مجله فقه مقارن
پیاپی 16 (پاییز و زمستان 1399)

Pay attention to Need in the process of solving various jurisprudential issues, is widely seen in the jurisprudential texts of Islamic denominations. This has led some jurists to regard Need as a legal principle. The present study, which has been done through descriptive-analytic method and based on library resources, in addition to analyzing the content of the rule, intends to examine its validity from the perspective of Islamic jurists and check the validity of referring to it in the two areas of worships and transactions. The findings of the present study show that Specific Need (Personal Need) is often mentioned in worship matters, and its existence is not a permission for Inherent Sins (Deadly Sins), even though it can lead to hardship. However, the application of Public Need (Typical Need), is mostly in transaction matters. Need, in this concept, besides principles such as the principle of permission and the principle of liberty of contracts, legitimizes actions and contracts and it can be a reason to limit the general principles of contracts. Public Need is of the public interests and by that we can limit general principles of contracts.

One of the conditions of prayer is its dependence on different times of the day, determining and knowing these times is of particular importance in the correct and proper way to pray which includes the timing of the fulfillment of duties, ghadha‘, the timing of nawafil and the virtue, the special time and the common time, etc. Therefore, in this study, the determination, regulation and arrangement of the prayers of maghrib and isha’ from the viewpoint of the five jurisprudential denominations has been discussed and, in the following, the scientific method of degrees and trigonometric regarding the proper schedule for the proper time of maghrib and isha’ prayers have been studied. Also, the terms of ghurub and maghrib, hamra al-Mashriqiya wa al-maghribiya, thulth and midnight have been explained from different perspectives of the five jurisprudences, according to the differences in the principles, basics and degree conversion, including diagrams, sampling designs and suitable subsets in this field. In this way, the differences in the principles in this discussion will be more systematic and understandable, and it will be a small step towards the explanation and proximity between the Islamic schools of thought.

Historical perspective is one of the methods of understanding religious texts. In this method, any understanding of these texts should be examined under the influence of the context during the period of its issuance. In his Ijtihad method, Ayatollah Boroujerdi has paid specific attention to the historical perspective and it seems that it is the historical perspective in the situation of traditions and historical roots of controversial issues that supports his interpretations of traditions. Through this historical perspective, he had achieved an unparalleled ability to interpret and justify traditions. Therefore, it can be said that he had a special and independent method in Ijtihad with a comparative method. In this article, we would like to briefly introduce the Ijtihad method of this prominent jurist and explain the place of historical perspective in his process of Ijtihad and its characteristics in three areas: 1- Principles 2- Hadith and Narrators 3- Jurisprudence and prove that paying attention to this component prevents abstract discussions in Ijtihad and it will significantly increase the certitude of the intention of the Infallible Imam.

Imam Mohammad Ghazali, who is one of the prominent figures of the Shafi‘i school, despite maintaining his adherence to the principles of the Shafi‘i School, disagrees with the head of his school on some fundamental issues. The most important of these are as follows: While Imam Shafi‘i considers the opposite concept as proof, Ghazali believes that it is not a proof and in fact, he believes that it does not make sense. On the subject of abrogation, Ghazali, like most Usulis, believes that it is possible for Qur’an to be abrogated by frequent Sunnah and Sunnah can be abrogated by the Qur'an as well, but Imam Shafi‘i believes that the Qur’an is abrogated by the Qur'an and Sunnah by the Sunnah. Another difference is in the proof of the words of the Companions, thus, according to the old saying of Imam Shafi‘i, the word of the Companions is a proof. Ghazali, on the other hand, does not consider the words of the Companions as a proof. Evaluating their ideas and arguments shows that in the above subjects, the preferred opinion is to consider the opposite concept as proof, the permission of abrogation of the Qur’an with Sunnah and the Sunnah with Qur'an, and the non-proof of the words of the Companions. There are jurisprudential works for each of these fundamental disagreements, which reflected in the views of Imam Shafi‘i and Imam Ghazali.

One of the questions raised about Islamic Hudud is whether the offenders would be exempted from Resurrectional Punishment after death if they are punished in the present world, or this worldly retribution would not compensate for their sin and cannot necessarily release them from Resurrectional Punishment? There are various opinions and differences among the experts of different Islamic schools. Some scholars believe that the mere imposition of punishment does compensate for Resurrectional Punishment, and the offender who has received punishment will not suffer from Resurrectional Punishment. This group express their opinion in the form of the rule “Al-Hudud Kaffarat” (compensation for the punishments). In contrast, others believe that Hudud are only the worldly punishments for the wrongdoing, and that do not suffice and would not compensate for the Resurrectional Punishments at all. Against these two views, some believe that the rule should be explained in details. In addition to examining different views of the scholars of Islamic denominations, and reviewing and analyzing the relevant arguments and evidences, this study refutes the two aforementioned viewpoints by scrutinizing the traditions and the circumstances of the issuance of the traditions and holds that it depends on the types and qualities of the offences and crimes.

Non-Muslim is a member of the Islamic community, who does not believe in an essentially-accepted principle of Islam, i.e., acknowledging Muhammad as the last prophet of God. According to Islamic jurisprudence, non-Muslims can obtain the citizenship of an Islamic country by accepting the ‘Dhimmah’ contract and enjoy its legal privileges as long as they do not commit any crime there. In crimes committed against individuals, in addition to retaliation and amnesty, paying the blood money to innocent victim(s) is also legitimate. Most of Islamic jurisprudents from the sects of Imamiyyah, Malikiyyah, Shafi‘iyyah, Hanbaliyyah, Dhahiriyyah, and Abadhiyyah believe that the blood money of non-Muslims is lower than that of Muslims. However, it seems that reasons given for this theory is not compatible with the significantly-expressed goal of the God in realizing social justice. The majority of documents referred to for such inequality have invalid references. It seems that the issues like ‘Dhimmah’ and ‘Jizya’, which have been considered in Islam for non-Muslims, have been all related to the certain time and situation in which these issues have appeared for the first time, and there is not any rationale for generalizing such cases to other times and situations. The blood money-related rules for non-Muslims are sub-clauses of other changeable rules; thus, they may vary in different times and situations. A clear difference among various references for non-Muslims’ blood money proves the above-mentioned issues. Conducting a descriptive study on the opinions of both Shia and Sunni jurisprudents and analyzing the way of their reasoning, the present research rejects the influence of a victim’s religion on the amount of his/her blood money.

Worthiness of the object of contract is one of the important issues in contract law. Analyzing this concept and its sanction is a place of disagreement in Shiite jurisprudence as well as Sunni jurisprudence. This article specifically seeks to find the answer to what the conventional verdict of worthlessness of the object of the contract is. Is the aforesaid contract invalid? In spite of the clear answer and the Shiite and Sunni jurists’ views about the invalidity of these contracts, this article shows that those contracts cannot be invalid in jurisprudence since first of all the criterion to identify whether the object of contract is worthy or not, is the object’s benefit, and there is no need to assume this benefit as an absolute and legal one. In other words, worthiness can be temporarily and accepted by the custom; so things that are legally worthless can be assumed to have worth. Secondly analyzing the traditions about the properties which are invalid in the jurists’ views says that these traditions cannot establish the invalidity of these contracts. Some of these traditions purely express the obligatory verdict of permanent prohibition and some of them accepted the conventional verdict validity. Just a few traditions are for the invalidity of these contracts. According to the rules, opposite traditions abolish each other and according to principles such as necessity of fulfillment of contracts, the validity of contract can be established.

In cases where the custodian of a minor child makes a decision whose effects continue after the age of puberty and growth, the question arises as to what the status of the decision and the transaction may be. The civil law has not stated a clear mandate in this regard. In jurisprudence this is a highly divergent issue. In general, the theories and views of the jurisprudents are based on five theories; one group consider the financial authority of custodian absolutely right and influential and the other group consider the financial authority of custodian invalid. Some jurists distinguish between the assumption of knowing about the continuation of the financial authority of custodian after puberty and the assumption of lack of knowledge. Some have explained about the current or future expediency of the minor. In the present paper, which is based on the descriptive-analytic method, it is concluded that in cases where the custodian makes decisions about the minor’s property, which has spread after his puberty and maturity, then the decisions are not valid and the minor can deny the actions taken after reaching legal age.

The role of “custom” and “conduct of the wise”, in different fields of knowledge and the process of jurisprudential and legal studies is not unclear for anyone, and jurisprudential scholars of Islamic denominations have always considered custom and conduct of the wise as an important and instructive element and the final solution. However, about the relationship between “custom” in Sunni terms and “conduct of the wise” in Imami terms, the provided definitions and evidences indicate the conceptual unity of “custom” and “conduct of the wise”. Findings of the research with a descriptive-analytical approach showed that since the time of Muhaqqiq Hilli, the “conduct of the wise”, “foundation of the wise” or “rational tradition” with a more specific meaning than “common custom”, has replaced the term “custom”. Although there are different types of custom, but correct and consistent custom has always been considered by scholars of jurisprudence and its role as a tool to identify, discover intentions and make the right decision in various fields of jurisprudence without a text is agreed upon by the Sunnis and the Imamis, and its effectiveness as an independent argument, except for matters of comprehensive association, is not only proven for the Imamis, but also for the Sunnis.

Halving the marriage portion in the event of divorce before sexual intercourse is one of the important jurisprudential decrees also reflected in Article 1092 of the Iranian Civil Code. A question arises here: if the wife discharges her husband of the marriage portion or grants it to him before the divorce, would she have the obligation of returning the substitute for half of the marriage portion? This descriptive-analytic study has examined the viewpoints of Imami jurisprudence, Sunni jurisprudence, and Iranian law with regard to the abovementioned issue. The results of the research indicate that according to the traditions and other proofs in Imami jurisprudence that the granting and discharging made by the wife have led to her enforcement of marriage portion and consequently, in case of divorce before sexual intercourse, she is obliged to return the substitute for half of the marriage portion to her husband. Hanbali denomination agrees to the mentioned idea but Maliki denomination does not accept that obligation. Each of the Hanafi and Shafi‘i schools, with distinguishing between different cases, accept the above said in some cases and reject it in others. According to the Iranian law, despite the disagreements, dividing marriage portion into halves, in the above said case, is admissible; however, under the Iranian Constitution and some laws, including the Family Protection Act, the religious minorities are subject to their religion in this regard.

In the Islamic legal system, the wife is entitled to several rights, including the marriage portion, which becomes her property through a permanent marriage. Today, according to the famous saying of the two main Islamic denominations, despite the fact that couples do not have to mention the marriage portion in the contract due to their lack of dependence of contract on mentioning the marriage portion, sometimes, based on misconceptions, they agree on marriage portions that the husband has no power to pay and the couple do not intend to give or receive the amount, but their intention is another amount of marriage portion that they have agreed out of contract. Since this type of mentioning marriage portion has become frequent in society, it is necessary to re-examine its nature and effects. The research shows that the fake marriage portion is void because of the lack of intention. The amount of marriage portion that the husband owes after the annulment of the mentioned amount, varies in different situations and according to the real intention of the couple. The present research has been conducted through descriptive-analytical method and with reference to library sources.

Due to its universality, Islam has established specific rules for how to communicate with followers of other religions as well as infidels. But the most severe of these rulings is related to martial infidel who are subject to rulings such as being deserve death and property. One of the things that can be seen as a challenge to achieving peaceful coexistence is the extensive interpretation of martial infidel. Many early jurists have considered the criterion of non- tributary to be sufficient for the validity of the martial title, and any infidel who does not have a treaty with the Islamic government deserves to absolutely be killed; whether he is at war with Muslims or not. But others have not considered this definition sufficient and required other criteria. In order to reach a comprehensive definition of martial infidel and identify its criteria and instances in the present era, the descriptive-analytical method and library and documentary information collection tools is used, and after re-reading the opinions of jurists about the originality of having war or coexistence from the perspective of scripture, tradition, and critique of the originality of war, as well as expressing the types of infidels, the prevailing view of the jurists regarding the martial has been criticized, and as a result, with the interpretation of the martial infidel, most infidels have been excluded from it.

Among the most important conditions of intuition regarding the evidence of litigation is maturity; what is used in the first place is the inaccuracy of the testimony of discriminating child, which can be deduced from the first principle and the abrogation of verses and some traditions. However, there are traditions that, despite the distinction in the case, have a strong emergence in the principle of accepting the testimony of discriminating child. Moreover, some prominent jurists have accepted the testimony of discriminating child in surgery and retribution as evidence, which of course can be criticized. He has been informed and has not absolutely accepted the testimony of discriminating child in Articles 177 and 179 of the Islamic Penal Code. This difference in analysis necessitates the analysis of the problem. Hence, what appears to be a set of arguments is that, in terms of the subject matter of the case, murder is a matter about which the child has the authority to testify. But from the point of view of the issue, not every murder can accept the testimony of the children, but in a murder in which at least four conditions are integrated, the testimony of the children can be accepted as one of the proofs of the lawsuit: (1) the murder that took place between them, (2) the lack of separation of the children after the murder.(3) the existence of a Reason for diagnosis (i. e. reaching the age of ten) and (4) the testimony of a child proves the murder of an error that is only the responsibility of the wise man. Such views have been taken by well-known Sunni jurists, including in the Maliki and Hanbali religions, as evidenced by the tradition of Sakuni, which is also mentioned in our sources. Therefore, it is suggested that the selected view be adopted as a common view in accordance with the principles and documents of the sects, so that in this challenging field, we can reach a common point so that the field of legal reform can be provided in this context.

Making statues, has a long and dark history. At the time of the Islamic revelations, due to the dominating atmosphere, idols and idolatry were forbidden. However, this sanction changed as Islam became more powerful in the course of time and environment. Therefore, the Shiite and Sunni jurisprudents have different views on this issue. They both consider making statue from a living organism as prohibited. The present study attempts to answer whether the prohibition of making statues belongs to the early jurisprudents. What is the role of time and place according to the jurists? The study wants also to probe whether the present Sunni and Shiite jurists also believe in the prohibition of making statues. The study of the historical development shows that at each stage and time, there have been different views on the prohibition of making statues and the religious scholars have had their views accordingly, and this is still a controversial issue.