the presupposition of other sciences” etc. In the end of the article, we have mentioned the very important benefit of “more and better comprehension of the Quranic verses and traditions”. Altogether, this article familiarizes us with twenty benefits and functions of the philosophy.

Is doubt in axioms inconsistent with their being axiomatic? Is it possible to cast doubt on the most axiomatic realities while this not being inconsistent with their being axiomatic? What makes a difference between axiomatic and theoretical propositions is their being in need or being needless of definition and reasoning. This is the key point in the return of the theoretical knowledge to axiomatic knowledge. However, extending this needlessness to needlessness in other affairs has led to emergence of difficulties in knowing axiomatic propositions as well. So, it is necessary to discuss some points, posed among scholars, about this feature and its distinction from other features of this type of science. Through this investigation, it is clarified that the immediate affirmation of axiomatic propositions, contrary to the initial assumption –which seems easy – has some conditions that causes mistakes in identifying and affirming axioms if ignored. In this article, after investigating the definition and stating the features of axiomatic propositions, we have mentioned the conditions and affairs needed by the axioms.